Opinion
Case No. 94-2202-JWL
August 16, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff objects to and seeks review (Doc. 711) of the magistrate judge's July 2, 2002, memorandum and order imposing monetary sanctions against plaintiff's counsel in the amount of $3,960 for attorney fees. Plaintiff argues that R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company ("Reynolds") did not submit sufficiently detailed time records to allow the magistrate judge to make a reasoned decision and that the amount awarded is clearly excessive. Reynolds points to the deference owed to a magistrate judge and argues that the time records it submitted were sufficient and that the magistrate judge's decision was reasonable.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) provides that a party may object to a ruling by a magistrate judge on a non-dispositive matter. "The district judge to whom the case is assigned shall consider such objections and shall modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate judge's order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 562, 566 (10th Cir. 1997). The clearly erroneous standard "requires that the reviewing court affirm unless it `on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Industries, 847 F.2d at 1464 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
In an order dated November 1, 2001, Magistrate Judge O'Hara denied defendant's motion to strike supplemental disclosures made by plaintiff's expert witnesses but held that plaintiff counsel's failure to comply with the court's scheduling order and June 14, 2001, order, addressing supplemental disclosures by expert witnesses, justified sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(f) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1). The magistrate judge ordered plaintiff's counsel to pay attorney fees for preparing the motion to strike and for taking a brief supplemental deposition of plaintiff's experts. Plaintiff's counsel sought review by this court and the court held that the magistrate judge's decision to sanction plaintiff's counsel was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law (Doc. 627).
Following this court's ruling, defendants submitted a request to the magistrate judge for attorney fees for preparing the motion to strike in the amount of $17,255, based on 50.75 hours at $340 per hour. In his July 2, 2002, order, the magistrate judge reviewed defendant's submission and concluded that it was excessive and that an award in the amount of $3,960 was appropriate. Plaintiff's counsel now asks this court to reverse the magistrate judge's decision and impose an even lower award. The court declines to do so because the court finds the magistrate judge's decision reasonable and is not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
Plaintiff's counsel bases its motion for reconsideration on the fact that Reynolds did not submit detailed time records and that an award of $3,900 for preparing a motion to strike is clearly excessive. The court disagrees with both arguments. The magistrate judge explained that "the substantial reduction from defendant's actual hours expended is largely attributable to defense counsel's lack of detail in billing entries." Because Reynolds submitted billing records that lacked detail, the court reasoned that, in its experience, 20 hours of billable time to prepare the motion, memorandum in support and reply was reasonable. It is precisely because Reynolds did not submit sufficiently detailed billing records that the court disregarded the 50 billable hours actually expended by defense counsel. The court concludes that the lack of detail in Reynolds' submissions to the court benefited plaintiff's counsel and is not a basis to overturn the magistrate's decision. See, e.g., Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 158 F.3d 1074, 1082 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding district court's general reduction of time where time records were inadequate because the court gave sufficient reasons for the reduction); Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1203 (10th Cir. 1986) ("A general reduction of hours claimed in order to achieve what the court determines to be a reasonable number is not an erroneous method, so long as there is sufficient reason for its use. . . . As anyone who has been in private practice well knows, for billing purposes such adjustments can take many forms, including a general write-down of total hours logged. In sum, the district court did not err by refusing to isolate and analyze every hour assigned to different tasks by Mr. Lopez and then prescribe task hours which were acceptable."); Smart SMR of New York, Inc. v. Zoning Commission of the Town of Stratford, 9 F. Supp.2d 143, 150-01 (D.Conn. 1998) (explaining that the submission regarding billable hours was vague and the hours appeared excessive and, based on the court's experience, concluding that the hours reasonably expended were one-half of the hours actually expended). The court finds the magistrate judge's estimation of the reasonable hours expended to prepare the papers consistent with the court's experience. The court is not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed in estimating the number of hours reasonably expended on the motion. On this basis, plaintiff's motion for review of the magistrate's judge's order (Doc. 711) is denied.
The court agrees with Reynolds that plaintiff's counsel disputes only the magistrate judge's calculation of the number of hours reasonably expended, not the reasonableness of the rate applied by the magistrate judge.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's objections to and motion for (Doc. 711) review of the magistrate judge's July 2, 2002, order is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.