Although we apply the substantive law of Delaware because Retail Relief was incorporated there, procedural issues such as how this court interprets statutes are governed by Connecticut law. Burton v. Burton, 189 Conn. 129, 139 n. 8, 454 A.2d 1282 (1983). Thus, we employ § 1-2z to establish a method of interpreting § 18-303 of the Delaware Code Annotated.

See Jewett v. Jewett, 265 Conn. 669, 694, 830 A.2d 193 (2003) (trial court properly awarded attorney's fees to plaintiff where defendant's failure to comply with discovery caused plaintiff to incur substantial legal fees and plaintiff was awarded primarily nonliquid assets); Bee v. Bee, 79 Conn. App. 783, 791-92, 831 A.2d 833 (trial court properly awarded attorney's fees to plaintiff where defendant dissipated plaintiffs substantial liquid assets and failure to award fees would have undermined orders seeking to achieve equal distribution of marital property), cert. denied, 266 Conn. 932, 837 A.2d 805 (2003). In fact, we have recognized in these circumstances that "the length of the proceedings and the time expended by counsel" are relevant considerations when determining the amount of such an award; Burton v. Burton, 189 Conn. 129, 142-43 n. 16, 454 A.2d 1282 (1983); as are "the nature, complexity and scope of the litigation. . . .

In this case, the award of fees is not an abuse of the trial court's discretion because the amount of that award is both: (1) supported by objective evidence in the record, including the fee affidavits of the plaintiff's counsel; and (2) does not exceed the amount necessary to avoid undermining the other financial orders in the case. See Burton v. Burton, 189 Conn. 129, 142 n.16, 454 A.2d 1282 (1983) (rejecting defendant's argument that trial court's review of proceedings characterized award as "effectively punishing the defendant for presenting a 'vigorous defense'" because "the length of the proceedings and the time expended by counsel are relevant when the amount of the award is set"). Accordingly, we reject the defendant's contention that the attorney's fee award was improperly punitive or "akin to double jeopardy" because the court already had sanctioned him in April, 2002, for failure to keep all of his financial records.

We ordinarily do not address issues that have not been properly raised before the trial court. Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 219-20, 682 A.2d 106 (1996) (court "not required to consider any claim that was not properly preserved in the trial court"); Yale University v. Blumenthal, 225 Conn. 32, 36 n. 4, 621 A.2d 1304 (1993) (Supreme Court declined to address issues briefed on appeal but not raised at trial); Burton v. Burton, 189 Conn. 129, 133 n. 3, 454 A.2d 1282 (1983); see also Practice Book § 4185, now Practice Book (1998 Rev.) § 60-5. Furthermore, in order to preserve a claim for appeal, an exception to a jury charge must "state distinctly the matter objected to and ground of the objection."

We do not entertain questions of law that were not raised at trial unless there is a demonstration of exceptional circumstances. Practice Book 4185; Hartford National Bank Trust Co. v. Tucker, 195 Conn. 218, 219-20 n. 1, 487 A.2d 528, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 845, 106 S.Ct. 135, 88 L.Ed.2d 111 (1985); Rokus v. Bridgeport, 191 Conn. 62, 67, 463 A.2d 252 (1983); Burton v. Burton, 189 Conn. 129, 133 n. 3, 454 A.2d 1282 (1983). There being no evidence of exceptional circumstances in this case, we refuse to consider the plaintiffs' constitutional claims.

We begin our analysis by stating that our decision in Koizim is part of the law of the state of Connecticut. Furthermore, even though under our commonlaw system new decisions may shed light on earlier cases due to the unique circumstances presented in each case, none of our decisions interpreting Koizim has overruled or changed our holding therein. See, e.g., Burton v. Burton, 189 Conn. 129, 142 n. 15, 454 A.2d 1282 (1983); Weiman v. Weiman, 188 Conn. 232, 236-37, 449 A.2d 151 (1982); Salvio v. Salvio, 186 Conn. 311, 328, 441 A.2d 190 (1982); Venuti v. Venuti, 185 Conn. 156, 163, 440 A.2d 878 (1981); Kaplan v. Kaplan, 185 Conn. 42, 45, 440 A.2d 252 (1981); Arrigoni v. Arrigoni, 184 Conn. 513, 519-20, 440 A.2d 206 (1981); Fattibene v. Fattibene, 183 Conn. 433, 443-44, 441 A.2d 3 (1981). Therefore, the trial court was correct in stating that its decision regarding attorney's fees was "governed" by the principles set forth in Koizim.

We note, however, that although we apply the substantive law of Massachusetts to decide these claims, the appropriate standard of review is a procedural issue and is governed by Connecticut law. See State v. Diaz, 226 Conn. 514, 557, 628 A.2d 567 (1993), ( Berdon, J., dissenting), citing Clisham v. Board of Police Commissioners, 223 Conn. 354, 370, 613 A.2d 254 (1992); Burton v. Burton, 189 Conn. 129, 139 n. 8, 454 A.2d 1282 (1983). "Although ordinarily the question of contract interpretation, being a question of the parties' intent, is a question of fact . . . [w]here there is definitive contract language, the determination of what the parties intended by their contractual commitments is a question of law."

Any such error "was favorable to the defendant and is therefore not a justifiable basis of complaint by him." Burton v. Burton, 189 Conn. 129, 137, 454 A.2d 1282 (1983); see State v. Hawthorne, 175 Conn. 569, 574, 402 A.2d 759 (1978). We conclude that the defendant has failed to satisfy his burden of showing that the trial court's charge defining "building" was probably harmful to him.

General Statutes 46b-62." Burton v. Burton, 189 Conn. 129, 141-42, 454 A.2d 1282 (1983). Because the trial court did not articulate the basis for its awards, we again note the failure of the plaintiff to request such an articulation.

"[E]very reasonable presumption will be given in favor of the trial court's ruling, and `[n]othing short of a conviction that the action of the trial court is one which discloses a clear abuse of discretion can warrant our interference.'" Burton v. Burton, 189 Conn. 129, 138, 454 A.2d 1282 (1983), quoting Trunik v. Trunik, 179 Conn. 287, 290, 426 A.2d 274 (1979). In a marital dissolution proceeding, the court may base financial awards on earning capacity rather than actual earned income of the parties.