Under this reasoning, the privilege has been extended to situations other than those involving strictly judicial proceedings. ( Thorp v. Adams, 58 Hun. 603 [11 N.Y.S. 479] [appearance before legislative commission]; Matthews v. Tufts, 87 N.Y. 568 [62 How. Prac. 508] [hearing before referee in bankruptcy]; Burroughs v. Cocke Willis, 56 Okla. 627 [ 156 P. 196, L.R.A. 1916E 1170] [taking of deposition]; Filer v. McCornick, 260 F. 309 [bank president attending meeting necessary to the war effort in time of emergency].) [4] Disciplinary proceedings are a function of the Supreme Court and, although the board of governors of The State Bar and its local committees technically are not judicial tribunals, their findings are considered to be those of an intermediate agency.

Section 285, O. S. 1931. A similar immunity is accorded suitors by judicial recognition. Thomas et al. v. Blackwell, 172 Okla. 487, 46 P.2d 509. Such privilege or immunity is available to plaintiffs as well as defendants. Burroughs v. Cocke Willis., 56 Okla. 627. 156 P. 196, L. R. A. 1916E, 1170. It applies to nonresidents of a county who are residents of the state as well as nonresidents of the state. The privilege is not without its limitations and exceptions (Thomas et al. v. Blackwell, supra), and thus may be denied a nonresident of the state who while prosecuting litigation in this jurisdiction is sued upon a transaction in connection with such litigation upon which the remedies available in the nonresidents' domicile would not be adequate.

Under this reasoning, the privilege has been extended to situations other than those involving strictly judicial proceedings. ( Thorp v. Adams, 58 Hun. 603 [11 N.Y.S. 479] [appearance before legislative commission]; Matthews v. Tufts, 87 N.Y. 568 [62 How. Prac. 508] [hearing before referee in bankruptcy]; Burroughs v. Cooke Willis, 56 Okla. 627 [ 156 P. 196, L.R.A. 1916E 1170] [taking of deposition]; Filer v. McCornick, 260 F. 309 [bank president attending meeting necessary to the war effort in time of emergency].)"

( Hammons v. Superior Court, 63 Cal.App. 700, 708 [ 219 P. 1037]; cf. Murrey v. Murrey, 216 Cal. 707, 710 [ 16 P.2d 741, 85 A.L.R. 1335]; Fox v. Hale Norcross S.M. Co., 108 Cal. 369, 424 [41 P. 308]; Van Kesler v. Superior Court, 109 Cal.App. 89, 90 [ 292 P. 544].) If, therefore, the controlling purpose of the presence within the jurisdiction is that of attending the trial, other subordinate activities will not destroy the immunity. The principle is stated in Hammons v. Superior Court, 63 Cal.App. 700, 708 [ 219 P. 1037], thus: "Bearing upon the contention that any immunity which Hammons may have had was lost because he attended to some other business while here, we find in Burroughs v. Cocke, supra, [56 Okl. 627 ( 156 P. 196, L.R.A. 1916E 1170)] the following: `However, it appears to us that the more reasonable rule and proper test in such cases should be that if the main and controlling reason that occasioned the party's being in the jurisdiction of the court was to attend upon court business, then, merely because he elected to transact other business not connected with the court, that he should not thereby forfeit his immunity; but if it should be determined that his claim of being within the jurisdiction for the purpose of attending upon court business was not bona fide, but was being used by him as a mere subterfuge, and that he was in fact there to transact other business not connected with the trial, and but for the desire to transact said other business he would not have come within the jurisdiction of the court, then he is not entitled to immunity. It thus becomes a question of fact, and each particular case must be decided on its own merits.

On those facts we held that he was not privileged or protected from service of summons in an action brought against him in this state. Many of the leading authorities upon this question are cited in Burroughs v. Cocke, 56 Okl. 627 [L. R. A. 1916E, 1170, 156 P. 196], and in the decision written by Judge Van Fleet in Filer v. McCornick, 260 Fed. 309. It appears that the great weight of authority is in favor of the immunity here claimed. The supreme court of Oklahoma in the cited case pointed out that the right is derived from the common law, and in a few states has been extended by statute law.

[1] The authorities of other jurisdictions involving the question as to what extent a nonresident party to an action attending the trial of the case is exempt from service of process issued in another action therein brought are by no means uniform. Many of them relate to the question of immunity granted witnesses from arrest while attending as such upon the trial of cases, the rights of whom, however, in this state are fixed by section 2067 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As to the rights of parties to actions, where they are nonresidents of the state wherein the trial is had, one line of argument is illustrated by Burroughs v. Cocke Willis, 56 Okl. 627, [L. R. A. 1916E, 1170, 156 P. 196], and Cooper v. Wyman, 122 N.C. 784, [65 Am. St. Rep. 731, 29 S.E. 947], upholding the privilege of immunity to parties, while other cases, such as Guynn v. McDaneld, 4 Idaho, 610, [95 Am. St. Rep. 158, 43 P. 74], Baldwin v. Emerson, 16 R.I. 305, [27 Am. St. Rep. 741, 15 A. 83], Baisley v. Baisley, 113 Mo. 544, [35 Am. St. Rep. 726, 21 S.W. 29], and Bishop v. Vose, 27 Conn. 1, may be cited in support of a contrary view. The reason for granting immunity to suitors is varied.

See, e.g., Reed v. Browning, 130 Ind. 575, 577, 30 N.E. 704, 705 (1892); Nathanson v. Spitz, 19 R.I. 70, 72, 31 A. 690, 691 (1895); McLeod v. Connecticut Passumpsic River R. Co., 58 Vt. 727, 733-734, 6 A. 648, 649, 650 (1886); New Orleans J. G. N. R. Co. v. Wallace, 50 Miss. 244, 248-249 (1874); Wagner v. Hallack, 3 Colo. 176, 182-183 (1877); Downer v. Shaw, 22 N. H. 277, 281 (1851); Moore v. Smith, 41 Ky. 340, 341 (1842); Adair County Bank v. Forrey, 74 Neb. 811, 815, 105 N.W. 714, 715-716 (1905). Most States, moreover, had statutes or common-law rules that exempted from service of process individuals who were brought into the forum by force or fraud, see, e.g., Wanzer v. Bright, 52 Ill. 35 (1869), or who were there as a party or witness in unrelated judicial proceedings, see, e.g., Burroughs v. Cocke Willis, 56 Okla. 627, 156 P. 196 (1916); Malloy v. Brewer, 7 S.D. 587, 64 N.W. 1120 (1895). These exceptions obviously rested upon the premise that service of process conferred jurisdiction.

The doctrine relied on is one of substantial right, is founded on principles of justice and propriety, and is not beset by any such restricted limitation. Burroughs v. Cocke et al. (Okl.) 156 P. 196, L.R.A. 1916E, 1170; Roschynialski v. Hale (D.C.) 201 F. 1017. It would be sacrificing substance to form, and giving an untoward and incidental thing a controlling effect, which its character does not warrant. The attendance of Stevenson at the interview was a mere casual and unforeseen incident arising during his necessary detention on the trial, was not contemplated in the purpose bringing him to the state, and can in no proper sense be regarded as the engaging by him in 'business' outside the original object of his visit.

Stewart v. Ramsay, 1916, 242 U.S. 128, 37 S.Ct. 44, 61 L.Ed. 192; Harris Foundation v. District Court, 1945, 196 Okla. 222, 163 P.2d 976, 162 A.L.R. 272. Cf. Burroughs v. Cocke Willis, 1916, 56 Okla. 627, 156 P. 196, L.R.A. 1916E, 1170. Union Water Development Co. v. Stevenson, D.C.N.D.Cal. 1919, 256 F. 981; Lonsdale Grain Co. v. Neil, 1918, 73 Okla. 221, 175 P. 823; accord, Commonwealth Cotton Oil Co. v. Hudson, 1916, 62 Okla. 23, 161 P. 535.

The cases and the circumstances are as follows: Bearman v. Hunt, 68 Okla. 96, 171 P. 1124, (nonresident witness or suitor attending court trial); Ada Dairy Products Co. v. Superior Court, Seminole County, Okla., 258 P.2d 939, (nonresident attorney representing person at trial); Bingham v. Bingham, Okla., 366 P.2d 396, (nonresident witness (father) attending hearing in Children's Court); Santee v. Simon, Okla., 384 P.2d 36, (nonresident officer and attorney of a corporation attending a pre-trial hearing as witnesses); Stumpf v. Pederson, 176 Okla. 136, 54 P.2d 1035, (nonresident witness under subpoena, attending tax commission hearing); Richardson v. Smith, Okla., 394 P.2d 480, (nonresident member of Petroleum Gas Board attending hearing before Petroleum Gas Administrator, at latter's request). In addition to the above cases the respondent also relies to a great extent upon Burroughs v. Cocke Willis, 56 Okla. 627, 156 P. 196. In that case we said that this privilege of immunity from service extended not only to those who attended upon the trial, "but also those who attend as witnesses or suitors in the taking of depositions."