Opinion
No. 01 Civ. 1929 (BSJ).
March 1, 2005
Memorandum and Order
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. ("Chase"), the defendant in the instant employment discrimination action, brings this motion for summary judgment. The Plaintiff, Nancy Burroughs ("Burroughs"), alleges that she was harassed and discriminated against based on her religion and her age.
JPMorgan Chase Bank is the successor in interest to Defendant Chase.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,et seq. An earlier order by this Court dismissed Burroughs' retaliation claims. (February 24, 2004 Order.) Defendant now moves for summary judgment on the remaining disparate treatment and harassment claims. As set forth below, this motion is granted as to Plaintiff's age discrimination claim and denied as to her claim of religious discrimination.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are either undisputed or as alleged by Plaintiff. Plaintiff was born on June 16, 1950. She is a licensed ordained minister and the founder and pastor of the Full True Gospel Tabernacle.On April 23, 1998, Plaintiff was hired by Chase as a Financial Services Representative. Plaintiff began working at a Chase location in Mohegan Lake in the summer of 1998. Plaintiff's supervisor at Mohegan Lake was Ericka Messia. Plaintiff claims that Messia harassed her and subjected her to discriminatory treatment. Plaintiff claims that Messia did not provide her with the same training that was provided to her co-workers. Plaintiff maintains that this treatment was based — at least in part — on her age and religion. Messia is alleged to have told Plaintiff that she reminded her of her mother, that her mother went to church like Plaintiff did, and that her mother was a hypocrite and Plaintiff was a hypocrite, too.
Plaintiff alleges that her employment was terminated due to her age and religion. The bank informed her that she was being discharged because she lent a homeless man $10, which constituted a violation of bank policy. Plaintiff claims that she was told her professed religious beliefs caused a conflict of interest with bank policy, yet she was not aware of any such policy until after the incident.
Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff cannot establish, as a matter of law, that she was subjected to any disparate treatment or harassment based upon her age or religion and (2) Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that Chase's non-discriminatory reason for her termination was a pretext for discrimination.
DISCUSSION
Summary Judgment Standard
A court may grant summary judgment only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c).
Once the moving party has met its burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to present "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e); see also Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. TN PLC, 905 F. Supp. 107, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Mere conclusory allegations will not suffice. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). If there is any disagreement about a material issue of fact, summary judgment is inappropriate.
Summary judgment in employment discrimination claims is granted with great caution. Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 1999); Ferrell v. Leake Watts Services, Inc., 2002 WL 31856816, *3 (S.D.N.Y.). However, that caution does not strip the summary judgment remedy of its function. To survive a motion for summary judgment in a discrimination case, the plaintiff must present at least some credible evidence that the defendants' actions were motivated by animus or ill-will related to the protected characteristic in question. Grillo v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 291 F.3d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2002).
I. Age Discrimination Claim
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, Plaintiff must show (1) that she was a member of a protected group; (2) that she was qualified for the position, action, or benefit in question; (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action; (4) under circumstances evincing discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Ferrell at *4.
Defendant disputes only the fourth prong of the standard, arguing that Burroughs cannot show she was terminated under circumstances that give rise to an inference of age discrimination. The Court notes that Plaintiff's burden at this stage is minimal. Zimmerman v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 376, 381 (2d Cir. 2001). However, Burroughs cannot meet even that burden. The only proof she offers on her claim of age discrimination is one remark made by Messia in 1998 that Plaintiff reminded Messia of her mother. (Dep. Tr. at 69.) Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law asserts: "Plaintiff has testified that Messia referred to Plaintiff's age throughout their relationship," (Opp'n Mot. at 5) but neither her deposition nor her pleadings specify what those remarks were or when they occurred. When pressed for details during her deposition, Burroughs said, "This termination is age related because of the way the person feels about you." (Dep. Tr. at 334.)
One comment that someone reminds her of her mother is insufficient to establish a prima facie claim of age discrimination. See Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 468 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he stray remarks of a decision-maker, without more, cannot prove a claim of employment discrimination.") Burroughs was terminated more than two years after the remark. Plaintiff cites no other specific instances of age-related comments. On this basis, Burroughs has failed to meet even the minimal burden of establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination.
II. Religious Discrimination Claim
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on account of an employee's religion with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . ." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)2(2).
To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination under Title VII, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that she (1) was a member of the protected class; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) was discharged; and (4) the discharge occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Rosen v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 528, 532 (2d Cir. 1991); Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 995 (2d Cir. 1985).
The basis for Burroughs' religious discrimination claim is barely articulated in her complaint or her memorandum in opposition to this motion. In the latter document she asserts, without more, that "[She] is an ordained Christian minister, and is very religious. Defendant knew of this fact and complacently allowed Messia to harass her because of it." (Opp'n Mot. at 8.) Plaintiff's harassment claim is discussed below, but the paltry support for her discrimination claim is notable by its absence. However, the sole possible ground for a valid claim of religious discrimination is referenced in Plaintiff's attorney's affirmation. (Affirmation in Opp'n at 5.)
Under the heading "Other Discrimination Actions by Defendant," the Affirmation notes Plaintiff's deposition testimony that the bank told her she was being terminated because her religious beliefs and her status as a clergy-person were "a conflict of interest" with the bank. (Dep. Tr. at 87, 98, 103, 106, 330, 335, 439.)
Under the burden-shifting rubric used in Title VII cases, the burden is initially on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie claim of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas at 802. After that the burden shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse job action. Id. The burden then returns to the plaintiff to show that the reason given was in fact a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804.
Burroughs pleadings, though sparse, do make out a prima facie case for religious discrimination. The defendant does not contest the first three elements of the prima facie standard: that Burroughs is a member of a protected class, that she was qualified for her position, and that she was discharged. On the fourth element, Plaintiff asserts that at her dismissal, the bank told her that her religious values created a conflict of interest with the bank. Although the Plaintiff does not advance this argument herself, whether these statements were made is a question of fact that is material to Plaintiff's religious discrimination claim. If the bank in fact told Burroughs directly that her religious beliefs necessitated her termination, that could support a prima facie claim of religious discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) ("The term `religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief . . .")
If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant, who must articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas at 802. The bank said it fired Burroughs for loaning her own money to a bank customer, in violation of bank policy. (Defendant's Rule 56.1 Stat. ¶ 54.) Burroughs concedes that while off-duty in the Pathmark grocery store in which the Chase branch was located, she gave $10 of her own money to a homeless man. (Dep. Tr. at 93.) The man returned the money to her while she was on duty at the teller window, and she placed it in her cash drawer. (Id. at 85.) Although the extra $10 — found in the vault during an audit — allegedly caused Plaintiff's drawer to be out of proof, the bank did not say it fired Plaintiff because her drawer did not reconcile. Rather, the bank claimed that Burroughs was fired "when she was found to have violated Bank policy by personally lending money to a Bank customer." (Defendant's Rule 56.1 Stat. ¶ 54.)
The bank's articulated reason does not pass muster as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for dismissal. In fact, it creates more questions of material fact than it resolves. The policy submitted to the Court says nothing about personally lending money to a Bank customer. Rather, it reads:
Conflicts of Interest. Even the appearance of a conflict between personal gain and the interest of Chase erodes the trust and confidence upon which our reputation rests.
The primary principle underlying Chase's policy for avoiding conflicts of interest is that employees must never permit their personal interests to conflict or appear to conflict with the interests of Chase. You must disclose to the Office of the Secretary all potential conflicts of interest, including those in which you may have been inadvertently placed due to either business or personal relationship with customers, suppliers, competitors, or other employees.
You may not engage in self-dealing or otherwise trade upon your position with Chase or accept from one seeking to do business with Chase a personal, business or other opportunity not available to other persons or made available to you because of your position with Chase.
(Messia Aff., Exh. B. Emphasis original.) This policy is the sole reason offered by the bank to explain Plaintiff's firing. The bank does not respond to her assertion that Kathleen Kirrane from the human resources department told her she was being terminated because her religious beliefs created "a conflict of interest" with the bank. (Dep. Tr. at 87, 98, 103, 106, 330, 335, 439.) The meaning of the policy, in the context of the facts of this case, is too unclear as it applies to Plaintiff to make summary judgment appropriate.
The bank also submits a page of its handbook, which notes, "Any difference found in a fine count after tellers have indicated that they are in proof may result in a recommendation for dismissal. These situations should be reviewed with the Human Resources representative." (Messia Aff., Exh. A.) Although the Defendant describes an episode in which Plaintiff's tray did not reconcile, Defendant's Rule 56.1 Stat. ¶ 45-48, the reason Defendant offers for Plaintiff's firing was that she lent money to a bank customer, not that her tray did not reconcile.
As noted above, courts are particularly careful in granting summary judgment for defendants in employment discrimination cases. Belfi, 191 F.3d at 135 ("We have emphasized that the trial court must be especially cautious in deciding whether to grant this drastic provisional remedy in a discrimination case, because the employer's intent is often at issue and careful scrutiny may reveal circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of discrimination.")
Thus, the Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Plaintiff can make a prima facie showing of discrimination, and whether the bank's proffered reasons for her termination were false or pretextual. Given the existence of a significant factual question, summary judgment on Plaintiff's religious discrimination claim is inappropriate.
III. Hostile work environment claim
Plaintiff claims that she was subject to harassment due to her age and religion. To make out a hostile work environment claim under Title VII or the ADEA, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she suffered unwelcome harassment; (3) she was harassed because of her membership in a protected class and (4) the harassment was sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive work environment. Meritor Sav. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Henkin v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 2003 WL 749236, *8 (S.D.N.Y.).
Plaintiff's lengthy deposition suggests that her relationship with Messia, a supervisor, was an unhappy one. However, Plaintiff has not met her burden of showing that the allegedly hostile behavior was discriminatory in origin. As noted above, Plaintiff merely repeats her assertion that her age was the reason Messia didn't like her. Plaintiff's unsupported recollections are not enough to avert summary judgment. Meiri, 759 F.2d at 998 ("To allow a party to defeat a motion for summary judgment by offering purely conclusory allegations of discrimination, absent any concrete particulars, would necessitate a trial in all Title VII cases.") Thus, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted on the hostile work environment claim.
CONCLUSION
Summary judgment for Defendant is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's age discrimination and hostile work environment claims, and DENIED as to Plaintiff's religious discrimination claim.
Trial will commence on Monday, June 13, 2005 at 10 a.m. The final pre-trial conference will take place on Monday, June 6, 2005 at 9:30 a.m. The parties are ordered to submit a joint pre-trial order on or before Tuesday, May 31, 2005. The parties' proposed voir dire, jury instructions, verdict sheet and motions in limine are due on or before Monday, May 23, 2005.
SO ORDERED: