Opinion
No. 98-1030.
Opinion filed July 21, 1999.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Richard D. Eade, Judge; L.T. Case No. 96-6595 CF10A.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Steven H. Malone, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Joseph A. Tringali, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Appellant was convicted of aggravated battery and assault, and appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly permitted the state to strike a juror because she was confused. We reverse.
The juror in question was Ms. Carlisle. The following occurred during voir dire when defense counsel was addressing prospective jurors as a group:
[Defense counsel]: So we're clear about what we're talking about, if you think he's guilty and Ms. Carlisle there thinks he's innocent and the two of you talk back and forth, you both are entitled to your own opinion. If you can't decide, that's what we call a hung jury. That's not what I'm talking about here. Let's say everybody agrees as to what the facts are, but you don't know what happened.
Ms. Drager [venireperson]: The state still hasn't proven their case.
[Defense counsel]: Ms. Carlisle, if you don't know what happened, is that guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?
Ms. Carlisle: Yeah. I guess. I don't know.
The above answer was the entire basis of the court later allowing the state to strike this juror. Prior to that, the state challenged her for cause based on the same answer stating:
[Prosecutor]: I hate to say this, I'm going to move to strike her for cause. I don't think she understands what's happening. She didn't clearly understand Mr. Bober's (defense counsel's) question, let's assume there is no evidence, what would your verdict have to be? She said guilty. I would like to hear from Bernie [defense counsel] on this. I get the feeling she doesn't know what's going on.
The Court: I had some concerns about her. I mean, it's like writing on a blank slate with her. Let me hear the defense's position on her.
[Defense counsel]: After I re-explained it to her. I can't say that she's necessarily the most brightest or most articulate person on the jury panel. I did feel that once I re-explained that issue that she did adequately satisfy me. I don't think there is a reason to strike her for cause.
The court denied the challenge for cause, but the state then exercised a peremptory challenge, resulting in the following colloquy:
The Court: That I'll grant. You have the burden of proof. You have to be assured that people understand what you're saying. You're striking her as a peremptory?
[Prosecutor]: Yes.
[Defense counsel]: I would object based on the fact she's the only black person on the jury panel.
The Court: We still have some bodies in the audience. We'll probably reach them the way we're going with this panel.
[Prosecutor]: First of all, I don't think it's showing a pattern. I have a race neutral reason and that's the law. I believe based on the race neutral reason I gave at first that she should be stricken for cause. The court does not agree.
The Court: I don't care what color she is you would have to persuade her that the accused is guilty. She had a blank look. And there was difficulty in making her understand some of the basic arguments that were advanced by our lawyers. It's a race neutral reason and I sustain the State's peremptory.
In Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688, 690 (Fla. 1993), the trial court, on its own, excused a juror on the basis of her "I.Q.," after her answers to questions regarding the death penalty showed some confusion. The defendant objected to the court's action, and also pointed out that she was the only black person on the jury at that time. In reversing for a new trial, our supreme court explained:
With regard to the trial judge's excusal of jurors during voir dire based on their IQ, we find clear error. There is no legal basis for excusing a juror based on the trial judge's arbitrary evaluation of the juror's IQ. The fact that the juror was confused is no basis for excusing her in this manner.
Similarly in Williams v. State, 574 So.2d 136 (Fla. 1991), our supreme court held that the trial court had erred in allowing the state to strike a black juror because he could not understand the concept of felony murder.
There is nothing wrong, in general, with a party seeking to remove a juror because the juror lacks the ability to understand the proceedings. In this case, however, the trial court was first asked by the state to excuse Ms. Carlisle for cause based on her answer. The trial court correctly denied the request, because the question posed to Ms. Carlisle was no model of clarity, and she was being challenged, so far as this record shows, solely because of her answer to that one question. If the state had been genuinely interested in her ability to understand the proceedings, we would have thought the state would have further explored the subject with her. State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1988).
When minority jurors are improperly removed it affects more than the defendant's right to a fair trial. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) was not only about the rights of the parties. It was also about a person's constitutional right to serve on a jury without being discriminated against. Slappy, 522 So.2d at 20. Peremptory challenges to minority jurors based on vague reasons such as this one will be viewed by this court with skepticism, where the record does not clearly support them. See Brown v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1363 (Fla. 4th DCA June 9, 1999).
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his drug use, because it showed other crimes. We disagree. The evidence was admissible because it was inseparable from the crimes charged and was also relevant to motive.
We reverse for a new trial.
WARNER, C.J., and TAYLOR, J., concur.