Opinion
2012-01-24
In the Matter of Robert BURRIS, appellant, v. Jennifer BURRIS, respondent. (Proceeding No. 1).In the Matter of Jennifer Burris, respondent, v. Robert Burris, appellant. (Proceeding No. 2).
Robert Burris, Highland Hills, N.Y., appellant pro se. Jennifer Burris, Ridgefield, N.J., respondent pro se.
Robert Burris, Highland Hills, N.Y., appellant pro se. Jennifer Burris, Ridgefield, N.J., respondent pro se.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., RANDALL T. ENG, PLUMMER E. LOTT, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.
In two related child support proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, the father appeals from an order of the Family Court, Rockland County (Warren, J.), entered November 5, 2010, which denied his objections to an order of the same court (Miklistsch, S.M.), entered June 21, 2010, granting the mother's motion for an award of an attorney's fee to the extent of directing him to pay an attorney's fee in the principal sum of $47,820.25 and fees in the principal sum of $1,342.10.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Family Court Act § 438(a) provides that in any proceeding under Family Court Act article 4, “the court may allow counsel fees at any stage of the proceeding, to the attorney representing the spouse, former spouse or person on behalf of children” (Family Ct. Act § 438[a] ). “As with an award of an attorney's fee made pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237(b), the court will base its decision primarily upon both parties' ability to pay, the nature and extent of the services required to deal with the support dispute, and the reasonableness of their performance under the circumstances” ( Matter of Nieves–Ford v. Gordon, 47 A.D.3d 936, 937, 850 N.Y.S.2d 588). “The determination of whether to award an attorney's fee is within the sound discretion of the hearing court” ( Matter of Wade v. Smith, 86 A.D.3d 577, 578, 926 N.Y.S.2d 906; see Matter of Dinhofer v. Zabezhanskaya, 79 A.D.3d 1039, 1040, 912 N.Y.S.2d 899; Matter of Sarfaty v. Recine, 57 A.D.3d 552, 552, 867 N.Y.S.2d 704).
Considering all of the circumstances of this case, including that the protracted nature of this dispute and the extent of the services required to deal with it were attributable to the actions and inactions of the father and his former counsel, the attorney's fee awarded to the mother was not an improvident exercise of discretion.
The father's remaining contentions either are without merit or are not properly before this Court, as they were not raised in his objections to the Support Magistrate's order entered June 21, 2010 ( see Matter of Tosques v. Ponyicky, 89 A.D.3d 1097, 933 N.Y.S.2d 579; Matter of Feng Lucy Luo v. Yang, 89 A.D.3d 946, 933 N.Y.S.2d 80; Matter of Hicks v. Hicks, 87 A.D.3d 1143, 1143–1144, 929 N.Y.S.2d 875).