It is clear that the consent to search may be given on actions alone. Burrell v. State, 45 Ala. App. 664, 235 So.2d 913 (1970). In Burrell this Court held that where the defendant volunteered the whereabouts of a gun, there simply was no search and hence no warrant was required.
It is clear that the consent to search may be given on actions alone. Burrell v. State, 45 Ala. App. 664, 235 So.2d 913 (1970). In Burrell this Court held that where the defendant volunteered the whereabouts of a gun, there simply was no search and hence no warrant was required.
Since the appellant had already told Detective Fowler that he had a .45 caliber pistol in his car, we fail to see how the appellant's privacy rights were violated by Fowler's looking in the car and seeing the pistol there. "In Burrell [ v. State, 45 Ala. App. 664, 666, 235 So.2d 913 (1970),] this Court held that where the defendant volunteered the whereabouts of a gun, there simply was no search." Hubbard v. State, 382 So.2d 577, 592 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979), affirmed, 382 So.2d 597 (Ala. 1980), set aside on other grounds, 405 So.2d 695 (Ala. 1981).
This was a general on-the-scene questioning of a citizen under circumstances that warranted investigation and is a well accepted police practice. Ison v. State, 281 Ala. 189, 200 So.2d 511; Burrell v. State, 45 Ala. App. 664, 235 So.2d 913. "An officer in the normal course of his patrol at 4:00 A.M., can stop a driver and ask for some identification under the circumstances depicted in this case.
This was not a search and no search warrant was required. Burrell v. State, 45 Ala. App. 664, 235 So.2d 913 (1970). The appellant testified that he carried the pistol for "protection" and kept it under the mattress in the room where he slept.
This was a general on-the-scene questioning of a citizen under circumstances that warranted investigation and is a well accepted police practice. Ison v. State, 281 Ala. 189, 200 So.2d 511; Burrell v. State, 45 Ala. App. 664, 235 So.2d 913. An officer in the normal course of his patrol at 4:00 A.M., can stop a driver and ask for some identification under the circumstances depicted in this case.
There has not been a "willful suppression of evidence" where the State does not inform defense counsel that the defendant voluntarily gave a fictitious name to police officers who had not taken the individual into custody or arrested the individual where it is not shown that the district attorney even knew of the event, and, in that, the mere giving of a fictitious name does not amount to a "written or oral statement given to law enforcement officers" as that term is used in a motion to produce and as the same term is used in the cases involving "Miranda warning" admissions or confessions. The giving of a fictitious name would simply be a voluntary statement, and where the attending circumstances clearly show the voluntariness of the statement, it is admissible. Ison v. State, 281 Ala. 189, 200 So.2d 511; Burrell v. State, 45 Ala. App. 664, 235 So.2d 913; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; WORDS AND PHRASES, Vol. 20A, p. 400, Vol. 40, p. 56 et seq. TYSON, Judge.