Opinion
A22-1116
03-15-2023
Beverly Nicole Burrell, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-16-18602
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Klaphake, Judge. [*]
ORDER OPINION
Elise L. Larson, Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In 2017, appellant Beverly Nicole Burrell was found guilty of two counts of third-degree murder. The district court sentenced appellant to two consecutive terms of 86 months in prison.
2. Appellant directly appealed her convictions. State v. Burrell, A17-1712, 2018 WL 4391098, at *1 (Minn.App. Sept. 17, 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 15, 2019). We affirmed appellant's convictions on September 17, 2018, and the Minnesota Supreme Court denied review on January 15, 2019. Id. at *1, *3
3. On March 29, 2022, appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief. The postconviction court summarily denied appellant's petition without a hearing. In reaching this decision, the postconviction court determined appellant's postconviction claims were statutorily time-barred, Knaffla-barred, and without merit. Appellant appealed.
Under the Knaffla rule, "once a direct appeal has been taken, all claims raised in the direct appeal and all claims that were known or should have been known but were not raised in the direct appeal are procedurally barred." Colbert v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 625-26 (Minn. 2015) (citing State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976)) (other citation omitted).
4. We review a denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it has "exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings." Rhodes v. State, 875 N.W.2d 779, 786 (Minn. 2016) (quoting Brown v. State, 863 N.W.2d 781, 786 (Minn. 2015)). Because it is dispositive, we focus our analysis on the postconviction court's determination that appellant's petition for postconviction relief is statutorily time-barred.
5. Under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2022), "No petition for postconviction relief may be filed more than two years after the later of: (1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court's disposition of petitioner's direct appeal." If a petitioner files a direct appeal, they may not file a petition for postconviction relief more than two years after their conviction is "final." Moua v. State, 778 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Minn. 2010). As relevant to this case, a petitioner's conviction is "final" 90 days after the Minnesota Supreme Court denies review of our decision on direct appeal. See Toua Hong Chang v. State, 778 N.W.2d 388, 390 (Minn.App. 2010).
6. Here, appellant filed a direct appeal. Burrell, 2018 WL 4391098. We affirmed appellant's convictions, and the supreme court denied review on January 15, 2019. Id. at *1, *3. Appellant's convictions became final 90 days after the supreme court denied review, on April 15, 2019, meaning appellant needed to file her postconviction petition before April 15, 2021, to comply with section 590.01, subdivision 4(a). See Toua Hong Chang, 778 N.W.2d at 390.
7. Appellant filed her postconviction petition on March 29, 2022, nearly a year after the April 15, 2021 deadline. Therefore, appellant's claims are statutorily time-barred unless they meet one of the exceptions in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b) (2022).
8. Appellant argues that the "interests of justice" exception in section 590.01, subdivision 4(b)(5), applies to her claims. We are unpersuaded.
9. The statute provides that "[a]ny petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (b) must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises." Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c) (2022). "'Claim' refers to an event that supports a right to relief under the asserted exception." Yang v. State, 805 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn.App. 2011), rev. granted (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012) and ord. granting rev. vacated (Minn. Aug. 7, 2012). We use an objective "knew or should have known" standard to determine the date a "claim arises." Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 550, 558-60 (Minn. 2012).
10. As the postconviction court noted, appellant's petition only raises claims that arose before or during her 2017 trial. Since appellant's claims arose in or before 2017, the time limit for the interests-of-justice exception expired in 2019. See Hannon v. State, 957 N.W.2d 425, 435-36 (Minn. 2021) (holding the interests-of-justice exception did not apply to postconviction petition because claim arose at trial more than two years prior to filing of the petition). Therefore, the interests-of-justice exception does not apply to appellant's claims.
In her postconviction petition, appellant argued the district court erred when it: (1) convicted her in four district court files because they were all part of a single-behavioral incident; (2) failed to provide instructions on a lesser-included offense in her bench trial; (3) failed to provide an accomplice instruction in her bench trial; and (4) violated her Fourth Amendment rights when it did not suppress evidence stemming from "entrapment."
11. Because appellant did not timely file the postconviction petition and the exceptions in section 590.01, subdivision 4(b), do not apply, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded appellant's petition is statutorily time-barred and summarily denied appellant's petition.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The postconviction court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
[*] Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.