Burrage v. Hunt

2 Citing cases

  1. Hunt v. Burrage

    163 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942)   Cited 2 times

    Relators, Hunt Oil Company, H. L. Hunt, individually and as Trustee of Hunt Production Company, seek a writ of prohibition to restrain Mrs. Annie Burrage et vir. and their attorneys from prosecuting their action filed February 26, 1942, in the 44th District Court of Dallas County, styled Mrs. Annie Burrage et vir. v. H. L. Hunt et al., No. 89814-B on the docket of said court. This relief sought is predicated upon relators' contentions that the issues raised by respondents in the action filed February 26, 1942, were litigated adversely to the latter in a prior suit heard in the Special District Court of Smith County; that the judgment entered in the latter court was affirmed by this Court of Civil Appeals, reported in Burrage et ux. v. Hunt et al., 147 S.W.2d 532; and that application for writ of error to the Supreme Court having been denied, "correct judgment," the judgment so entered has become final. The litigants, respondents and relators, are the same here as in the prior suit, except Hunt Oil Company, a successor in title.

  2. Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Gilliland Refining Co.

    151 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)   Cited 3 times

    See, also, Nichols v. Dibrell, 61 Tex. 539; Hanrick v. Gurley, 93 Tex. 458, 54 S.W. 347, 55 S.W. 119, 56 S.W. 330. So, if the Federal District Court as a necessary element of its judgment, on appellee's cross action, adjudged that the two oil purchasing contracts theretofore entered into between appellant and appellee Gilliland Refining Company had been rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties, then there could be no cause of action now for damages for their breach. We are not unmindful of our holding in Burrage v. Hunt, 147 S.W.2d 532, writ dismissed, wherein we looked to the opinion of the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals to ascertain the issues before the Dallas County District Court and determined by it in Hunt's bill of review. In that case the record before us offered no other method of ascertainment of the basis for the judgment of the District Court of Dallas County.