Opinion
C/A No. 5:17-cv-01295-RMG-KDW
07-28-2017
Isiah Ha'Keem Burns, Plaintiff, v. Officer Dalton; Director Myers; Co-Director Kitchens; Lt. Sligh; Lt. Seaward, and Lt. Friely, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
(partial summary dismissal)
This is a civil action filed pro se by a local detention center detainee. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the district court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e); 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal). I. Factual Background
Plaintiff alleges excessive force against an officer (Defendant Dalton) at Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center ("ASGDC"), which is in Richland County, South Carolina. He asserts that Dalton unreasonably hit him in the face and injured his left arm on August 11, 2015. Plaintiff also names several supervisory officials as Defendants (Myers, Kitchens, Sligh, Seaward, and Friely), but he does not include any allegations against them. Plaintiff seeks $36,000.00 in compensatory damages. II. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Plaintiff's pro se Complaint filed in this case. This review has been conducted pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Kerr v. Marshall Univ. Bd. of Governors, 824 F.3d 62, 72 (4th Cir. 2016). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 630 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). Even under this less stringent standard, the Complaint filed in this case is subject to partial summary dismissal under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). III. Discussion
The Complaint is subject to partial summary dismissal as to Defendants Myers, Kitchens, Sligh, Seaward, and Friely because, following a careful review of the Complaint, there are no allegations of wrongdoing by these Defendants contained in the Complaint. Under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, more specifically 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), this court should dismiss an action filed by a prisoner that is "frivolous" or "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." Because there are no allegations of any wrongdoing by Defendants Myers, Kitchens, Sligh, Seaward, or Friely, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted as to these Defendants. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) ("Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed."); Newkirk v. Circuit Court of City of Hampton, No. 3:14CV372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (complaint subject to summary dismissal where no factual allegations against named defendants within the body of the pleading); see also Krych v. Hvass, 83 F. App'x 854, 855 (8th Cir. 2003); Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1401 n.8 (7th Cir. 1994); Walker v. Hodge, 4 F.3d 991, * 2 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1993); Banks v. Scott, 3:13CV363, 2014 WL 5430987, at *2 (E.D. Va. Oct. 24, 2014). In absence of substantive allegations of wrongdoing against the named Defendants, there is nothing from which this court can liberally construe any type of plausible cause of action arising from the Complaint against them. See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310 (4th Cir. 1996) (statute allowing dismissal of in forma pauperis claims encompasses complaints that are either legally or factually baseless); Weller v. Dep't of Social Servs., 901 F.2d at 389 n.2 (dismissal proper where there were no allegations to support claim).
Furthermore, the fact that Defendants Myers, Kitchens, Sligh, Seaward, and Friely are supervisory personnel at ASGDC does not substitute for the lack of substantive allegations of wrongdoing by them because their positions as supervisors of Defendant Dalton are not, alone, a basis on which to hold them liable to Plaintiff for the alleged wrongdoing of their subordinate. To assert a plausible constitutional-violation claim against any particular public official under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff's allegations must show a causal connection or affirmative link between the conduct of which the plaintiff complains and the official sued. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976) (a § 1983 plaintiff must show that he suffered a specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant, and an affirmative link between the injury and that conduct); Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir.1977) (for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). As a general rule, the doctrine of vicarious liability or respondeat superior is not available to a § 1983 plaintiff as a means to create liability of a state-actor supervisor for the acts or his/her subordinate. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
Plaintiff's claims for damages allegedly arising from the conditions of his confinement within a local detention center in South Carolina are properly considered by this court under its federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is the procedural mechanism through which Congress provided a private civil cause of action based on allegations of federal constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 731-32 (1989). "The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails." Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (citation omitted). No other viable basis for the exercise of this court's subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's allegations is evident from the face of the Complaint.
There is a limited exception to the prohibition against imposing respondeat superior or vicarious liability on supervisory personnel in § 1983 cases, which has been enunciated in cases such as Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 370-75 (4th Cir. 1984). Supervisory officials like Defendants Myers, Kitchens, Sligh, Seaward, and Friely may be held liable in certain circumstances for the constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates so long as the facts alleged satisfy the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' established three-part test for supervisory liability under § 1983: "(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed 'a pervasive and unreasonable risk' of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show 'deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices,'; and (3) that there was an 'affirmative causal link' between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff." Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). In Randall v. Prince George's County, 302 F.3d 188, 206 (4th Cir. 2002), the Fourth Circuit concluded that, "[u]nder the first prong of Shaw, the conduct engaged in by the supervisor's subordinates must be 'pervasive,' meaning that the 'conduct is widespread, or at least has been used on several different occasions.'" Furthermore, in establishing "deliberate indifference" under Shaw's second prong, a plaintiff "[o]rdinarily . . . cannot satisfy his burden of proof by pointing to a single incident or isolated incidents . . . for a supervisor cannot be expected . . . to guard against the deliberate criminal acts of his properly trained employees when he has no basis upon which to anticipate the misconduct." Id. (quoting Slakan, 737 F.2d at 373); see also Green v. Beck, No.12-7279, 2013 WL 4517028, *2 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2013) (alleged failure of supervisory officials to investigate grievances not sufficient to establish liability under § 1983).
The Slaken exception is not adequately pleaded in this case because, as previously noted, the Complaint contains no allegations against Defendants Myers, Kitchens, Sligh, Seaward, or Friely, much less allegations of any personal knowledge (or even subjective knowledge) of the problems that Plaintiff alleges he has been having with Defendant Dalton at ASGDC. Thus, regardless of how pervasive the alleged problems at ASGDC might be, Defendants Myers, Kitchens, Sligh, Seaward, and Friely cannot be found liable for them simply based on their jobs as supervisors at the detention center. IV. Recommendation
Accordingly, it is recommended that the district court partially dismiss the Complaint in this case this action without prejudice as to Defendants Myers, Kitchens, Sligh, Seaward, and Friely. See Brown v. Briscoe, 998 F.2d 201, 202-04 (4th Cir. 1993); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal). The Complaint is being served on Defendant Dalton.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. July 28, 2017
Florence, South Carolina
/s/
Kaymani D. West
United States Magistrate Judge
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached
"Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation."
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).