Opinion
CIVIL 1:17cv100-HSO-JCG
11-08-2017
Connie BURNS, Individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Geneva Woods and on Behalf of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Geneva Woods, Deceased, Plaintiff v. COVENANT HEALTH & REHAB OF PICAYUNE, LLC, Defendant
Joe Sam Owen, Ashley W. Gunn, Owen, Galloway & Myers, PLLC, Gulfport, MS, for Plaintiff. John D. Houston, Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, PA, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant.
Joe Sam Owen, Ashley W. Gunn, Owen, Galloway & Myers, PLLC, Gulfport, MS, for Plaintiff.
John D. Houston, Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, PA, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S [1] COMPLAINT/MOTION TO VACATE ARBITRATION AWARD
HALIL SULEYMAN OZERDEN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff's Complaint/Motion [1] to Vacate Arbitration Award. This Motion is fully briefed. After due consideration of the record and relevant legal authority, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate should be denied, and that her Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
On or about July 17, 2013, Plaintiff Connie Burns' (“Plaintiff” or “Burns”) mother, Geneva Woods (“Woods”), was admitted to Defendant Covenant Health & Rehab of Picayune, LLC's (“Covenant”) nursing home in Picayune, Mississippi. Compl. [1] at 2. At the time of her admission, Woods suffered from various ailments, including malignant melanoma in the right ear. Id. at 3.
According to Plaintiff, on or about June 29, 2014, “while Woods was a resident of Covenant, an inordinate amount of insect larvae were found oozing from the right ear canal onto other areas of Woods' body, ” which Plaintiff witnessed. Id. “Woods died on June 30, 2014, due to cardiopulmonary arrest.” Id. Plaintiff Burns, Individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Geneva Woods and on behalf of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Geneva Woods, Deceased, submitted a demand for arbitration to Covenant through JAMS arbitration service. Plaintiff advanced claims for negligence and bystander liability under Mississippi law. See Demand [1-2] at 1-3; Arbitration Compl. [1-2] at 4-10.
Plaintiff also asserted a wrongful death claim, which she later abandoned during arbitration. See Compl. [1] at 4 n.2.
Plaintiff claimed that Covenant's staff failed to properly monitor Woods' ear wound or to implement necessary and proper wound care to the right ear. Arbitration Compl. [1-2] at 7; see also Compl. [1] at 4. “As a result of these failures, Woods' right ear, and other areas, became infested with insect larvae which resulted in damages for both Woods and Burns.” Arbitration Compl. [1-2] at 7; see also Compl. [1] at 4. Plaintiff designated Sandra Stanton, Ph.D., R.N. (“Stanton”), “as an expert in the field of nursing to give nursing standard of care opinions regarding the nursing care provided to Woods by Covenant, specifically the wound care treatment to the malignant right ear.” Compl. [1] at 4.
On September 22, 2016, Covenant moved for summary judgment in the arbitration case. See Mot. [8-3] at 1-9. Covenant argued that Plaintiff's expert Stanton, “though qualified to render expert opinions as to any alleged deviations in the applicable standard of care as applies to the nursing care provided to Ms. Woods by the nursing staff” of Covenant, was not qualified under Mississippi law “to render expert opinions as to the proximate cause of, or existence of any injuries alleged to have been caused to Ms. Woods.” Id. at 5. The arbitrator held oral argument on the motion on October 18, 2016. See Tr. [8-4] at 1-98.
After considering Covenant's motion, Plaintiff's response, Covenant's reply, and Plaintiff's rebuttal, as well as the transcript of the oral argument, all deposition testimony, the pleadings, and other relevant submissions, the arbitrator granted Covenant's motion for summary judgment. See Order on Mot. for Summ. J. [1-3] at 1-5. The arbitrator found that Plaintiff “did not provide admissible, qualified medical testimony as to the causation of any injury in her personal injury claim.” Id. at 2. Relying upon Vaughn v. Mississippi Baptist Medical Center, 20 So.3d 645, 651 (Miss. 2009), the arbitrator concluded that a nurse cannot testify as to medical causation nor to her diagnostic impressions. Id. at 3. The arbitrator referred to Defendant's designated medical expert, Gregory A. Compton, M.D. (“Dr. Compton”), who opined that the larvae were eating only necrotic tissue, inflicted no pain on Woods, and caused no harm to the wound or the patient. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration on November 28, 2016, see Mot. [8-12] at 1-11, which the arbitrator denied, see Order [8-14] at 1. On January 30, 2017, the arbitrator entered a Final Award [1-4] in Covenant's favor. See Final Award [1-4] at 1.
B. Procedural History
On April 6, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint/Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award [1] in this Court, asserting that the award should be vacated pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). Compl. [1] at 5. According to Plaintiff, the arbitrator ignored and refused to consider material evidence relating to Woods' surviving personal injury claim, as well as evidence pertaining to Burns' bystander claim. Id. at 10-19. Plaintiff alleges that the arbitrator refused to give any weight to certain relevant, transcribed testimony, including the testimony of her nursing expert Stanton, on the purported injuries to Woods. Plaintiff moves the Court to vacate the Final Award pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) and remand the matter to arbitration. Id. at 19. Covenant opposes this request.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Relevant Legal Authority
The review of an arbitration award is “exceedingly deferential.” Petrofac, Inc. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 687 F.3d 671, 674 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Apache Bohai Corp. LDC v. Texaco China BV, 480 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007)). “Under the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA'), an arbitrator's decision will be vacated ‘only in very unusual circumstances.' ” Rainier DSC 1, L.L.C. v. Rainier Capital Mgmt., L.P., 828 F.3d 362, 364 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995)). “The burden of proof is on the party seeking to vacate the award, and any doubts or uncertainties must be resolved in favor of upholding it.” Cooper v. WestEnd Capital Mgmt., L.L.C., 832 F.3d 534, 544 (5th Cir. 2016).
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) provides that
[i]n any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration--
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.9 U.S.C. § 10(a). Plaintiff relies upon § 10(a)(3), arguing that “the arbitrator was guilty in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, ” Compl. [1] at 5, and that Plaintiff “was completely denied the right to a hearing as Covenant's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted before Burns had the opportunity to present her case and to probe Covenant's defense, ” id. at 7.
“Notably, Section 10(a) does not provide for vacatur of an arbitration award based on the merits of a party's claim.” Householder Grp. v. Caughran, 354 Fed.Appx. 848, 851 (5th Cir. 2009). Courts do not have authority to review an arbitrator's decision on the merits. See Id. (citing Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001); Kergosien v. Ocean Energy, Inc., 390 F.3d 346, 357 (5th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009)). The merits are irrelevant to a determination of whether statutory grounds exist under Section 10(a) to vacate the arbitration award. See id.
Misconduct requiring vacation of an award must be an error in the arbitrator's determination that is not simply an error of law, but which so affects the rights of a party that it deprived the party of a fair hearing. Rainier DSC 1, L.L.C., 828 F.3d at 364 (quoting Laws v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 452 F.3d 398, 399 (5th Cir. 2006)). A mere mistake of fact or law will not justify setting aside an arbitration award. See Cooper v. WestEnd Capital Mgmt., L.L.C., 832 F.3d 534, 546 (5th Cir. 2016). “The risk that arbitrators may construe the governing law imperfectly in the course of delivering a decision that attempts in good faith to interpret the relevant law is a risk that every party to arbitration assumes.” Id. (quotation omitted).
B. Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate the Arbitration Award should be denied.
Plaintiff argues that genuine disputes of material fact existed as to the personal injury and bystander claims, which precluded summary judgment in this case. See Reply [11] at 2. Despite Plaintiff's attempt to cast her arguments under the guise of arbitrator misconduct, her assertions go the merits of Woods' personal injury claim and Plaintiff's bystander claim. Courts do not have authority to conduct a review of an arbitrator's decision on the merits. See Householder Grp., 354 Fed.Appx. at 851. Plaintiff's “arguments concerning the merits are irrelevant to [the Court's] determination of whether there are statutory grounds within Section 10(a) under which the arbitration award should be vacated.” Id. In this case, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the arbitrator's decision based upon her interpretation of Mississippi law rises to the level of misconduct contemplated under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
Plaintiff had agreed that the arbitration would be conducted pursuant to JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures, see Arbitration Agreement [1-1] at 2-3, and those rules contemplate a summary-disposition procedure, see JAMS Rule 18 [8-2] at 12. Plaintiff has not shown that the arbitrator's mere grant of summary judgment, in and of itself, constituted misconduct. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3).
In resolving Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the arbitrator received and considered Stanton's opinions, but determined that Stanton was unqualified to render certain opinions as to medical causation and diagnostic impressions based upon Mississippi law. See Order on Mot. for Summ. J. [1-3] at 2-5. In seeking vacatur of the arbitration award, Plaintiff has identified nothing more than alleged mistakes of law or fact committed by the arbitrator. However, an alleged mistake of law or fact by the arbitrator is insufficient to vacate the arbitration award. See Cooper, 832 F.3d at 546.
Even if the arbitrator's holding was based upon a serious error of fact or law, any such error alone is likewise insufficient to establish misconduct under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). See id.; see also Rainier DSC 1, L.L.C., 828 F.3d at 364. There is no indication from the record that the arbitrator's determination was one that so affected Plaintiff's rights that it may be said that she was deprived of a fair hearing. See Id. Every indication is that Plaintiff received a fair hearing before the arbitrator, in that she had notice of and an opportunity to respond to Defendant's request for summary judgment. See, e.g., Generica Ltd. v. Pharm. Basics, Inc., 125 F.3d 1123, 1130 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a fundamentally fair hearing by an arbitrator “is one that meets the minimal requirements of fairness-adequate notice, a hearing on the evidence, and an impartial decision by the arbitrator” (quotation omitted)).
In sum, Plaintiff has not shown that the arbitrator refused to hear material evidence, otherwise engaged in “misconduct, ” or deprived Plaintiff of a fair hearing. Plaintiff has not shown a sufficient basis for vacatur of the arbitration award. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a); Cooper, 832 F.3d at 544.
III. CONCLUSION
To the extent the Court has not addressed any of the parties' arguments, it has considered them and determined that they would not alter the result. After carefully reviewing the record, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not met her burden of demonstrating the existence of any of the limited grounds for vacating the arbitration award in this case. Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate the arbitration award will be denied.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, Plaintiff's Motion [1] to Vacate Arbitration Award is DENIED, and that her Complaint [1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED.