(See also Clapp v. Vatcher, 9 Cal.App. 462, 466 [ 99 P. 549]; Edgar v. Bank of America, 50 Cal.App.2d 827, 833 [ 123 P.2d 885]; The Fiduciary Principle, 37 C.L.R. 539-555.) It is an elementary principle of the law of trusts that a trustee is forbidden to make use of the trust property for his private or individual purposes or to derive any profit therefrom (Civ. Code, § 2229; Purdy v. Johnson, 174 Cal. 521, 529 [ 163 P. 893]; Rest., Trusts, § 205(b); Crenshaw v. Roy C. Seeley Co., 129 Cal.App. 627 [ 19 P.2d 50]; 25 Cal.Jur., § 190, p. 342) and if he does derive profit from such a breach of trust he is liable to the beneficiary therefor ( Estate of Piercy, 168 Cal. 755 [ 145 P. 91]; Burns v. Clark, 133 Cal. 634, 639 [ 66 P. 12, 85 Am.St.Rep. 233]; Tobin Grocery Co. v. Spry, 204 Cal. 247 [ 267 P. 694]; 2 Scott on Trusts, § 170.2, p. 1199; Rest., Trusts, § 205(b); Civ. Code, § 2237). The policy of the law has always been, up until this case, to put fiduciaries beyond the reach of temptation by making it unprofitable for them to yield to it.
. . ." ( Burns v. Clark (1901) 133 Cal. 634, 639 [ 66 P. 12]. Accord Southern Cal. Disinfecting Co. v. Lomkin (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 431, 444 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 43]; Williams v. Weisser,supra, 273 Cal.App.2d at pp. 733-734.) That statute applies to a limited class of cases, primarily involving the exploitation of an employer's confidential information or trade secrets by a former employee to the employer's detriment.
This list, even though in part prepared by him, was the absolute property of plaintiff and was a valuable part of its property. (Civ. Code, sec. 1985; Gower v. Andrew, 59 Cal. 119, [34 Am. Rep. 242]; Burns v. Clark, 133 Cal. 634, [85 Am. St. Rep. 233, 66 P. 12].) Thus in Lamb v. Evans, L.R. (1893), Ch. Div. 218, canvassers for a directory, after leaving the service of their former employer, used the data they had collected to assist a rival publication in procuring advertisements from the same parties. An injunction was granted, and the court said:
The code speaks of things which the employee "acquires," not matters which he creates. In Burns v. Clark, 133 Cal. 634, 639 [ 66 P. 12, 85 Am.St. Rep. 233], the Supreme Court said that the section, then section 1985 of the Civil Code, was to be construed as "but an expression of the familiar principle that forbids an agent or trustee from using the trust property or powers conferred upon him for his own benefit, and which, in case of his doing so, requires him to account for the profits." (See also Southern Cal. Disinfecting Co. v. Lomkin, 183 Cal.App.2d 431, 444 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 43].)
Everything which an employee acquires by virtue of his employment, except the compensation which is due to him from his employer, belongs to the employer, whether acquired lawfully or unlawfully, or during or after the expiration of the term of his employment.' "As pointed out in Burns v. Clark, 133 Cal. 634 [ 66 P. 12, 85 Am. St. Rep. 233], a key phrase in section 2860 is the phrase `by virtue of his employment.' "A statement of the law on this subject, law which is really quite elementary, appears in 2 California Jurisprudence 2d at pages 769-774; and having satisfied myself of the fairness and reliability of the statement, I have no hesitancy in citing it as a short-cut to an abundance of precedent. "
This is the second appeal of the case. ( Burns v. Clark, 133 Cal. 634, [85 Am. St. Rep. 233, 66 P. 12].) Substantially every principle of law now involved was decided adversely to defendants in the first appeal.
Consequently, title to mineral lands cannot be acquired by occupancy unless for the prime purpose of mining or extracting minerals. Burns v. Clark, 133 Cal. 634, 66 P. 12; Tit. 30 U.S.C.A. § 22. We therefore hold that an attempted location for any other purpose than that thus specified, is wholly void.
Plaintiff's employees also interfered with Defendants' hunt by constantly watching them from nearby and by driving motorized vehicles on public parcels near Defendants while they hunted in an effort to scare away the game. (ECF 66 p. 12.) When the hunters refused to stop corner crossing and hunting on the public lands, Mr. Grende contacted the Wyoming Game and Fish Department, which said it would not take action against the hunters.
This interpretation is reasonable in the context of the ads because other statements in those ads undercut the impression that Microsoft is promoting 100% protection. For example, the ads state that Safe Links "mitigate[s] malicious content" and "helps prevent users from going to malicious websites when they click them in email" [ECF No. 97-66 p. 12; ECF No. 97-36 p. 9 (emphasis added)]. The ads also contain statements suggesting that Safe Links’ protection is variable depending on a user's settings [ECF No. 97-71 p. 20 ("Protect your organization from harmful hyperlinks through ATP Safe Links policies . Create a custom blocked URL list for more advanced protection") (emphasis added)]. In one case, an ad explicitly states that Microsoft does not guarantee 100% protection [ECF No. 97-72 p. 11 ("No solution is 100% effective, and that makes it important to have an ‘assume breach’ mindset.")].
It is said: 1 American Law of Mining § 5.4, at 720 (1964); United States ex rel. United States Borax Co. v. Ickes, 68 App.D.C. 399, 98 F.2d 271 (1938); Bagg v. New Jersey Loan Company, 88 Ariz. 182, 354 P.2d 40 (1960); Burns v. clark, 133 Cal. 634, 66 P. 12 (1901). See Brown v. Murphy, 36 Cal.App.2d 171, 97 P.2d 281 (1901).