Ordinarily, this is legally sufficient. Burney v. State, 347 S.W.2d 723 (Tex.Cr.App. 1961); Bass v. State, 427 S.W.2d 624 (Tex.Cr.App. 1968); Ames v. State, 499 S.W.2d 110 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); Johnson v. State, 541 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Parr v. State, 575 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978); Few v. State, 588 S.W.2d 578 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979); Thomas v. State, 621 S.W.2d 158 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980); Marrs v. State, supra. In Haecker v. State, supra, where an information rather than an indictment was involved, this Court stated:
Haecker v. State, 571 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978). See also Pollard v. State, 567 S.W.2d 11 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978); Milligan v. State, 554 S.W.2d 192 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977); Lopez v. State, 494 S.W.2d 560 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); Burney v. State, 347 S.W.2d 723 (Tex.Cr.App. 1961); Maedgen v. State, 104 S.W.2d 518 (Tex.Cr.App. 1937). Article 21.17, V.A.C.C.P., provides that "words used in a statute to define an offense need not be strictly pursued in the indictment; it is sufficient to use other words conveying the same meaning, or which include the sense of the statutory words."
Art. 21.01, V.A.C.C.P. It was a familiar rule then, and still is, that "where an offense is defined by our statute (and there are none other in this State), all of the essential elements of the offense must be alleged in the indictment," Rice v. State, 37 Tex.Crim. 36, 38 S.W. 801 (1897). Likewise, an indictment drawn in the language of the statute creating and defining an offense is ordinarily sufficient, Burney v. State, 171 Tex.Crim. 274, 347 S.W.2d 723, 725 (1961). Thus, we first note here that the information is Not drawn in the language of the statute in that it omits the phrase "other than marihuana."
Although it is not always sufficient to follow the language of the statute, compare Treadgill v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 426, 292 S.W.2d 121, the general rule is that when the language of a statute is itself completely descriptive of the offense, the indictment will be sufficient if it follows the language of the statute and expressly charges the described offense of the accused. See, e.g., Burney v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 274, 347 S.W.2d 723. In the case at bar, we conclude that the indictment sufficiently informs the appellant of the offense charged.
The complaint and information followed the language of the statute, Art. 1436e, supra, and was sufficient to charge an offense. 30 Tex.Jur.2d 580, Sec. 27; Burney v. State, 171 Tex.Crim. 347, 347 S.W.2d 723. We do not agree with appellant that because the terms "invitee' and "licensee' have a different legal meaning the allegation that she was on the premises as an "invitee and licensee' rendered the state's pleading invalid for repugnancy. The gist of the offense is that the accused be legally on the premises as an invitee or licensee. It would have been clearly improper to allege in the disjunctive that she was on the premises as an invitee or licensee.
As a general rule, an indictment which tracks the language in the statute is usually sufficient to allege an offense and to give the accused notice of the charges against him. See Thomas v. State, 621 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) (on rehearing); Burney v. State, 171 Tex.Crim. 274, 347 S.W.2d 723, 725 (1961). When an act is statutorily defined by more than one means or manner, on timely request, the State must allege the means.