Burney v. State

6 Citing cases

  1. Castillo v. State

    689 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)   Cited 30 times
    In Castillo v. State, 689 S.W.2d 443 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984), it was held an indictment for arson was insufficiently precise where it merely alleged the appellant "started a fire."

    Ordinarily, this is legally sufficient. Burney v. State, 347 S.W.2d 723 (Tex.Cr.App. 1961); Bass v. State, 427 S.W.2d 624 (Tex.Cr.App. 1968); Ames v. State, 499 S.W.2d 110 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); Johnson v. State, 541 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Parr v. State, 575 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978); Few v. State, 588 S.W.2d 578 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979); Thomas v. State, 621 S.W.2d 158 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980); Marrs v. State, supra. In Haecker v. State, supra, where an information rather than an indictment was involved, this Court stated:

  2. McCravy v. State

    642 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)   Cited 44 times
    Finding no requirement to admonish defendant on nonbinding character of prosecuting attorney's recommendation where no plea agreement and no recommendation from prosecutor existed

    Haecker v. State, 571 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978). See also Pollard v. State, 567 S.W.2d 11 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978); Milligan v. State, 554 S.W.2d 192 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977); Lopez v. State, 494 S.W.2d 560 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); Burney v. State, 347 S.W.2d 723 (Tex.Cr.App. 1961); Maedgen v. State, 104 S.W.2d 518 (Tex.Cr.App. 1937). Article 21.17, V.A.C.C.P., provides that "words used in a statute to define an offense need not be strictly pursued in the indictment; it is sufficient to use other words conveying the same meaning, or which include the sense of the statutory words."

  3. Few v. State

    588 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)   Cited 32 times
    Discussing differences between the federal Controlled Substances Act and the Texas Controlled Substances Act, particularly regarding their treatment of synthetic hallucinogenic substances, and observing that the Texas "Legislature greatly expanded what was the more restricted definition of tetrahydrocannabinols in the draft uniform act and the Federal law"

    Art. 21.01, V.A.C.C.P. It was a familiar rule then, and still is, that "where an offense is defined by our statute (and there are none other in this State), all of the essential elements of the offense must be alleged in the indictment," Rice v. State, 37 Tex.Crim. 36, 38 S.W. 801 (1897). Likewise, an indictment drawn in the language of the statute creating and defining an offense is ordinarily sufficient, Burney v. State, 171 Tex.Crim. 274, 347 S.W.2d 723, 725 (1961). Thus, we first note here that the information is Not drawn in the language of the statute in that it omits the phrase "other than marihuana."

  4. Lopez v. State

    494 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)   Cited 16 times

    Although it is not always sufficient to follow the language of the statute, compare Treadgill v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 426, 292 S.W.2d 121, the general rule is that when the language of a statute is itself completely descriptive of the offense, the indictment will be sufficient if it follows the language of the statute and expressly charges the described offense of the accused. See, e.g., Burney v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 274, 347 S.W.2d 723. In the case at bar, we conclude that the indictment sufficiently informs the appellant of the offense charged.

  5. Blankenship v. State

    390 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965)   Cited 3 times

    The complaint and information followed the language of the statute, Art. 1436e, supra, and was sufficient to charge an offense. 30 Tex.Jur.2d 580, Sec. 27; Burney v. State, 171 Tex.Crim. 347, 347 S.W.2d 723. We do not agree with appellant that because the terms "invitee' and "licensee' have a different legal meaning the allegation that she was on the premises as an "invitee and licensee' rendered the state's pleading invalid for repugnancy. The gist of the offense is that the accused be legally on the premises as an invitee or licensee. It would have been clearly improper to allege in the disjunctive that she was on the premises as an invitee or licensee.

  6. Rojas v. State

    693 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. App. 1985)   Cited 2 times

    As a general rule, an indictment which tracks the language in the statute is usually sufficient to allege an offense and to give the accused notice of the charges against him. See Thomas v. State, 621 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) (on rehearing); Burney v. State, 171 Tex.Crim. 274, 347 S.W.2d 723, 725 (1961). When an act is statutorily defined by more than one means or manner, on timely request, the State must allege the means.