Strictly construed it would prohibit a motorist from stopping when confronted with an obstruction, or from stopping to avoid a collision, or to avoid running over a pedestrian. We have held that in the stopping of an automobile on the highway for an appreciable length of time, under conditions different from those shown here, the motorist is guilty of negligence per se. Ashton v. Roop, Ky., 244 S.W.2d 727; Burnett v. Yurt, Ky., 247 S.W.2d 227. More recently, in the case of Jack Cole Company v. Hoff, Ky., 274 S.W.2d 658, we held a truck driver negligent as a matter of law in violating the last above quoted statute when he stopped his truck on the main highway and left it standing while he went to the assistance of a disabled motorist on the side of the road. (Appellees in this case request us to overrule the holding in the above case to the effect that a vehicle stopped for the purpose of assisting another motorist may be classed as an "emergency vehicle" with in the exclusion clause of KRS 189.450(1).
KRS 189.450. It is true the statute has been construed as not giving an absolute right to leave in such a place a car which has sustained only a minor damage that does not interfere with its ready removal. Thus, in Burnett v. Yurt, Ky., 247 S.W.2d 227, the motorist was held to be negligent in leaving his car on the pavement when it was in good running order and only had a fender dented. But in that case and others we have held it to be a question for the jury when a stationary car in such a place was run into. Among other recent cases so holding are American Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Patterson, Ky., 243 S.W.2d 472; Ashton v. Roop, Ky., 244 S.W.2d 727; Banner Transfer Co. v. Morse, Ky., 274 S.W.2d 380.
We have construed subsection (1) of the present statute as prohibiting the leaving of a vehicle parked on the paved portion of the highway. Burnett v. Yurt, Ky., 247 S.W.2d 227. Subsection (4) of the statute is aimed primarily at stopping or parking off the main traveled portion. The appellants suggest that, under the particular circumstances, their truck should be classed as an "emergency vehicle," within the exclusion clause of KRS 189.450(1).
Admittedly, there was some ambiguity in the applicable statute, KRS 189.450, prior to its amendment in 1952. This ambiguity was recognized in several cases, including Bradley v. Clarke, 219 Ky. 438, 293 S.W. 1082; Padgett v. Brangan, 228 Ky. 440, 15 S.W.2d 277, and Burnett v. Yurt, Ky., 1952, 247 S.W.2d 227. But we said in the Burnett case: "The appellant was negligent in leaving his car parked on the paved portion of the highway.
Although the Court, by placing limitations upon the application of the last clear chance doctrine, has evidenced a purpose to give greater recognition to the defense of contributory negligence, yet a reluctance on the part of the Court to preclude injured plaintiffs from recovery has been reflected in a tendency to let the question of proximate cause go to the jury in cases where, under a strict application of the rules, the plaintiff's negligence clearly was a proximate cause as a matter of law. See Burnett v. Yurt, Ky., 247 S.W.2d 227; Swift Co. v. Thompson's Adm'r, 308 Ky. 529, 214 S.W.2d 758. Of course, in any case where the facts are in dispute, it is for the jury to determine the facts.