Opinion
12-20-1897
BURNE v. O'SHAUGHNESSY et al.
J. H. Meeker, for complainant Wm. J. Kearns, for defendants John O'Shaughnessy and others. Wm. C. Nicoll, for defendant Oury.
Creditors' bill by Martin Burne against John O'Shaughnessy and others. Heard on demurrers to the bill. Demurrers overruled.
J. H. Meeker, for complainant Wm. J. Kearns, for defendants John O'Shaughnessy and others.
Wm. C. Nicoll, for defendant Oury.
EMERY, V. C. The complainant is a judgment and execution creditor of the defendant John O'Shaughnessy, and filed this bill to enable him to obtain satisfaction of his judgment out of the property of defendant. Three classes of property are sought to be reached, viz. real estate, personal chattels, and the proceeds of a life insurance policy, payable to defendant. The real estate is held by the defendant Bridget O'Shaughnessy; and, as to the real estate, the bill substantially charges that it was purchased with funds of the debtor, and that the title was put in the name of his wife, in fraud of the complainant's right as creditor, and for the same purpose was conveyed by the wife shortly before her death to the defendant Bridget O'Shaughnessy. As to the personal chattels and the life insurance money, the bill charges that another defendant, Oury, under a fraudulent judgment and execution, upon which nothing is due, has levied upon the judgment debtor's personal property, and, his execution being prior to complainant's, is about to sell this property thereunder in fraud of complainant An injunction is prayed, restraining the paymeritof the Insurance money to the judgment debtor or any other person, and to this end the insurance company is made a defendant. Separate demurrers, for multifariousness only, have been filed by the defendants John O'Shaughnessy, the judgment debtor, Oury, Bridget O'Shaughnessy, and the insurance company, together with its officers. The ground relied on by counsel for demurrants is that each of the separate demurrants had no connection with the case against the other defendants, and should not be put to the burden of a defense against these claims. But while, as to defendants other than the judgment debtor, this want of connection with portions of the whole case as presented by the bill may exist, yet the settled rule of this court in relation to bills of this character is that they are not, on that account alone, multifarious. Creditors' bills of this class are considered to present the single object of enabling the complainant to obtain satisfaction of his judgment at law out of the judgment debtor's property, and the equitable jurisdiction of the bill is based on this object. Inasmuch as the object of the bill and the relief prayed are the satisfaction of the judgment, and this may be decreed out of any property of the debtor, which is properly reached by the aid of this court, the complainant, in his bill filed for this general purpose, is not restricted to relief against a single class of property, alleged to belong to the debtor, and he may follow in one bill separate properties of the debtor in the hands of separate defendants. This rule in relation to creditors' bills was settled by Chancellor Green in Way v. Bragaw (1863) 16 N. J. Eq. 213. In that case real estate of the judgment debtor was alleged to be fraudulently conveyed to one defendant, personal estate to have been similarly conveyed to another defendant, and certain equitable interests and property not to be reached by execution at law were also sought to be applied. A demurrer for multifariousness on the ground of the separate interests of defendants in the property sought to be reached was overruled. This rule was followed on this point in a similar case (Randolph v. Daly [1863] 16 N. J. Eq. 313), Chancellor Green saying (page 315): "It is well settled that on a bill to set aside fraudulent conveyances made by a debtor, and for a discovery of his property, it is no objection that a defendant to whom a portion of the property has been conveyed has no connection with other fraudulent transactions of the debtor. The case against the debtor is entire. If the defendant is a necessary party to some part of the case as stated, he cannot object that he has no interest in other transactions which constitute a part of the entire case." These cases have not been since questioned, and they control the present case on the point now involved. I have examined all of the cases referred to by the demurrants' counsel, and find nothing in them to qualify or control the doctrine of these cases, nor do I think that the present case is distinguishable.
The distinction mainly insisted on is that the fraudulent transactions alleged in regard to the real estate occurred before 1889, and that those relating to the personal estate occurred in 1897. But this only relates to the degree or marked character of the separation between the two classes of property and of the claims against the separate owners, and manifestly does not prevent the operation of the rule settled by the above cases, that claims against persons in fact owning separate properties by separate fraudulent transactions may be united in bills of this character. And so far as Oury, the claimant of a lien on the personal property, and Bridget O'Shaughnessy, the claimant of the real estate, are concerned, it must also be observed that they are properly joined for another reason, pointed out in Way v. Bragaw, supra (page 216), viz. that their separate titles are connected not only in their operation against the complainant's remedy at law, but in the relief to be administered, inasmuch as, on a decree in favor of complainant against both, the real estate can only be sold to pay the balance remaining due after the application of the personal estate to the complainant's claim. The insurance company is a necessary party to the relief prayed by way of reaching the insurance moneys in their hands as equitable assets, and for the purpose of restraining payment to the judgment debtor pending the suit. They may, by petition for payment into court, be relieved from further prosecution. Meyers v. Schuman (N. J. Ch.; Green, V. C, March, 1895) 31 Atl. 460, 461. The demurrers are therefore overruled, with costs, and an injunction under the rule to show cause will be advised.