Opinion
No. 05-08-01677-CR
Opinion Filled July 6, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F06-00407-SR.
Before Justice RICHTER, LANG-MIERS, and MYERS.
OPINION
Appellant waived a jury and pleaded nolo contendere to the felony offense of injury to a child. The trial court found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at thirty years' imprisonment and a $6000 fine. In three issues on appeal, appellant argues the evidence is factually insufficient to support a conviction for intentional injury to a child, the trial court utilized an improper legal standard to evaluate mens rea, and the trial court should have convicted appellant of the lesser-included offense of reckless injury to a child. In a cross-point, the State argues the judgment should be modified to reflect appellant's no contest plea. Concluding appellant's arguments are without merit and sustaining appellant's cross-point, we modify the trial court's judgment to reflect the no contest plea and affirm the judgment as modified.
Appellant did not stipulate to the veracity of the evidence or otherwise judicially confess to the crime as charged.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first issue, appellant contends the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction. In his second and third issues, appellant claims the trial court did not evaluate the evidence under the proper legal standard and erred because he should have been convicted of reckless, as opposed to intentional, injury to a child. Appellant, however, cites no authority to explain or support his entitlement to a legal or factual sufficiency review where, as here, he has pled no contest to a trial court and waived his right to a jury trial. The State counters appellant's arguments claiming the evidence embraced every element of the offense charged and is sufficient to support the judgment of guilt. We agree with the State.Applicable Law
The legal effect of a nolo contendere or "no contest" plea is the same as a plea of guilty. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 27.02(5) (Vernon 2006). Where a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a felony, the appellate standards of review for legal and factual sufficiency do not apply. Ex parte Martin, 747 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Ex parte Williams, 703 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); O'Brien v. State, 154 S.W.3d 908, 910 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.); Keller v. State, 125 S.W.3d 600, 604-05 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. dism'd). Although the State must introduce evidence into the record establishing the defendant's guilt, see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15 (Vernon 2005), there is no requirement that the supporting evidence prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. McGill v. State, 200 S.W.3d 325, 330 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.). Rather, the supporting evidence must simply embrace each essential element of the offense charged. Stone v. State, 919 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); McGill, 200 S.W.3d at 330. The issue is whether sufficient evidence supports the judgment of guilt under article 1.15. McGill, 200 S.W.3d at 330; Keller, 125 S.W.3d at 605. To support appellant's nolo contendere plea to the charge in the indictment, the State was required to prove that appellant intentionally and knowingly caused serious bodily injury to SB, a child 14 years of age or younger, by striking her with and against an unknown object, a deadly weapon, and by shaking her with his hands, a deadly weapon. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04(a) (1) (Vernon Supp. 2009). In general, a person acts "intentionally" when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result . Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 2003). A person acts "knowingly" when he is aware that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id. at 6.03(b). Injury to a child, however, is a result-oriented offense requiring a mental state that relates not to the specific conduct but to the result of the conduct. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Thus, the mental state criminalized in the injury to a child statute is that state of mind which contemplates the prohibited result, i.e. serious bodily injury. See Haggins v. State, 785 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Therefore, our inquiry is confined to whether the evidence in this case embraces each essential element of the offense of intentional injury to a child and supports the judgment of guilt under article 1.15.Evidence Presented
SB, a three-month-old baby in appellant's sole care on the day of the injury, arrived at the hospital with twelve fractures, a neck and spinal injury, and a severe brain injury. SB's mother testified that SB was fine when she left for work that morning. Appellant initially claimed the baby was injured when she fell off of the couch. When the injury first occurred, appellant called his mother-in-law instead of an ambulance. During the conversation with his mother-in-law, appellant expressed reluctance to call an ambulance because he was afraid "they" would take SB away. Appellant finally called 911, and told the operator as well as the paramedics and firefighters who subsequently arrived that SB had fallen off of the couch. When the paramedics arrived, SB was unresponsive and not breathing. Appellant, however, was calm and did not appear shocked or panicked. After SB was taken to the hospital, appellant continued to claim the baby fell off of the couch. Dr. Matthew Cox testified that SB arrived at the hospital with several skeletal injuries, including two skull fractures, corner fractures on her upper arms and left tibia, rib fractures on both sides of the chest wall, and a pubic bone fracture. SB also sustained a severe head injury and damage to her neck and spine. Dr. Cox stated that it took four traumatic forces to cause these injuries. A violent shaking episode would have caused the brain injury, neck injury, and fractures in the baby's upper arms, tibia, and ribs. Two impacts with or against a hard object would have caused the two separate skull fractures, and a stomp or compression directly on the pelvis would have caused the pubic fracture. Dr. Cox opined that the injuries had to be caused intentionally. According to Dr. Cox, a person would know they were causing serious bodily injury because of the kind of force it would take to inflict the injuries. Dr. Cox further opined that the injuries could not have been caused by a single fall, and no fall could cause the "flailing" injuries SB sustained. Appellant told Dr. Cox he placed the baby on her side on the couch while he went to use the restroom, and when he returned found SB lying on the floor and unresponsive. Appellant said he picked SB up, patted her on the back, called an ambulance, and tried to perform CPR. Dr. Cox noted, however, that there was a concern that the history provided did not explain the extent of the injuries. After Dr. Cox testified, appellant changed his version of events. For the first time on direct examination, appellant claimed SB fell head first from a broken car seat and on to a hard metal surface when the handle of the car seat snapped. Appellant admitted that he had been reckless and agreed he was guilty of recklessly injuring his child. Although there is no dispute that SB sustained serious bodily injury while in appellant's care, appellant claims the trial court gave undue weight to the medical testimony and did not even consider his testimony that he acted recklessly rather than knowingly or intentionally. In support of his argument, appellant points out that neither he nor the baby's mother are sophisticated care givers, and therefore it is reasonable to deduce that appellant had no idea the type of injury shaking an infant could cause. Appellant also postulates that it is possible that he engaged in actions that could be characterized as "shaking" without realizing it. In further support of his argument, appellant points to testimony, primarily from family members, that he was a loving, caring father. While it is true that the State and appellant offered conflicting testimony concerning appellant's mental state, the weight the trial court afforded the evidence is immaterial to the present analysis. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15. In addition, the fact finder may infer intent from the accused's acts and words as well as the surrounding circumstances. See Ledesma v. State, 677 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Intent may also be inferred from the extent of the injuries to the victim, the method used to produce the injuries, and the relative size and strength of the parties. Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Based on Dr. Cox's testimony, the nature of the baby's injuries, as well as appellant's acts, words, and conduct at the time of the offense, we conclude the evidence embraced every essential element of the offense charged and was sufficient to establish appellant's guilt. As such, it was adequate to support appellant's plea and the finding of guilt under article 1.15. Appellant's first and third issues are overruled.Evaluation of the Evidence
In his second issue, appellant asserts the court did not evaluate the evidence under the proper legal standard. In particular, appellant claims that comments made by the trial court establish the court did not employ the correct legal standard for "intentional" conduct in this type of case. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial judge stated:I don't want to believe you or anybody else would do this to a child. Your lawyer argued that it was not intentional and I don't believe that you intended to hurt your child . . . But we can form intent in an instant. The intent was not to hurt your child, but the definition of intent is conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct that caused the injury or the result. . . .While the trial judge's comments may be misplaced, the analysis appellant seeks to have us perform is not applicable to our review of the evidence in a no contest plea. See Williams, 703 S.W.2d at 682. Under article 1.15, the trial court's judgment is affirmed if the evidence introduced embraces every essential element of the offense charged and is sufficient to establish a defendant's guilt. See McGill, 200 S.W.3d at 330; Keller, 125 S.W.3d at 605. We have already concluded that the evidence in the record meets this statutory requirement and supports the trial court's judgment. Accordingly, appellant's second issue is overruled.