We would be loathe to see in this country any departure from the doctrine thus enunciated * * *." Burkitt et al v. School District No. 1, et al, 195 Or. 471, 495-97, 246 P.2d 566 (1952). The possibility of a conflict between requirements imposed on students by school officials and requirements imposed on their children by parents is further documentation of the need to interpret school officials' statutory authority in this context as limited to enacting rules having a reasonable relation with the proper operation of the schools.
Cases in other jurisdictions have construed similar laws much less restrictively. In Burkitt v. School Dist. No. 1, Multnomah County, 195 Or. 471 [ 246 P.2d 566, at page 572], the court states: "[W]e think that there need not be any high degree 'of ritual or mystery' in their conduct to bring a particular society within the category of 'secret.'" In the Burkitt case the Supreme Court of Oregon approves a circuit court finding that among many Portland clubs "'it would not be required of the school board or the superintendent of schools to ferret out each and every club and all their proceedings to find out if they were secret societies,'" and the court observes (on p. 572 [246 P.2d]): "Moreover the evidence shows that in organization, officers, types of records kept, rushing, pledging, initiation (with necessary variations as between fraternities and sororities) all the members of the Big Six followed somewhat of a pattern.
Further, school boards are charged with responsibility "for educating children residing in the district" which includes determining "what things are detrimental to the successful management, good order and discipline of the schools and the rules required to produce these conditions." Id; and Burkitt et al. v. School District No. 1, et al., 195 Or. 471, 492, 246 P.2d 566 (1952) (citations omitted). This grant of authority expressly includes the power to develop a drug abuse program as provided by O.R.S. 336.222:
Where reasonable physical contact (not to punish) is necessary to maintain order in a class or to prevent a student from inflicting possible damage to property or injury to another student, a teacher has the responsibility to take necessary and reasonable action in the exercise of his supervisory duties. We are of the further opinion that said rule is not unreasonable, Harris v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Secretary of Education, 372 A.2d 953 (Pa. Comwlth. 1977), nor arbitrary or discriminatory. Burkitt v. School District No. 1, Multnomah County, 195 Or. 471, 246 P.2d 566 (1952). II. WHETHER THE BOARD IN CONDUCTING THE REQUIRED HEARING FOR DISMISSAL OF SHORBA VIOLATED THE PROVISIONS OF HRS § 297-12, SUPRA NOTE 2, THUS, REQUIRING OF THE BOARD TO AFFORD SHORBA A NEW HEARING IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAID STATUTE.
But he has no "right" to compel the Board of Education to exercise its discretion to his personal advantage so he can participate in the named activities. See Utah Mfrs. v. Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 23 P.2d 229; Burkitt v. School Dist. No. 1, 195 Or. 471, 246 P.2d 566. See State v. Lawrence Circuit Court, 240 Ind. 114, 162 N.E.2d 250; McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 455 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517, (Where it was stated: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."); also Board of Trustees of University of Mississippi v. Waugh, 105 Miss. 623, 62 So. 827, affirmed 237 U.S. 589, 35 S.Ct. 720, 59 L.Ed. 1131: ("The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was never intended to act as an accomplice to any young man who wanted to take advantage of the gratuitous advantages offered the youths to obtain an education, and yet refuse to obey and submit to the disciplinary regulations enacted by the Legislature for the welfare of the institutions of learning.")
Nevertheless, whatever the differences between this case and Neuhaus might be, we are constrained to agree with plaintiff that a case that is decided on the ground that the challenged disciplinary action violates ORS 339.240 is authority for the proposition that a party may seek relief on the same ground. Much of the authority that the district considers as contrary to that proposition in fact is not. The cases — mainly federal — on which the district relies do not seem to us to indicate that the courts lack jurisdiction or review authority, as distinct from holding that they have a very circumscribed scope of review over the disciplinary judgments of school officials. There is no inconsistency between the latter proposition and Neuhaus. See, e.g., Burkitt et al. v. School Dist. No. 1, et al., 195 Or. 471, 246 P.2d 566 (1952). It is not necessary to reexamine here whether Neuhaus was correctly decided on the point in question, because plaintiff does not succeed even with its benefit.
ion is vested with broad discretionary powers in adopting a policy prohibiting affiliation with such organizations in the government, management and discipline of the schools; that such regulations do not deprive the pupils or parents of any natural or constitutional rights or privileges; that, when, in the opinion of the school authorities, such organizations have a deleterious influence and are found to be inimical to the best interests of the school, a school board is authorized, even in the absence of a specific statute granting such power, to adopt regulations prohibiting them; and that such power is inherent in a board of education. See Coggins v. Board of Education, 223 N.C. 763, 28 S.E.2d 527; Wilson v. Abilene Independent School District (Tex.Civ.App.), 190 S.W.2d 406; Wayland v. Board of School Directors, 43 Wn. 441, 86 P. 642, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.), 352; Antell v. Stokes, 287 Mass. 103, 191 N.E. 407; Steele v. Sexton, 234 N.W. 436; Burkitt v. School District No. 1, 195 Ore., 471, 246 P.2d 566; and 47 American Jurisprudence, 423, Section 169, and 79 Corpus Juris Secundum, 446, Section 499. We have considered the contentions of the plaintiffs that the enforcement of this regulation would constitute an invasion of parental authority, and that the state of Ohio by the enactment of Section 2923.35, Revised Code, and the repeal of Sections 12908 and 12909 of the General Code, has pre-empted the field leaving a local board of education without authority to adopt such a regulation; and we find no merit in these contentions.
[4] Submission agreements are to be construed like other contracts so as to give effect to the intention of the parties, the presumption being that all matters in dispute were intended to be decided. ( Dugan v. Phillips, 77 Cal.App. 268, 278 [ 246 P.2d 566]; Popcorn Equipment Co. v. Page, supra.) [5] The basic contract having provided that the arbitrators should have the power to terminate the agreement, that provision was automatically imported into the submission agreement, along with such questions as whether Dr. Straus might compel specific performance or recover compensatory damages to which he might be entitled at law.
A third case, Burkitt, et al. v. School Dist. No. 1, et al., quoted a California appellate court's use of the phrase "literary society" to describe a society that became part of a fraternity. 195 Or 471, 480, 246 P2d 566 (1952) (quoting Bradford v. Board of Education, 18 Cal App 19, 23, 121 P 929 (1912) ("The first Greek letter society in a secondary school was Alpha Phi, a literary society, which became a part of a fraternity in 1876.")). Although the court has found no contemporaneous definition of "literary society," the 1828 edition of Webster's dictionary defined the word "society" to include "[a]ny number of persons associated for a particular purpose, whether incorporated by law, or only united by articles of agreement; a fraternity * * * we have bible societies for various objects * * * societies for mechanics, and learned societies; societies for encouraging arts, &c."