Consistent with this general rule, it has been held that a prisoner retains the right to read what he wants unless the state can show a countervailing interest warranting censorship. See Burke v. Levi, 391 F. Supp. 186, 190-91 (E.D.Va. 1975); Laaman v. Hancock, 351 F. Supp. 1265, 1267-68 (D.N.H. 1972); Sostre v. Otis, 330 F. Supp. 941, 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Rowland v. Sigler, 327 F. Supp. 821, 824-25 (D.Neb.), aff'd sub nom., Rowland v. Jones, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971); Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375, 1382 (D.Conn. 1971); Payne v. Whitmore, 325 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (N.D.Cal. 1971); Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), the Supreme Court held that in order to justify censorship of prisoners' personal correspondence, two requirements must be met: (1) prison officials must show that "censorship furthers one or more of the substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation;" and (2) "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved."