" Procunier v. Martinez (1974) 416 U.S. 396, 404, 405, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224. After all, "courts possess no expertise in the conduct and management of correctional institutions." Finney v. Arkansas Board of Correction (8th Cir. 1974) 505 F.2d 194, 200. Because of this want of judicial expertise, "prison officials must be accorded latitude in the administration of prison affairs," Cruz v. Beto, supra, 405 U.S. at 321, 92 S.Ct. at 1081; Frazier v. Ciccone (8th Cir. 1974) 506 F.2d 1022, 1024, and their judgments are entitled to "great weight," Ross v. Blackledge (4th Cir. 1973) 477 F.2d 616, 618; Gardner v. Joyce (5th Cir. 1973) 482 F.2d 283, 285, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1096, 94 S.Ct. 731, 38 L.Ed.2d 555 (1973); Burke v. Levi (E.D.Va. 1975) 391 F. Supp. 186, 189. Particularly, "[W]here state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities." Procunier v. Martinez, supra, 416 U.S. at 405, 94 S.Ct. at 1807. Courts are accordingly limited in their exercise of power in this area to deprivations which represent constitutional abuses and they cannot prohibit a given condition or treatment in prison management unless it reaches the level of an unconstitutional deprivation. It has been well said that "[C]ourts encounter numerous cases in which the acts or conditions under attack are clearly undesirable and are condemned by penologists, but the courts are powerless to act because the practices are not so abusive as to violate a constitutional right.

In this jurisdiction, the only court that has considered the publisher's-only rule in light of Procunier concluded that it was unconstitutional. Burke v. Levi, 391 F. Supp. 186 (E.D.Va. 1975). While the court recognizes that Burke was vacated and remanded as moot in Burke v. Levi, 530 F.2d 967 (1975), the reasoning of the district court nevertheless remains valid and convincing.

Restrictions placed on the exercise of prisoners' First Amendment rights are to be upheld if they further the substantial governmental interest of security, order and rehabilitation and the limitation is no greater than necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974); Burke v. Levi, 391 F. Supp. 186 (E.D.Va.), rev'd on other grounds, 530 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1975). This Court is satisfied that requiring prior approval in advance of inmates corresponding with one another is necessary for the maintenance of security and good order in the penal institutions.

Consistent with this general rule, it has been held that a prisoner retains the right to read what he wants unless the state can show a countervailing interest warranting censorship. See Burke v. Levi, 391 F. Supp. 186, 190-91 (E.D.Va. 1975); Laaman v. Hancock, 351 F. Supp. 1265, 1267-68 (D.N.H. 1972); Sostre v. Otis, 330 F. Supp. 941, 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Rowland v. Sigler, 327 F. Supp. 821, 824-25 (D.Neb.), aff'd sub nom., Rowland v. Jones, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971); Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375, 1382 (D.Conn. 1971); Payne v. Whitmore, 325 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (N.D.Cal. 1971); Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), the Supreme Court held that in order to justify censorship of prisoners' personal correspondence, two requirements must be met: (1) prison officials must show that "censorship furthers one or more of the substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation;" and (2) "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved."

Morgan v. LaVallee, 526 F.2d 221, 224-225 (2d Cir. 1975); McCleary v. Kelly, 376 F. Supp. 1186, 1190-1191 (M.D.Pa. 1974); The Luparar v. Stoneman, 382 F. Supp. 495, 498-499 (D.Vt. 1974). See also Burke v. Levi, 391 F. Supp. 186, 190-191 (E.D.Va. 1975); Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 425-426 (E.D.Okla. 1974). A number of cases prior to Procunier v. Martinez recognize the prisoner's First Amendment right to receive literature.

Importantly, in Ross, the court noted that: "the law was clear [in late 1979-early 1980] that prison authorities could not as a regular practice censor inmate mail, even if the letter unduly complains or magnifies grievances or is defamatory; rather, as was clear, censorship — and other restrictions on inmates' first amendment rights — must be justified by using narrowly drawn means to further substantial governmental interests in security, rehabilitation, and order." Id. at 695 (emphasis added); see also Burke v. Levi, 391 F. Supp. 186, 190 (E.D. Va. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 530 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1975) ("the Court finds that the criteria enumerated in . . . Martinez . . . are met with the exception of that part of [the prison regulation] which permits the screening of incoming and outgoing mail for `(contents) which suggest . . . false, malicious, libelous or confidential information about individual inmates, government officials, and others.'"); Bressman v. Farrier, 825 F. Supp. 231, 233 (N.D. Iowa 1993) (quoting Travis v. Norris, 805 F.2d 806, 808 (8th Cir. 1986) ("It is well-established in the Eighth Circuit and elsewhere that prison officials `may not censor inmate correspondence simply to eliminate unflattering or unwelcome opinions or factually inaccurate statements.

Bell v. Wolfish, ___ U.S. ___ at ___ — ___, 99 S.Ct. 1861 at 1886, 60 L.Ed.2d 447. See also Burke v. Levi, 391 F. Supp. 186 (E.D.Va. 1975). For all of the above reasons, the court chooses not to adopt the recommendation of the magistrate, and plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction is denied while defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.

White v. Woodroff, 378 F. Supp. 1004 (W.D.Va. 1974). In the majority of cases, the courts have ruled unconstitutional the attempts of prison authorities to prevent inmates from communicating their grievances, their ideas and their concerns to the outside world, whether it be by informal censorship of "inflammatory" material, Brown v. Schubert, 389 F. Supp. 281 (E.D.Wis. 1975); Chiarello v. Bohlinger, 391 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), or by prison regulation, Hopkins v. Collins, 411 F. Supp. 831 (D.Md. 1976); Burke v. Levi, 391 F. Supp. 186 (E.D.Va. 1975); Frazier v. Donelon, 381 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.La. 1974). In none of the cases cited was there as flagrant and harsh censorship as occurred in the treatment of the plaintiff in this case.

Conditions of Parole Allegedly Giving Rise to § 1983 Claims Federal courts are loathe to interfere in the administration of state prisons absent a violation of a federal constitutional right, Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304, 307 (8th Cir. 1971); Burke v. Levi, 391 F. Supp. 186, 189 (E.D.Va. 1975). The parole system is a part of the state correctional system in that parole is a form of custody whereby the prisoner leaves his place of incarceration while remaining in the legal custody and control of the Board of Parole until termination of his sentence.