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explaining that the federal rules of evidence generally apply to civil actions and proceedings
Summary of this case from Fewless v. Health-MichiganOpinion
Case Number 01-10335-BC.
January 7, 2003
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REMANDING CIVIL ACTION TO SAGINAW COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
The plaintiff, Michelle K. Burke, originally filed this action in the Saginaw County Circuit Court alleging that the defendant terminated her employment in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2612, and the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA), Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1202. The defendant removed the case to this Court citing this Court's federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). The Court has entertained the state law claim under its supplemental jurisdiction authority. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The Court scheduled the motion for a hearing on November 26, 2002, at which time counsel for the parties appeared in open court. At that time, counsel for the plaintiff requested that the Court continue the hearing pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) because a key witness employed by the defendant, one Kathy Verros, was unavailable for deposition, and her evidence was allegedly necessary to determine the motion. The Court adjourned the hearing, directed the parties to complete the deposition of Ms.
Verros within three weeks, and allowed the parties to file supplemental briefs. The Court has reviewed the submissions and finds that the relevant law and facts have been set forth in the motion papers and that further oral argument will not aid in the disposition of the motions. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the motions be decided on the papers submitted. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(e)(2).
The Court finds that there is no material fact dispute with respect to the plaintiff's claim under the FMLA, and that the plaintiff has not established a prima facie case on that claim.
The Court will therefore grant the defendant's motion in part and dismiss that claim. The Court also concludes that there are unresolved questions of state law raised in the PWDCRA claim, and that, given the dismissal of the only federal claim, that state law claim ought to be decided by state courts. The Court will therefore remand the state law claim to the Saginaw County Circuit Court from whence it came. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
I.
The plaintiff, Michelle Burke, was an account executive for defendant HealthPlus of Michigan, Inc. for well over a decade. On March 21, 2002, the plaintiff was presented with a letter stating that she was being terminated from her employment because of "continued demonstration of poor judgment in withholding information from your supervisor and requesting and accepting incentive payment on a terminated account." Def.'s Ex. 4a. Offered the choice to resign or be terminated, the plaintiff elected to resign for "personal reasons." Def.'s Ex. 30a at 61-62.
The termination letter specifically referenced the plaintiff's handling of three HealthPlus accounts: the State of Michigan, Standish Community Hospital, and ITT. On April 20, 1999, the plaintiff was placed on 180 days probation due to her failure to verify the correct rates in a rate confirmation letter from the State of Michigan dated June 29, 1998 and addressed to the plaintiff. Her failure caused incorrect payments to HealthPlus for a period of one year, and resulted in a $269,603 loss, including $30,000-$40,000 of direct monetary loss and over $200,000 worth of time spent reconstructing and recouping other losses. That same April 20, 1999 warning letter also admonished the plaintiff about her use of unscheduled paid time off (PTO).
Employees were permitted 40 hours of unscheduled PTO for "sick time" each year. Beyer Dep. at 22. On November 18, 1999, the plaintiff was removed from probation and advised that her work performance would continue to be monitored. The removal notice further indicated approval of the plaintiff's advance scheduling of the PTO she did take, and indicated that similar planning would be expected in the future. Unscheduled PTO was again raised in the plaintiff's 1999 evaluation, in which supervisor Beyer indicated that "Michelle's PTO should be utilized for planned days off and keep unscheduled PTO to less than 40 hours per year." Pl.'s Ex. B.
The Standish Community Hospital account became an issue after the plaintiff submitted an "accomplishment sheet" in early 2000 that listed, as one of her accomplishments, the renewal of the Standish account. Although the plaintiff testified that she had indeed conducted a rate renewal in late 1999, see Burke Dep. at 69, Standish turns out not to have been a HealthPlus client in 2000.
The plaintiff testified that she was not under the impression that Standish had intended to terminate their account until early 2000 when her supervisor, Debbie Beyer, told her there was a problem. Id. at 67-68. The plaintiff acknowledged that renewals never occurred without affirmative confirmation by the client, and could not recall any such agreement signed by the Standish hospital. Id. at 69. Beyer subsequently received a copy of a letter sent by the hospital indicating its desire to terminate its account. The plaintiff admits to having seen the letter and misplacing it. Id. at 69-70. Beyer believes that the plaintiff knew about the letter all along, but the plaintiff was not disciplined at that time for the mix-up. Beyer Dep. at 84-85.
On November 6, 2000, ITT, one of the plaintiff's accounts, advised that it would not be renewing its account with HealthPlus, which was due to expire on December 31, 2000. The plaintiff claims that she never saw this letter until early 2001. See Burke Dep. at 77-78. Once again, the plaintiff's supervisor believed that the plaintiff had seen the letter, but ignored it. On or about February 23, 2001, an ITT representative called HealthPlus extremely upset about continued billings for an account that it had cancelled. The plaintiff admits that Beyer asked her about the drop in ITT accounts at the beginning of the 2001 year, and that she had disobeyed Beyer's direction to find out what was happening with the account.
The plaintiff's mishandling of the Standish and ITT accounts apparently prevented HealthPlus from pursuing corrective action to save them. The plaintiff, however, received a small bonus as a result of her claimed retention of the ITT account.
Prior to this time, there appears to be no dispute that Burke was an excellent employee. Her evaluation score for 1998 was 367, which equated to "exceeds customer expectations." Pl.'s Ex. C. Her scores in 1996 and 1997 were 341 and 347, respectively. Even in 1999, when she spent six months on probation as a result of the State of Michigan account issue, she received a score of 301, solidly within the "meets customer expectations" range of 251-350.
These annual evaluations were intended to be accurate, comprehensive evaluations of each account executive's performance.
Beyer Dep. at 149. Burke's 2000 evaluation also appears to be favorable, although HealthPlus has been unable to produce this evaluation despite admitting that it should have been completed by the time of the plaintiff's March, 2001 resignation. Handwritten notations on the plaintiff's termination memo suggest that her score for 2000 was 305, still a satisfactory score. See Pl.'s Ex.
F.
In late 1997, the plaintiff had an echocardiogram (EKG) to determine if a family history of heart defects had created similar complications for her. A cardiologist interpreted the echocardiogram and the plaintiff was then advised by her family physician that she had a possible bicuspid aortic valve — a structural defect — with normal function. In 1999, Burke contends that she took short-term disability leave related to this diagnosis.
Around February 13, 2001, the plaintiff visited a physician because she has complaints of chest pain. Another EKG was performed showing a left bundle branch block. The plaintiff saw her family physician on February 21, complaining of additional chest pain and palpitations, especially during stressful periods. She was referred to a cardiologist for further tests.
After conducting a Holster monitor examination on February 22, 2001 on the plaintiff, the same cardiologist who previously diagnosed a structural defect then suggested that the plaintiff might be suffering from a bicuspid aortic value subject to tachycardic episodes. The plaintiff took another stress test. On March 7, however, the plaintiff's cardiologist definitively ruled out a bicuspid aortic value.
During this period of time, February to March of 2001, the plaintiff never took more than two days at a time from work. Burke Dep. at 53. The plaintiff insists that any time she did take off was done in accordance with the defendant's PTO policy and that she was never denied PTO when she asked for it during this time period. Id. at 49. Supervisor Beyer states that she does not recall the plaintiff ever requesting medical leave from her, although she does recall one occasion in which the plaintiff was absent for part of the day for a doctor's visit. Beyer Dep. at 55-59, 112, 114-22. The plaintiff testified that she did not officially request FMLA leave because she hoped she could get her condition under control. Burke Dep. at 49, 52.
Burke suffered no medical problems through her next year and a half of employment, and she testified that her workload was not any different after the misdiagnosis than it was previously. Id. at 23, 35, 36-37. She was physically active: among other activities, Burke taught baton-twirling in a community education program. Burke Dep. at 37, 38, 39.
Burke "resigned" her employment with HealthPlus after being confronted with the March 21, 2002 letter. She claims that the real reason she was fired was her employer's unfounded concern over her supposed health problems, which included an improper treatment of her leave requests in violation of the FMLA. The defendant contends that the plaintiff has not established a prima facie case on her FMLA claim because she never had a "serious health condition" for which a medical leave of absence was requested or necessary, not has the plaintiff come forward with any evidence that the defendant retaliated against her for exercising her rights under the FMLA.
At the hearing on the defendant's motion, the Court granted the plaintiff's request, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), to take the deposition of Kathleen Verros, who was he director of human resources at the time of the plaintiff's termination, and who drafted the letter informing Burke that HealthPlus intended to terminate her. That deposition, a transcript of which was filed by the plaintiff on January 2, 2003, established that Verros's knowledge of the events surround Burke's termination is limited to that stated in the termination letter.
II.
A motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 presumes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (internal quotes omitted).
A fact is "material" if its resolution affects the outcome of the lawsuit. Lenning v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2001). "Materiality" is determined by the substantive law claim. Boyd v. Baeppler, 215 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2000). An issue is "genuine" if a "reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Henson v. Nat'l Aeronautics Space Admin., 14 F.3d 1143, 1148 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Irrelevant or unnecessary factual disputes do not create genuine issues of material fact. St. Francis Health Care Centre v. Shalala, 205 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 2000). When the "record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party," there is no genuine issue of material fact. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 951 (6th Cir. 2000). Thus a factual dispute which "is merely colorable or is not significantly probative" will not defeat a motion for summary judgment which is properly supported. Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 772 (6th Cir. 1999).
The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts. Mt. Lebanon Personal Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Univ., Inc., 276 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 2002). The party opposing the motion then may not "rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact" but must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion. Street v. J.C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual material showing "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. If the non-moving party, after sufficient opportunity for discovery, is unable to meet his or her burden of proof, summary judgment is clearly proper. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.
The party who bears the burden of proof must present a jury question as to each element of the claim. Davis v. McCourt, 226 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2000). Failure to prove an essential element of a claim renders all other facts immaterial for summary judgment purposes. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Elvisly Yours, Inc., 936 F.2d 889, 895 (6th Cir. 1991).
Since the passage of the FMLA, eligible employees are entitled to as many as twelve weeks of leave during a one-year period if, among other things, they have "a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). Employees manifest a "serious health condition" when they suffer "an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves — (A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider." Id. § 2611(11). In order to prevail on her claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) she had a serious health condition; (2) that prevented her from performing her job duties; and (3) she gave the defendant reasonable notice of her need to take leave and the reasons for doing so. Whitaker v. Bosch Braking Sys. Div. Of Robert Bosch Corp., 180 F. Supp.2d 922, 926 (W.D.Mich. 2001).
In addition to permitting the employee to take medical leave, the FMLA also protects employees for retaliation for exercising their rights under the FMLA. See Chandler v. Specialty Tires of Am. (Tennessee), Inc., 283 F.3d 818, 825 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)). The FMLA does not protect employees from discrimination on the basis of the medical condition that gave rise to the leave. Id. An employee who lacks direct proof of employer retaliation can use the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show that she notified HealthPlus of her intent to take leave, that she suffered adverse action such as discharge from employment, and that there is a causal connection between the two events. See Skrjanc v. Great Lakes Power Serv. Co., 272 F.3d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 2001). Once a prima facie case has been made, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's discharge. Id. at 315. If such a reason is articulated, then the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the decision is pretextual. Id. The employee need not expressly invoke the FMLA to her employer in order to meet the notice requirement. "Once an employer is given notice that an employee is requesting leave for a FMLA-qualifying reason, the employer bears the obligation to collect any additional information necessary to make the leave comply with the requirements of the FMLA." Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 450 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding notice to be insufficient when it was given after the plaintiff had already resigned from the company); see also Brohm v. JD Properties, Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir. 1998) (rejecting FMLA claim where the plaintiff did not even know his sleeping on the job was a medical problem prior to being separated from his employment).
Proximity of time between notice and adverse employment action usually will not, by itself, provide sufficient evidence of causation to survive summary judgment. Chandler, 283 F.3d at 826. Compare id. with Ford v. Gen. Motors Corp., 305 F.3d 545, 555 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding temporal proximity sufficient where Title VII retaliation started immediately after the protected conduct occurred) and Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 582-83 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding prima facie case for retaliation made when alleged retaliatory activity started the same day the complaint was made). However, the combination of proximity in time with other evidence, such as the lack of credibility of the proffered reason for termination, may be sufficient. Chandler, 283 F.3d at 826.
When demonstrating pretext, the plaintiff need not offer direct evidence that the discharge was motivated by the taking of FMLA leave. Instead, the plaintiff can survive summary judgment simply by demonstrating that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the proffered reason for discharge was false. Skrjanc, 272 F.3d at 316 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000)) (rejecting the plaintiff's attempts to disprove the nondiscriminatory reason advanced by his employer).
Here, the plaintiff has not offered evidence establishing a prima facie case of an FMLA violation. Nowhere does the plaintiff demonstrate that her health condition, to the extent that she had one at all, rendered her unable to perform her duties as an account executive. See Sharpe v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 19 F. Supp.2d 483, 489 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (finding bereavement not to be "serious health condition" because it did not render the plaintiff fundamentally unable to perform her duties, even if she was distraught with grief). In fact, the plaintiff admitted that, aside from occasional trips to the doctor, her "condition" did not interfere at all with her job duties.
Proof of the retaliation claim is also lacking, mainly because the plaintiff never actually told her supervisor that she wanted to take leave. See Skrjanc, 272 F.3d at 314. In fact, she specifically admitted she did not want to take leave because she "did not want to take time off work." Burke Dep. at 52. Instead, the plaintiff took limited periods of PTO. The plaintiff contends that FMLA leave was involved because Beyer, her supervisor, specifically informed the plaintiff that if she went on leave, Beyer would be stuck doing her job as well. Id. at 50. However, the plaintiff never went on leave or declared her intent to do so, which complicates the plaintiff's obligation task of pointing to any protected activity against which the defendant allegedly retaliated.
Instead, the plaintiff asserts that because the defendant required that PTO be used before FMLA leave could be taken, "retaliation" against her for her alleged abuse of PTO was the equivalent of prohibited FMLA retaliation. This argument is unconvincing. PTO is an employment benefit offered by HealthPlus; this employer can impose appropriate discipline as it sees fit for the improper use of it. Such is the reality of at-will employment. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, she at most can show that HealthPlus was hostile to her because of the possibility that she was ill and would take FMLA leave at some time in the future after her PTO time had expired. Taking adverse employment against an employee because of her medical condition, however, is distinct from retaliation because she declared her intention to take, or actually took, unpaid family medical leave. See Chandler, 283 F.3d at 825. the former does not constitute a violation of the FMLA, and the plaintiff has not shown that the latter has occurred here. The defendant, therefore, is entitled to summary judgment on the FMLA count.
III.
Michigan's Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act provides that employers shall not "[d]ischarge or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of a disability or genetic information that is unrelated to the individual's ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position." Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1202(b). The relevant portion of the PWDCRA defines disability as follows:
(i) A determinable physical or mental characteristic of an individual, which may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional disorder, if the characteristic:
(A) For purposes of article 2, substantially limits 1 or more of the major life activities of that individual and is unrelated to the individual's ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position or substantially limits 1 or more of the major life activities of that individual and is unrelated to the individual's qualifications for employment or promotion.
. . .
(iii) Being regarded as having a determinable physical or mental characteristic described in subparagraph ( i).
Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1103(d). The plaintiff here does not contend that she actually suffered from a "disability." Rather, her claim is based on the theory that HealthPlus regarded her as physically disabled. In order to recover under a "regarded as" theory, the plaintiff must first make a prima facie case that she was discharged because her employer regarded her as being disabled.
This may be accomplished by proving that (1) the plaintiff was regarded as having a determinable physical or mental characteristic; (2) the perceived characteristic was regarded as substantially limiting one or more of the plaintiff's major life activities; and (3) the perceived characteristic was regarded as being unrelated either to the plaintiff's ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position or to the plaintiff's qualifications for employment or promotion. Michalski v. Reuven Bar Levav, 463 Mich. 723, 732, 625 N.W.2d 754, 760 (2001). The physical or mental handicap allegedly perceived by the employer must evaluated by the court "as it was perceived at the time of the plaintiff's employment." Id. at 733, 625 N.W.2d at 760. Once the plaintiff has made a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant, who must come forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiff's termination. Rauch v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 997 F. Supp. 834, 837 (E.D.Mich. 1998). The plaintiff then has the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason for termination is false and merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. In this case, the plaintiff contends that many of the documents which the defendant seeks to use to justify her termination were withheld from her in violation of the Bullard-Plawecki Employee Right to Know Act (BPERKA), which requires an employer to disclose to an employee her personnel file upon demand of the employee. The Act also provides in relevant part:
Personnel record information which was not included in the personnel record but should have been as required by this act shall not be used by an employer in a judicial or quasi judicial proceeding. However, personnel record information which, in the opinion of the judge in a judicial proceeding . . . was not intentionally excluded in the personnel record, may be used by the employer in the judicial . . . proceeding, if the employee agrees or if the employee has been given a reasonable time to review the information.
The defendant argues that the preclusion sanction should not apply here because the documents were not intentionally withheld, and the plaintiff has eventually recovered them. It appears that the documents in question consisted of memoranda relating to possible discipline, which the defendant had not placed in the plaintiff's personnel file, but rather put in a separate "investigation folder." The defendant relies on the decision in Beauchamp v. Great West Life Assurance Co., 918 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D.Mich. 1996), in which another judge in this district found that the defendant was not barred from using in evidence a form that had not been produced in accordance with the plaintiff's Bullard-Plawicki Act request because the form had not been intentionally withheld, the plaintiff was aware of the document's existence, and the form was produced to the plaintiff when the defendant filed her motion to compel arbitration.
This Court is not convinced that the Bullard-Plawicki Act, a state statute, would bar the admission of the documents in a trial in this Court. When federal courts exercising supplemental jurisdiction are called upon to decide state law claims, the rules for decision are determined as when the court exercises diversity jurisdiction. Super Sulky, Inc. v. United States Trotting Ass'n, 174 F.3d 733, 741 (6th Cir. 1999) ("A federal court exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is bound to apply the law of the forum state to the same extent as if it were exercising its diversity jurisdiction."). Thus, in state law matters, the Court is bound by the substantive law of the forum state, but applies the procedural law of the federal courts. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). The admission of evidence in hearings and trials is a matter of procedure, 19 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller Edward H. Cooper, § 4512 (2d ed. 1996); Salas by Salas v. Wang, 846 F.2d 897, 905-06 (3d Cir. 1988), and in federal courts is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Barnes v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 201 F.3d 815, 829 (6th Cir. 2000); Grossheim v. Freightliner Corp., 974 F.2d 745, 754 (6th Cir. 1992); Laney v. Celotex Corp., 901 F.2d 1319, 1320 (6th Cir. 1990) "Indeed, the federal rules themselves provide that they `apply generally to civil actions and proceedings.'" Legg v. Chopra, 286 F.3d 286, 290 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Fed.R.Evid. 1101(b)).
Further, if the Court were required to apply the preclusion sanction of the Bullard-Plawicki Act, this Court would not be inclined to adopt the reasoning in Beauchamp. It appears that the court in that case transformed a good-faith exception, which an employer might interpose, into a requirement of bad faith to be established by the employee seeking to enforce rights under the Bullard-Plawicki Act. A record is "intentionally excluded" from the personnel file when a representative of an employer makes a conscious decision to keep it separate, and especially when the employer refrains from turning it over when a formal Bullard-Plawicki request is made. The good-faith exception exempts clerical oversights in providing particular portions of a file, not the wholesale subversion of the Act by authorizing employers to keep such information secret until litigation, if it is produced then at all. The "right to know" that employees have in Michigan includes all items defined by the law as personnel records. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 423.501(c) (defining personnel record as "a record kept by the employer that identifies the employee, to the extent that the record is used or has been used, or may affect or be used relative to that employee's qualifications for employment, promotion, transfer, additional compensation, or disciplinary action"). Under Michigan law, discharged employees have a right to see those records in their entirety before they incur the costs of retaining counsel, filing suit and conducting discovery.
But that matter need not be decided by this Court. The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) state in relevant part:
The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if —
. . .
(1) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(2) the district court has or dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.
Pursuant to this statute, this Court has the discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims in the circumstances of this case, particularly when the federal claim has been dismissed. Weeks v. Portage County Executive Offices, 235 F.3d 275, 279-80 (6th Cir. 2000). In this case, the claim which remains before this Court arise under a Michigan statute, and is impacted by the application of another Michigan statute which prescribes a procedure for excluding evidence in certain circumstances of pre-suit non-disclosure.
In deciding substantive state law claims, it is the obligation of the federal district courts to apply the law of the state's highest court, or to ascertain the state law from all relevant data. See Central Mich. Bd. of Trs. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 117 F. Supp.2d 627, 632 (E.D.Mich. 2000). This Court believes that, under the circumstances of this case, the state courts of Michigan are in a better position to determine and apply the applicable law. There is especially no good reason for this Court to retain jurisdiction in this case and to engage in the endeavor of determining and applying state law when there are no federal claims remaining in this Court; the discovery is complete, and the state court need only determine any further dispositive motions and, if appropriate, try the case, applying the state evidentiary laws of preclusion if the state court decides they are applicable.
Where a case containing both federal and state law claims has been removed to this Court pursuant to the court's federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1441, and the federal claim has been dismissed, this Court has discretion to either dismiss the remaining state law claims or to remand them. Long v. Bando Mfg. of Am., Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 761 (6th Cir. 2000). In exercising that discretion, the court may consider the convenience of the parties and expeditiousness in resolving the case. Id. The plaintiff in this case originally filed the action in the Saginaw County Circuit Court, her forum of choice.
The Court believes that it is more appropriate to remand the state law claim to the plaintiff's original forum of choice rather than dismiss it.
IV.
The plaintiff has not come forth with evidence that establishes a question of material fact with respect to her FMLA claim. The PWDCRA claim arising under state law will be remanded to the state court.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and the plaintiff's claim arising under the FMLA is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
It is further ORDERED that the remaining claim is REMANDED to the Saginaw County, Michigan Circuit Court.