Burk v. Sunn

10 Citing cases

  1. Rose v. Oba

    68 Haw. 422 (Haw. 1986)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that provisions in a hospital’s bylaws governing corrective action against doctors did not affect private rights of or procedures available to the public

    1984), and be submitted for the approval of the governor and formally filed with the lieutenant governor, HRS § 91-4(a) (1976). Rules not promulgated in accordance with the HAPA rule-making requirements are invalid and unenforceable. Burk v. Sunn, 68 Haw. ___, ___, 705 P.2d 17, 20-21 (1985). Appellants admit the relevant procedures governing corrective action were not adopted in accordance with the HAPA rule-making requirements, but contend compliance was not necessary because the procedures are not "rules" within the meaning of HRS § 91-1(4).

  2. Martinez v. Espinas

    938 F. Supp. 650 (D. Haw. 1996)   Cited 1 times
    In Martinez, the court also held that the DPS policy at issue, COR 12.02, was an internal guideline, not an administrative rule, that was not binding on DPS, id. at 654, and noted that it was aware of no authority that required correctional facilities to provide library time to inmates in excess of three hours per week, id. at 655.

    Administrative "rules" not promulgated in accordance with the HAPA are invalid and unenforceable. Burk v. Sunn, 68 Haw. 80, 83, 705 P.2d 17 (1985). Here, however, either Policy No. COR.12.02 is a "rule" within the meaning of the HAPA, in which case it is invalid and unenforceable because it was not promulgated in accordance therewith, or it is a mere "internal guideline" which does not bind DPS.

  3. Kawashima v. State, Department of Education

    140 Haw. 139 (Haw. 2017)

    see also Aluli v. Lewin, 73 Haw. 56, 57, 59, 828 P.2d 802, 803-04 (1992) (finding that the State Department of Health’s issuance of an “air pollution permit authorizing the construction and operation of [geothermal] wells” which would emit hydrogen sulfide was not in accordance with rulemaking, and that “[a]ir quality is an integral part of the quality of life and the public should have input in these matters”); Burk v. Sunn, 68 Haw. 80, 93, 705 P.2d 17, 27 (1985) (holding that the Department of Social Services and Housing’s policy with respect to prorating benefits under a food stamp program was a rule because it had a “direct impact on the rights of Pood Stamp recipients”). In contrast, this court has held that bylaws or instructional procedures that do not affect “private rights of or procedures available to the public” are not rules.

  4. Kawashima v. State

    398 P.3d 728 (Haw. 2017)   Cited 9 times

    " Id. This court reasoned that these amendments plainly " 'affected' in both a practical and a legal sense the 'private rights' not only of those tenants actually living in public housing but also those members of the public at large who were interested in becoming tenants." Id. ; see also Aluli v. Lewin , 73 Haw. 56, 57, 59, 828 P.2d 802, 803-04 (1992) (finding that the State Department of Health's issuance of an "air pollution permit authorizing the construction and operation of [geothermal] wells" which would emit hydrogen sulfide was not in accordance with rulemaking, and that "[a]ir quality is an integral part of the quality of life and the public should have input in these matters"); Burk v. Sunn , 68 Haw. 80, 93, 705 P.2d 17, 27 (1985) (holding that the Department of Social Services and Housing's policy with respect to prorating benefits under a food stamp program was a rule because it had a "direct impact on the rights of Food Stamp recipients").In contrast, this court has held that bylaws or instructional procedures that do not affect "private rights of or procedures available to the public" are not rules.

  5. State v. Erickstad

    2000 N.D. 202 (N.D. 2000)   Cited 52 times
    Holding that police officer’s testimony about the value of a pickup truck, a figure he obtained from the Kelley Blue Book website, fell within the published compilation hearsay exception

    The Kelley Blue Book has been specifically recognized as a reliable reference for valuation of vehicles. See, e.g., Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1274 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1986) (recognizing the Kelley Blue Book as "the standard reference for prices" of vehicles and mobile homes); In re Mama's Original Foods, Inc., 234 B.R. 500, 504 (Bankr.C.D.Cal. 1999) (Kelley Blue Book "establishes the market value for automobiles" and a sale at the Kelley Blue Book price "is presumptively at the market price"); In re Gates, 214 B.R. 467, 471 n. 6 (Bankr.D.Md. 1997) (Kelley Blue Book is recognized "as credible evidence of valuation"); Burk v. Sunn, 705 P.2d 17, 25-26 (Haw. 1985) (recognizing Hawaii Department of Social Services and Housing administrative rule providing that, for purposes of AFDC eligibility, the fair market value of an automobile may be determined by considering the Kelley Blue Book retail value). [¶ 33] We recognize that, in this case, the police officer checked the value of the pickup on the Kelley Blue Book internet website, not in the print edition.

  6. Foytik v. Chandler

    88 Haw. 307 (Haw. 1998)   Cited 32 times
    Reiterating that, under Hawaii law, claim preclusion “precludes the relitigation, not only of the issues which were actually litigated in the first action, but also of all grounds of claim and defense which might have been properly litigated in the first action but were not litigated or decided” (quoting Morneau v. Stark Enters., Ltd., 56 Haw. 420, 422-23, 539 P.2d 472, 474-75 (1975))

    B. DHS Provided Adequate Notice Under the HAPA Regarding Its Proposed Amendments to HAR §§ 17-678-17 TO 17-678-19. We have held that administrative rules not promulgated in accordance of the HAPA are invalid and unenforceable. See, e.g., Burk v. Sunn, 68 Haw. 80, 83, 705 P.2d 17, 20-21 (1985). Moreover, in a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of administrative rules, "[t]he court shall declare the rule invalid if it finds that it violates constitutional or statutory provisions, or exceeds the statutory authority of the agency, or was adopted without compliance with statutory rulemaking procedures."

  7. Matter of Rulemaking, N.J.A.C. 10:82-1.2

    117 N.J. 311 (N.J. 1989)   Cited 59 times
    Construing that N.J.S.A. 44:8-111, which states that the Commissioner of Human Services " shall ... [p]romulgate, alter and amend from time to time such rules, regulations and directory orders as may be necessary for the administration of State aid and for the carrying out of any provisions of [welfare] law regulating the same," obligated the Commissioner to specify in a regulation a " standard of need" for welfare recipients

    The Supreme Court explained the function of the standard of need by saying that, while [the Social Security Act] leaves the States free to effect downward adjustments in the level of benefits paid, it accomplishes within that framework the goal, however modest, of forcing a State to accept the political consequence of such a cutback and bringing to light the true extent to which actual assistance falls short of the minimum acceptable. [ Burk v. Sunn, 68 Haw. 80, 705 P.2d 17, 22 (Haw. 1985) (quoting Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 413, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 1218, 25 L.Ed.2d 442, 456 (1970)).] Moreover, a state cannot obscure what standard of need applies.

  8. Green Party v. Nago

    137 Haw. 58 (Haw. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 1 times

    “Rules not promulgated in accordance with the HAPA rule-making requirements are invalid and unenforceable.” Id. (citing Burk v. Sunn, 68 Haw. 80, 83, 705 P.2d 17, 20-21 (1985)). “Rule” is broadly defined by HRS § 91-1(4) as meaning:

  9. Jacober v. Sunn

    715 P.2d 813 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that an administrative agency "may not enact rules and regulations which enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the act being administered"

    See In re Marques, 37 Haw. 260 (1945); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 374 (1974). Thus, in order to be valid and enforceable, those rules must have been established in accordance with HAPA.Burk v. Sunn, 68 Haw. ___, 705 P.2d 17 (1985); Costa v. Sunn, 64 Haw. 389, 642 P.2d 530 (1982); 5 Haw. App. 419, 697 P.2d 43 (1985). In the instant case, DSSH concedes that its rules implementing the May 19, 1982 statutory amendments were not promulgated in accordance with HAPA until October 1982. Accordingly, we affirm the lower court's decision that plaintiffs are entitled to recover benefits through October 1982.

  10. B.C. v. Dept. of Human Services

    263 N.J. Super. 225 (App. Div. 1993)

    the amount of money which has been determined to be essential to maintain an acceptable standard of living. [Id. at 319, 566 A.2d 1154, quoting Burk v. Sunn, 68 Haw. 80, 705 P.2d 17, 22 (1985).] Accordingly, N.J.A.C. 10:82-1.1A was promulgated as of July 1, 1992, codifying New Jersey's standard of need.