1984), and be submitted for the approval of the governor and formally filed with the lieutenant governor, HRS § 91-4(a) (1976). Rules not promulgated in accordance with the HAPA rule-making requirements are invalid and unenforceable. Burk v. Sunn, 68 Haw. ___, ___, 705 P.2d 17, 20-21 (1985). Appellants admit the relevant procedures governing corrective action were not adopted in accordance with the HAPA rule-making requirements, but contend compliance was not necessary because the procedures are not "rules" within the meaning of HRS § 91-1(4).
Administrative "rules" not promulgated in accordance with the HAPA are invalid and unenforceable. Burk v. Sunn, 68 Haw. 80, 83, 705 P.2d 17 (1985). Here, however, either Policy No. COR.12.02 is a "rule" within the meaning of the HAPA, in which case it is invalid and unenforceable because it was not promulgated in accordance therewith, or it is a mere "internal guideline" which does not bind DPS.
see also Aluli v. Lewin, 73 Haw. 56, 57, 59, 828 P.2d 802, 803-04 (1992) (finding that the State Department of Health’s issuance of an “air pollution permit authorizing the construction and operation of [geothermal] wells” which would emit hydrogen sulfide was not in accordance with rulemaking, and that “[a]ir quality is an integral part of the quality of life and the public should have input in these matters”); Burk v. Sunn, 68 Haw. 80, 93, 705 P.2d 17, 27 (1985) (holding that the Department of Social Services and Housing’s policy with respect to prorating benefits under a food stamp program was a rule because it had a “direct impact on the rights of Pood Stamp recipients”). In contrast, this court has held that bylaws or instructional procedures that do not affect “private rights of or procedures available to the public” are not rules.
" Id. This court reasoned that these amendments plainly " 'affected' in both a practical and a legal sense the 'private rights' not only of those tenants actually living in public housing but also those members of the public at large who were interested in becoming tenants." Id. ; see also Aluli v. Lewin , 73 Haw. 56, 57, 59, 828 P.2d 802, 803-04 (1992) (finding that the State Department of Health's issuance of an "air pollution permit authorizing the construction and operation of [geothermal] wells" which would emit hydrogen sulfide was not in accordance with rulemaking, and that "[a]ir quality is an integral part of the quality of life and the public should have input in these matters"); Burk v. Sunn , 68 Haw. 80, 93, 705 P.2d 17, 27 (1985) (holding that the Department of Social Services and Housing's policy with respect to prorating benefits under a food stamp program was a rule because it had a "direct impact on the rights of Food Stamp recipients").In contrast, this court has held that bylaws or instructional procedures that do not affect "private rights of or procedures available to the public" are not rules.
The Kelley Blue Book has been specifically recognized as a reliable reference for valuation of vehicles. See, e.g., Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1274 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1986) (recognizing the Kelley Blue Book as "the standard reference for prices" of vehicles and mobile homes); In re Mama's Original Foods, Inc., 234 B.R. 500, 504 (Bankr.C.D.Cal. 1999) (Kelley Blue Book "establishes the market value for automobiles" and a sale at the Kelley Blue Book price "is presumptively at the market price"); In re Gates, 214 B.R. 467, 471 n. 6 (Bankr.D.Md. 1997) (Kelley Blue Book is recognized "as credible evidence of valuation"); Burk v. Sunn, 705 P.2d 17, 25-26 (Haw. 1985) (recognizing Hawaii Department of Social Services and Housing administrative rule providing that, for purposes of AFDC eligibility, the fair market value of an automobile may be determined by considering the Kelley Blue Book retail value). [¶ 33] We recognize that, in this case, the police officer checked the value of the pickup on the Kelley Blue Book internet website, not in the print edition.
B. DHS Provided Adequate Notice Under the HAPA Regarding Its Proposed Amendments to HAR §§ 17-678-17 TO 17-678-19. We have held that administrative rules not promulgated in accordance of the HAPA are invalid and unenforceable. See, e.g., Burk v. Sunn, 68 Haw. 80, 83, 705 P.2d 17, 20-21 (1985). Moreover, in a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of administrative rules, "[t]he court shall declare the rule invalid if it finds that it violates constitutional or statutory provisions, or exceeds the statutory authority of the agency, or was adopted without compliance with statutory rulemaking procedures."
The Supreme Court explained the function of the standard of need by saying that, while [the Social Security Act] leaves the States free to effect downward adjustments in the level of benefits paid, it accomplishes within that framework the goal, however modest, of forcing a State to accept the political consequence of such a cutback and bringing to light the true extent to which actual assistance falls short of the minimum acceptable. [ Burk v. Sunn, 68 Haw. 80, 705 P.2d 17, 22 (Haw. 1985) (quoting Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 413, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 1218, 25 L.Ed.2d 442, 456 (1970)).] Moreover, a state cannot obscure what standard of need applies.
“Rules not promulgated in accordance with the HAPA rule-making requirements are invalid and unenforceable.” Id. (citing Burk v. Sunn, 68 Haw. 80, 83, 705 P.2d 17, 20-21 (1985)). “Rule” is broadly defined by HRS § 91-1(4) as meaning:
See In re Marques, 37 Haw. 260 (1945); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 374 (1974). Thus, in order to be valid and enforceable, those rules must have been established in accordance with HAPA.Burk v. Sunn, 68 Haw. ___, 705 P.2d 17 (1985); Costa v. Sunn, 64 Haw. 389, 642 P.2d 530 (1982); 5 Haw. App. 419, 697 P.2d 43 (1985). In the instant case, DSSH concedes that its rules implementing the May 19, 1982 statutory amendments were not promulgated in accordance with HAPA until October 1982. Accordingly, we affirm the lower court's decision that plaintiffs are entitled to recover benefits through October 1982.
the amount of money which has been determined to be essential to maintain an acceptable standard of living. [Id. at 319, 566 A.2d 1154, quoting Burk v. Sunn, 68 Haw. 80, 705 P.2d 17, 22 (1985).] Accordingly, N.J.A.C. 10:82-1.1A was promulgated as of July 1, 1992, codifying New Jersey's standard of need.