Opinion
December 1, 1934.
1. JURISDICTION: Appeal and Error. Where the circuit court set aside an award of the Compensation Commission and directed an award of a sum which exceeded the original award by more than $7,500, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction of the appeal.
2. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: Award of Commission. Where the finding of facts upon an issue by the Workmen's Compensation Commission was supported by substantial evidence and upon a second hearing additional evidence was introduced upon the issue, it only raised a question of the preponderance of evidence and the same finding upon the evidence as on the first hearing is supported by substantial evidence.
3. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: Findings by Commission. The weight of conflicting evidence is for the determination of the Workmen's Compensation Commission and if its finding of facts is supported by substantial evidence it is conclusive upon reviewing courts.
In determining whether or not there is substantial evidence to sustain the award of the commission, reviewing courts will consider only the evidence favorable in support of such award.
Appeal from Barton Circuit Court. — Hon. C.A. Hendricks, Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED ( with directions).
Cornelius Murphy, Jr., and Silvers Sheppard for appellants.
(1) The circuit court had no authority on appeal from the Workmen's Compensation Commission to try the case de novo and pass judgment on the weight of the evidence. Hamnack v. West Plains Lbr. Co., 30 S.W.2d 650; Jackson v. General Metals Roofing Co., 43 S.W.2d 865; Jones v. Century Coal Co., 46 S.W.2d 196; Burgstrand v. Crowe Coal Co., 62 S.W.2d 406. (2) There was substantial evidence to support each finding of the Workmen's Compensation Commission and on review the appellate court must look to the evidence most favorable to support the finding of the commission. Brewer v. Ash Grove Lime Cement Co., 25 S.W.2d 1086; Goebel v. Mo. Candy Co., 50 S.W.2d 741; Leilich v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 40 S.W.2d 601; Jones v. Century Coal Co., 46 S.W.2d 196; Schulte v. Grand Union Tea Coffee Co., 43 S.W.2d 832. (3) The employer was engaged in mining coal and operated for only a part of the whole number of working days in each year and there was substantial evidence to support the finding of the Compensation Commission in adopting 225 as the number of working days as a basis for computing the annual earnings. Burgstrand v. Crowe Coal Co., 62 S.W.2d 406; Sec. 3320 (e), R.S. 1929; Johnson v. Kruckemeyer, 29 S.W.2d 730; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Davis, 42 S.W.2d 945; Allison v. Eyermann Const. Co., 43 S.W.2d 1063. (4) The employee had suffered a previous injury on January 2, 1929, and as a result of said accident he became industrially blind in his right eye for which compensation had been paid and said blindness existed at the time of this second accident. The resulting condition was permanent total disability and was due to a combination of the injury existing as a result of the accident of January 2, 1929, and the injury of January 23, 1930. Compensation is therefore 2/3 of that for permanent total disability in other cases and the average annual earnings at the time of the last injury is used as a basis for computing compensation. Secs. 3316, 3317 (a), R.S. 1929; Goebel v. Mo. Candy Co., 50 S.W.2d 741; Burgstrand v. Crowe Coal Co., 62 S.W.2d 406. (5) The finding that the average weekly wage of the employee was $22.93 was a finding of fact by the commission and is conclusive and binding on courts of review. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Davis, 42 S.W.2d 945; Harbour v. Gardner, 38 S.W.2d 295; Wadley v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 37 S.W.2d 665; 28 R.C.L. 821; L.R.A. 1916A, 149. (6) The findings of fact and award of the commission have the force and effect of the verdict of a jury. State ex rel. Bremen-Clark Syrup Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Comm., 8 S.W.2d 899; Kinder v. Hannibal Car Wheel Foundry Co., 18 S.W.2d 91; Hager v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 17 S.W.2d 578; Cotter v. Valentine Coal Co., 14 S.W.2d 660; DeMay v. Liberty Foundry Co., 37 S.W.2d 640; Lekmitas v. R.C. Const. Co., 46 S.W.2d 963; Perry v. Kreis Sons, 49 S.W.2d 220.
A.H. Carl for appellee.
(1) The appellants contend in Point 1 of its brief page 13 that the circuit court had no authority on appeal from the Workmen's Compensation Commission to try the case de novo and pass judgment on the weight of the evidence and cite the following cases, to-wit: Hammack v. West Plains Lbr. Co., 30 S.W.2d 650; Jackson v. General Metals Roofing Co., 43 S.W.2d 865; Jones v. Century Coal Co., 46 S.W.2d 196; Burgstrand v. Crowe Coal Co., 62 S.W.2d 406. With the above cases cited by the appellants, in this contention respondent is in complete accord, but it is our sincere contention that the judge of the Circuit Court of Barton County, Missouri, had a right under Section 3342, Revised Statutes 1929, to set aside the award and findings made by the Compensation Commission in this case. Adams v. Lilbourin Grain Co., 48 S.W.2d 147. This opinion was rendered by Justice Cox. The court said in its opinion: "This finding is not supported by sufficient, competent evidence, but is incomprehensible on that theory consistent with a proper regard for their duty to determine issues according to law and evidence; and we are firmly convinced that the trial court was right in setting the finding aside and remanding the case to the commission for further proceedings." Kensen v. Ely v. Walker D.G. Co., 48 S.W.2d 167. "Circuit court may reverse compensation award for insufficiency of evidence." R.S. 1929, sec. 3342; Elsas v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 50 S.W.2d 130. "Terms of Compensation Act should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose." R.S. 1929, sec. 3374. (2) The appellants have contended in Point 2 of its Authorities page 13 of its brief, that there was substantial evidence to support each finding of the Workmen's Compensation Commission and on review the appellate court must look to the evidence most favorable to support the finding of the commission. In this contention we agree with appellants that the above statement is true and correct and the cases cited under Point 2 of appellants' brief herein upholds that theory, but, on the other hand, it is our sincere contention, when the evidence does not support the findings of the Workmen's Compensation Commission and on review the appellate court has the right to set aside the findings of the Workmen's Compensation Commission and is so held and set out under Section 3342, General Statutes of Missouri, 1929, and upheld by Adams v. Lilbourin Grain Co., 48 S.W.2d 147; Kenser v. Ely Walker D.G. Co., 48 S.W.2d 167; Elsas v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 50 S.W.2d 130.
This is the second appeal in this case. Our opinion on the first appeal is reported in Burgstrand v. Crowe Coal Co., 333 Mo. 43, 62 S.W.2d 406. The controversy originated before the Workmen's Compensation Commission. On the first appeal, we remanded the cause for further proceedings before the commission. Pursuant to our mandate the commission held another hearing, which we shall refer to as the second hearing, at which the record of its first hearing, including the evidence then taken, was introduced, together with some additional evidence and again made an award in favor of the plaintiff, respondent here, from which he appealed to the circuit court. That court set aside the findings and award of the commission and itself made a detailed finding of facts, set out the amounts that it determined should be awarded to the plaintiff and remanded the cause to the commission with directions to that body to award plaintiff compensation in accordance with the circuit court's findings. The employer and the insurer appealed.
The commission awarded plaintiff compensation at the rate of $10.18 per week for three hundred weeks and thereafter for life at $6 per week. Plaintiff's age was shown. Using the mortality tables provided by statute as a basis for computing the amount of the award after the expiration of the three hundred weeks the total award of the commission aggregated $6,430.78, from which was to be deducted $1,350 already paid. The amounts which the circuit court found and directed the commission to award aggregated $13,956, less the $1,350 already paid, leaving a balance of $12,606, which the court directed the commission to award. The difference between the amount awarded by the commission and the amount of the circuit court's judgment, from which this appeal was taken, was thus $7525.22, giving this court appellate jurisdiction. [See Burgstrand v. Crowe Coal Co., supra.]
Appellant Crowe Coal Company operated a strip coal mine in Barton County where respondent was employed as a shot firer. Appellant Consolidated Underwriters was the employer's insurer. It is conceded that respondent's injuries were due to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and that he is now totally and permanently disabled. The only controversy before the commission was as to the weekly allowance to be made.
Respondent had suffered an injury to his right eye, with some other minor injuries, from a premature explosion of powder on January 2, 1929, while working for the same employer. Following that accident there was a hearing before the commission and evidence was taken, a transcript of which was introduced herein. After said hearing that claim was settled and appellants paid respondent $1567.28 in full discharge thereof. In September, 1929, respondent returned to work and again, on January 23, 1930, a premature explosion occurred which destroyed the vision of his left eye, and whatever vision he had left in the right eye after the first accident. The claim for compensation in this case grows out of the last injury.
The commission determined plaintiff's earnings by taking 225 as the number of days in the year he worked, at $5.30 per day. The daily wage is not in dispute. Plaintiff insists there was no substantial evidence to justify the commission's finding of 225 working days as the basis for computing his earnings and the weekly compensation to be awarded. There was evidence that the mine did not operate at all times throughout the year. We held on the former appeal that there was substantial evidence to support the commission's finding on this issue. The same evidence was before the commission on the second hearing. Indeed, it was agreed at the beginning of said second hearing "that the original award of the commission as to all matters except the application of the two-thirds compensation under Section 3317 stands, and that . . . this hearing shall go into the proposition only of the condition of the eye of the employee at the time of the last accident."
The evidence on this issue is reviewed in our former opinion and need not be again epitomized. On this hearing, notwithstanding the agreement above mentioned, plaintiff, by deposition, offered some additional evidence tending to show that he worked more than 225 days in the year. But since there was substantial evidence to sustain the commission's finding of 225 days, the additional testimony only raised a question of the preponderance of evidence, — a question which will be referred to later, with citation of authorities. This contention must be ruled against respondent.
On the first hearing of this claim the commission found that plaintiff had previously received an injury to his right eye but did not find that he had suffered the loss of sight therein nor that there existed a previous disability at the time the last injury was received. Nevertheless the commission, in fixing the compensation, applied the third provision of subdivision (a) of Section 3317, Revised Statutes 1929 (12 Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 8253). Said subdivision (a) provides that cases of permanent disability where there has been a previous disability shall be compensated on the basis of the average annual earnings at the time of the last injury. Said third provision of the section reads: "If the resulting condition be a permanent total disability, the compensation therefor shall be two-thirds of that for permanent total disability in other cases." We held on the former appeal that the commission had erred in applying said third provision because there was no finding that the permanent total disability had resulted from a combination of a previous disability and the last injury, and for that reason we remanded the cause. See Burgstrand v. Crowe Coal Co., supra, where the question is fully discussed.
At the second hearing, the one here involved, the commission took further evidence as to the condition of plaintiff's right eye resulting from the first accident. As above stated a transcript of the evidence offered at the hearing following the first accident was also introduced. The commission then made a complete finding of facts based upon all the evidence taken. After stating facts found which are not in dispute, it stated its finding on the point now under consideration as follows: "We find from the evidence that on January 2, 1929, employee sustained an accidental injury and as a result of said accident he became industrially blind in his right eye, and that said blindness existed when employee sustained the second accident on January 23, 1930. We further find that the employee's permanent total disability resulted from a combination of the disability existing as a result of the accident of January 2, 1929, and the injury of January 23, 1930. Therefore, employee's compensation for the permanent total disability shall be two-thirds of that for total permanent disability in other cases."
Respondent contends that there was no substantial evidence to support this finding of the commission and the award based thereon, a contention upheld by the circuit court. This contention requires an examination of the evidence bearing on this issue.
Plaintiff was treated for both injuries by Dr. H.L. Steele, an eye specialist whose qualifications are admitted. Dr. Steele testified as a witness for plaintiff on the hearing before the commission for compensation for the first accident, which hearing was held about April 25, 1929. On said hearing following the first accident he testified to the nature and extent of the injury to plaintiff's right eye, his treatments and tests he had made of plaintiff's vision and said in substance that in his opinion plaintiff had suffered a ninety per cent loss of vision in the right eye as a result of the first injury; that the eye was of no industrial use; and that said loss of sight was permanent. Plaintiff himself at that hearing testified that he could see "very little" out of his right eye.
At the hearing of the instant claim Dr. Steele was not used as a witness by the plaintiff, but was called by defendants. He testified substantially as he had at the hearing of April 25, 1929, relative to the first injury and its effect on plaintiff's right eye, but in greater detail, and also testified as to the second injury and his treatment thereof. He again testified that as a result of the first injury plaintiff had corneal ulcers in the right eye, and that a permanent scar had formed over the pupil of that eye, which conditions existed at the time of the second injury; that, in his opinion, plaintiff, as a result of the first injury, was left permanently "for all industrial purposes, blind in that eye."
Other eye specialists, whose qualifications were either admitted or proved, said, in answer to hypothetical questions predicated upon the existence of the ulcers and scar and other facts testified to by Dr. Steele as revealed by his treatments and examinations, that in their opinions plaintiff was left permanently blind in the right eye for industrial purposes as a result of the first injury.
The evidence outlined above cannot be held unsubstantial. Dr. Steele had treated plaintiff for both injuries. He knew and described the condition of plaintiff's right eye resulting from the first injury and had tested his vision. Other eye specialists corroborated his opinion that the conditions described by him would cause and had caused a practically complete and permanent loss of vision for industrial purposes in plaintiff's right eye. It is true plaintiff's own testimony and other evidence introduced by him tended to show that he had much better vision in his right eye at the time of the second injury than indicated by Dr. Steele's testimony or by his own testimony given at the hearing following the first injury. But the weight of conflicting evidence is for the determination of the commission. If the finding of facts by that body is supported by substantial evidence it is conclusive and binding on reviewing courts. [Sec. 3342, R.S. 1929, 12 Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 8275; Leilich v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 328 Mo. 112, 120, 40 S.W.2d 601, 604 (4, 5); Doughton v. Marland Refining Co., 331 Mo. 280, 290, 53 S.W.2d 236, 241; Gillick v. Fruin-Colnon Const. Co., 334 Mo. 135, 65 S.W.2d 927; Jackson v. Curtiss-Wright Airplane Co., 334 Mo. 805, 68 S.W.2d 715, 719.] And in determining whether or not there is substantial evidence to sustain the award of the commission reviewing courts will consider only the evidence favorable in support of such award. [Probst v. St. Louis Basket Box Co. (Mo. App.), 52 S.W.2d 501; Sweeny v. Sweeny Tire Stores Co., 227 Mo. App. 93, 49 S.W.2d 205; Vollet v. Federal Brilliant Sign Co. (Mo. App.), 49 S.W.2d 201. See, also, Leilich v. Chevrolet Motor Co., supra.]
Under our opinion on the former appeal the facts found by the commission on the second hearing make a case coming within the provision of the statute (the third provision of subdivision (a) of Sec. 3317), which the commission applied. The commission's finding is supported by substantial evidence, therefore binding upon the circuit court and upon this court.
The foregoing disposes of the only questions presented on this appeal. As we said on the first appeal "we will not analyze the finding of facts and conclusions of law made by the circuit court. . . . It had no authority to make a finding of facts and enter a judgment awarding compensation," or to direct the commission to make an award in accordance with the court's findings. Since the award of the commission is supported by substantial evidence and does not appear to be invalid on other grounds it should have been affirmed by the circuit court. The judgment of the circuit court is therefore reversed and the cause is remanded to that court with directions to enter judgment affirming the award of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. Westhues, C., concurs; Bohling, C., not sitting.
The foregoing opinion by COOLEY, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.