Burgin v. Patch

7 Citing cases

  1. Raffety v. Parker

    241 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1957)   Cited 9 times
    Applying Missouri law

    nited States v. Blow, 7 Cir., 77 F.2d 141 (a tax case); Rossi v. Davis, 345 Mo. 362, 133 S.W.2d 363, 125 A.L.R. 1111; Cadbury v. Parrish, 89 N.H. 464, 200 A. 791; Nelligan v. Long, 320 Mass. 439, 70 N.E.2d 175, 170 A.L.R. 126, and In re Koffend's Will, 218 Minn. 206, 15 N.W.2d 590 (in each of which the trust owned the common stock of a corporation which itself took the depreciation); Dexter v. Dexter, 274 Mass. 273, 174 N.E. 493, 77 A.L.R. 750 (wherein the trust consisted of periodic receipts of the net income from another trust and was all net income and depreciation was not involved — case distinguished in Industrial Trust Co. v. Parks, 57 R.I. 363, 190 A. 32, 109 A.L.R. 220; Guthrie v. Crews, 286 Mo. 438, 229 S.W. 182 (wherein the beneficiary had the right not only to income, but, as well, to invade corpus); Evans v. Ockershausen, 69 App.D.C. 285, 100 F.2d 695, 128 A.L.R. 177; Buckingham v. Morrison, 136 Ill. 437, 27 N.E. 65; Saulsberry v. Saulsberry, 162 Ky. 486, 172 S.W. 932, and Burgin v. Patch, 312 Mass. 219, 44 N.E.2d 684 (cases depending upon local law or the peculiar terms of the trust.) It should, indeed, be obvious that a Trustee who annually pays out to life income beneficiaries the whole amount produced by a machine, operated and being worn out by the trust, without charging depreciation to cover the wear-out of the machine, is paying to such beneficiaries not only the net income from the machine, but is also paying them annually an aliquot part of the value of the machine itself, for although repairs may postpone, they cannot prevent, the eventual total depletion of the asset.

  2. Johnson v. Hazen

    333 Mass. 636 (Mass. 1956)   Cited 12 times

    Ed.) c. 235, § 8, applies, this court cannot reverse the decree because, where the evidence is not reported and there is no report of material facts, we must assume that the judge found all facts essential to the entry of the decree. Burgin v. Patch, 312 Mass. 219, 223. Undoubtedly this rule is correct but it is usually limited to cases where the decree is within the scope of the pleadings.

  3. Hall v. Evans

    326 Mass. 691 (Mass. 1951)   Cited 2 times

    The will provided that the trustees "shall pay out of . . . net income to my wife, Mercy L. Patch, during her natural life a sum of money which, with the income upon her own property, shall equal five thousand dollars per year . . . it being my desire and intention that my said wife shall have a total income of five thousand dollars per year during her natural life." This language was interpreted by this court in Burgin v. Patch, 312 Mass. 219, as giving authority to the trustees to take annually from principal enough to insure payments to the widow of $5,000 per year. Her individual income is not shown by the evidence but in no year did she receive in all more than $5,000.

  4. Nelligan v. Long

    70 N.E.2d 175 (Mass. 1946)   Cited 10 times
    In Nelligan v. Long, 320 Mass. 439, the trustees under a will received real estate occupied by a corporation carrying on a quarrying and stone crushing business with a direction "to carry on the... business... so long as the same shows a reasonable amount of profit on the investment."

    ' In re Inman, 1 Ch. 187, 191. `The authority given by the will indicated a preference of the life tenant to this extent, which took the case out of the ordinary rule.' New England Trust Co. v. Eaton, 140 Mass. 532, 541. `The power thus given to hold the property as they may receive it, is not an extension of the time for conversion, but authority to continue an investment as such, and the whole net income of investments thus authorized must go to the tenants for life by the terms of the will.'" It is also to be observed that the provisions for the testator's wife were preferred because she is a purchaser for value in the eye of the law ( Pope v. Pope, 209 Mass. 432, 439; Burgin v. Patch, 312 Mass. 219, 223, and cases cited), and that testamentary provisions for the wife and children of a testator are to be construed liberally. The accountants in the present case properly paid to those entitled to income from the trust estate the entire net income therefrom in the respective proportions or amounts prescribed by the will.

  5. Früh v. Früh

    316 Mass. 590 (Mass. 1944)   Cited 4 times

    No reason appearing, it is not easy to believe that a man intends to disinherit his wife. See Burgin v. Patch, 312 Mass. 219, 223. This commonly remains true even if husband and wife held some property jointly, of which there was evidence in this case.

  6. Gray v. McCausland

    51 N.E.2d 441 (Mass. 1943)   Cited 13 times
    In Gray v. McCausland (314 Mass. 743), a case containing facts quite analogous to those here, a gift was made by the testatrix to her stepchildren of "all the property of every name and nature left me by my late husband * * * as shown in the inventory of his estate".

    We are well within the established bounds. See, for example, Wadsworth v. Ruggles, 6 Pick. 63; Morse v. Stearns, 131 Mass. 389; Gould v. Chamberlain, 184 Mass. 115, 121; Best v. Berry, 189 Mass. 510; Polsey v. Newton, 199 Mass. 450; Lydon v. Campbell, 204 Mass. 580; Sherwin v. Smith, 282 Mass. 306, 310; Boston Safe Deposit Trust Co. v. Prindle, 290 Mass. 577, 582; Adams v. Adams, 308 Mass. 584, 590; Poor v. Hodge, 311 Mass. 312, 317; and Burgin v. Patch, 312 Mass. 219, 223. The words of the will are susceptible of the interpretation ascribed to them.

  7. Stevens v. Moossa

    318 N.E.2d 840 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974)   Cited 1 times

    Pope v. Pope, 209 Mass. 432, 438-439 (1911). Burgin v. Patch, 312 Mass. 219, 223 (1942). Nelligan v. Long, 320 Mass. 439, 447 (1946).