Opinion
Civil Nos. 01-4638 (JBS), 02-0582 (JBS).
May 19, 2003
Beverly C. Moore, Esquire, MOORE BROWN, Washington, DC, and Philip M. Licht, Esquire, Mt. Laurel, NJ, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
C. Scott Toomey, Esquire, CAMPBELL CAMPBELL EDWARDS CONROY, P.C., Turnersville, NJ., and Brian C. Anderson, Esquire, Neil K. Gilman, Esquire, Andrew J. Trask, Esquire, O'MELVENY MYERS, LLP., Washington, DC, Attorneys for Defendant Ford Motor Company.
OPINION
These matters come before the Court upon plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the Court's Opinion and Order of September 30, 2002, in Burgess et al. v. Ford Motor Co., Civil No. 01-4638 (JBS), and the Court's Opinion and Order of October 8, 2002, inBroussard et al. v. Ford Motor Co., Civil No. 02-582 (JBS). The cases of Broussard and Burgess are factually similar, involving claims of defective ignition switches, installed by Ford, which plaintiffs allege caused fires in their vehicles. Because the Court's previous decisions regarding Ford's motions to dismiss and to sever in both Broussard and Burgess are similar to each other, the present motions for reconsideration in both cases will be treated together here. For the reasons discussed herein, plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
These cases, much like the Snodgrass et al. v. Ford Motor Co. case, involve allegations of defective ignition switches installed by Ford, a manufacturer and distributor of vehicles, in their automobiles of model years 1984 to 1993. (Broussard Amended Compl. ¶¶ 6-7; Burgess Amended Compl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs in the Broussard and Burgess cases allege that these installed defective ignition switches, designed by United Technologies Automotive, Inc. ("UTA"), caused fires and substantial damage to their vehicles. (Broussard Amended Compl. ¶¶ 6-7; Burgess Amended Compl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs bring claims of implied warranty, deceptive trade practices, negligence, deceptive trade practices by omission, and breach of extended service contract. (Broussard Amended Compl. ¶ 1; Burgess Amended Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs also allege that certain plaintiffs suffered personal injuries as a result of the fires. Certain plaintiffs alleging Magnuson-Moss Act warranty claims invoked federal question jurisdiction, while others with state law claims invoked diversity jurisdiction.
This Court previously granted in part and denied in part defendant's motions to sever and to dismiss those claims that did not meet the jurisdictional amount in the Burgess case on September 30, 2002, and in the Broussard case on October 8, 2002. The Court granted defendant's motion to sever with respect to both cases, determining that plaintiffs' claims do not arise under a common transaction or occurrence or have sufficient commonality of law or fact for permissive joinder under Rule 20, Fed.R.Civ.P. (Burgess Opinion, at 15; Broussard Opinion, at 13-14.) The Court also determined that the requisite jurisdictional amount was not satisfied for those asserting actual damages of $5,000 or less, with no personal injury claim, and invoking either diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction under the Magnuson-Moss Act.
Plaintiffs filed their motions for reconsideration on October 21, 2002, in both the Burgess and Broussard cases. Subsequent to filing their motion, plaintiffs' counsel submitted a faxed letter dated October 25, 2002, and a letter dated January 13, 2003, bringing additional case law to the Court's attention.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs in their motions for reconsideration argue that the Court's Opinions and Orders of September 30, 2002 and October 8, 2002, should be reversed and that all claims of the two cases should be allowed to proceed in this Court. Plaintiffs argue that the Court erred in its analysis of severance under Rule 20(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., contending that the commonality evidence in their Complaints meets the transaction or occurrence standard for joinder under Rule 20(a), that a majority of the plaintiffs in the Burgess and Broussard cases will prevail on partial summary judgment similar to a percentage of the plaintiffs in theSnodgrass case, that the Court incorrectly stated that the plaintiffs must meet different standards of proof to establish their trade practices claim, and that the case-specific causation evidence is not as individualized as the Court thinks.
With respect to the dismissal of 14 plaintiffs' claims inBurgess and 25 plaintiffs' claims in Broussard, plaintiffs disagree with the Court's decision to not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the dismissed 39 plaintiffs' claims which did not satisfy the federal jurisdictional amount, and argues that the Court's employment of a $5,000 actual damage cutoff amount was arbitrary and incorrect, and that the Court's estimation of the highest foreseeable allocation of attorneys' fees to these plaintiffs of $35,000 each was incorrect.
A. Standard for Reconsideration
Local Civil Rule 7.1(g) requires that a motion for reargument shall be served within 10 days of the entry of the order or judgment on which reargument is sought. Such motions should be accompanied by a "brief setting forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the Judge or Magistrate has overlooked." Id. "A party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the court's decision, and `recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party's burden.'" Panna v. Firstrust Sav. Bank, 760 F. Supp. 432, 435 (D.N.J. 1991) (quotingCarteret Sav. Bank, F.A. v. Shushan, 721 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D.N.J. 1989)). As this Court has stated, "motions for reargument succeed only where a `dispositive factual matter or controlling decision of law' was presented to the Court but not considered."Damiano v. Sony Music Entertainment, 975 F. Supp. 623, 634 (D.N.J. 1996) (JBS) (quoting Pelham v. United States, 661 F. Supp 1063, 1065 (D.N.J. 1987). Where no facts or cases were overlooked, such a motion will be denied. Egloff v. New Jersey Air Nat'l Guard, 684 F. Supp. 1275, 1279 (D.N.J. 1988); Resorts Int'l v. Greate Bay Hotel and Casino, 830 F. Supp. 826, 831 (D.N.J. 1992). If the record was inadequately developed on a particular issue, the court has discretion to reconsider the matter, Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace Corp., 849 F. Supp. 987, 990 (D.N.J. 1994), but not to the extent of considering new evidence that was available but not submitted while the motion was pending. Florham Park Chevron, Inc. v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 159, 162 (D.N.J. 1988). In other words, a "motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle to reargue the motion or to present evidence which should have been raised before."Bermingham v. Sony Corp. of America, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 834, 856-67 (D.N.J. 1992), aff'd, 37 F.3d 1485 (3d Cir. 1994). As the late Chief Judge Gerry noted, "[w]e are in fact bound not to consider such new materials, lest the strictures of our reconsideration rule erode entirely." Resorts Int'l, 830 F. Supp. at 831 n. 3. (emphasis in original). Consequently, only when the matters overlooked might reasonably have resulted in a different conclusion if the court had considered them will the court entertain such a motion. Panna, 760 F. Supp. at 435.
B. Analysis
Plaintiffs move for reconsideration of the Court's Opinions and Orders of September 30, 2002 and October 8, 2002, in theBurgess and Broussard cases, respectively, arguing that the claims should not be severed because plaintiffs have strong evidence supporting their claims on ignition switch fire causation similar to that demonstrated in the Snodgrass case. Plaintiffs also take issue with the Court's reasoning that permissive joinder under Rule 20(a) would entail different sets of claims, different laws, different sets of claim-specific evidence, different vehicle maintenance records, and other issues that are individualized and unique to each claim. In addition, with respect to dismissal of certain plaintiffs' claims, plaintiffs argue that the Court should have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the dismissed claims, that the limit of punitive damages equal to three times actual damages was incorrect, and that the Court erred in projecting a ceiling for attorney fees on these small claims.
In the Burgess decision of September 30, 2002, and in theBroussard decision of October 8, 2002, this Court considered defendant Ford's motions for severance and to dismiss plaintiffs' claims. In both cases, the Court analyzed whether plaintiffs' causes of action satisfied the factors for permissive joinder under Rule 20(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., and whether the severed claims sufficiently met the jurisdictional amount to invoke either diversity jurisdiction or jurisdiction under the Magnuson-Moss Act.
In both the Burgess and Broussard cases, the Court granted defendant's motion to sever plaintiffs' claims, due to the lack of commonality of law or fact under Rule 20(a)'s analysis for permissive joinder, and granted in part defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. In Burgess, the Court dismissed 17 vehicle fire claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, allowing 14 other claims to proceed. In theBroussard case, the Court dismissed 25 vehicle fire claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, allowing 33 such claims to proceed.
Notwithstanding the merits of any particular claim, whether any particular claim is successful on summary judgment is not relevant to whether a commonality of law or fact predominates the claims as a whole under the Rule 20 permissive joinder analysis. At that particular stage, the Court must consider whether the plaintiffs' claims arise under a common transaction or occurrence, or whether a commonality of law or fact predominates the claims. Such an inquiry requires consideration of the individualized factors of each claim, including the claim-specific evidence, and the state laws applicable, as this Court has previously stated on too many occasions to recount.
Plaintiffs' motion merely argues with the Court's decision that Rule 20(a) permissive joinder is not appropriate in this instance. Plaintiffs do not present any dispositive factual matter or controlling decision of law that this Court has overlooked. To the extent that plaintiffs contend they have claim-specific evidence on ignition switch causation, as summarized in tables previously submitted, see Pls.' Br. at 6, such alleged evidence provides no support for the feasibility of joining the claims, but rather, emphasizes the fact that joinder of the claims would require consideration of claim-specific evidence.
Where individual case-specific issues predominate, severance of the plaintiffs' claims was proper. That plaintiffs allegedly have direct proof that their fires were caused by the Fox ignition switches does not resolve plaintiffs' dilemma regarding the multiple laws that would be applied, and the numerous sets of evidence that would have to be presented. Causation must depend primarily on an individualized, fact-specific analysis of each claim.
With respect to the jurisdictional dismissal of certain plaintiffs' claims, plaintiffs also fail to present any controlling decision of law or dispositive factual matter that was overlooked by the Court. Although plaintiffs argue that the Court should have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims, the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is within the sound discretion of the court, see Peter Bay Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Stillman, 294 F.3d 524, 534 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing New Jersey Turnpike Auth. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 197 F.3d 96, 113 (3d Cir. 1999); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)), and the Court's dismissal of certain claims is therefore appropriate.
Plaintiffs also present nothing in the form of controlling decision of law or dispositive factual matter in their arguments that the $5,000 cutoff and the limit of punitive damages equal to three times actual damages were incorrect. Plaintiffs merely express their dismay at failing to claim more than $5,000 in damages, asserting that plaintiffs experienced more than that amount in damages due to "mere aggravation and lost time caused by the fire." Pls.' Br. at 15. Failure to include such damages, however, can be attributed only to the neglect of plaintiffs in their pleadings. In addition, plaintiffs state that while certain states' UDAP statutes limit punitive damages recovery to three times actual damages, the Court's cutoff amount is incorrect. Plaintiffs, however, cite to no authority contrary to the Court's jurisdictional amount calculus. Plaintiffs' arguments therefore fail to present grounds for reconsideration.
None of the dismissed claims involves personal injury. Each alleges only property damage of not more than $5,000 due to a vehicle fire. The prospect of punitive damages beyond the statutory doubling or trebling of loss, while not legally impossible under certain states' laws, has not been shown to have occurred in the hundreds of Ford ignition switch claims litigated since 1996, so far as this Court is aware. Therefore, it is not reasonable to keep a $5,000 property damage claim alive because of the possibility of some heretofore unobtained punitive damage award that exceeds three times the property damage.
Furthermore, plaintiffs argue that the Court erred in suggesting the practical impossibility of attorney fees exceeding $35,000 for each of the small dismissed claims. Plaintiffs contend that In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 50 F. Supp. 100, 104 (D.P.R. 1999), supports the transferability of attorney fees to later litigation. Dupont Plaza, however, involved the participation and remuneration of attorneys who worked on the common fund of the plaintiffs represented in that case, which was a consolidation of all claims relating to a fire disaster at the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel. While the attorney fees in that case were awarded to those attorneys whose work benefitted all plaintiffs involved in the multiparty mass litigation, there is no indication that the court awarded attorney fees to attorneys whose work benefitted another, separate litigation, as plaintiffs suggest. Dupont Plaza therefore provides no support for plaintiffs' contention.
In addition, although plaintiffs raise Gulfstream III Associates, Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1993) in their faxed letter of October 25, 2002, that case is inapposite. In that case, the district court held that if plaintiff can prove that the fees and expenses incurred in the other litigation resulted in work product that was actually used in the Gulfstream litigation, that the time spent on the other litigation was "inextricably linked" to the Gulfstream case, and that plaintiff had not previously been compensated for the work, then the fees of the other litigation may be included in the attorney fee award. Unlike Gulfstream, the Court is not considering an attorney fee award in either the Broussard orBurgess case at this time. To the extent that plaintiffs attempt to argue that the Court's calculus of jurisdictional amount is in error because the attorney fees from the Snodgrass litigation may be included in the computation of attorney fees for these cases, such a theory is premature at this stage, where plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees in the Snodgrass case is currently pending.
Plaintiffs' citation to this Court's October 29, 1999 Opinion in the related MDL case of Rick v. Ford Motor Co., Civil No. 98-4138 (JBS), is also unpersuasive. In Rick, this Court, finding that the controversy involved an amount in excess of the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum, accordingly denied plaintiff's motion for remand to state court and determined that removal to federal court was proper. In that case, the Court determined that plaintiff had met the jurisdictional amount where the plaintiff had asserted damages of approximately $6,268. Here, contrary to plaintiffs' representation that the actual damages threshold held by the Court in the Burgess and Broussard decisions was $13,333, the Court dismissed only those claims that asserted $5,000 in actual damages or less. The Rick decision is thus consistent with the Court's determinations in both Broussard and Burgess, and plaintiffs' argument therefore fails.
Implicit in plaintiffs' disagreement with the Court is their assumption that even in a case with less than $5,000 in damages, the small claim could foreseeably and reasonably require the expenditure of more than $35,000 in attorney's fees and costs under a fee-shifting statute. If plaintiffs are correct in their assumption that it could require, say, $45,000 in attorney time and costs to prevail upon a $2,500 motor vehicle property damage claim, then counsel and the Court would not be doing their jobs to promote the just and efficient resolution of their disputes as required by Rule 1, Fed.R.Civ.P. This Court cannot assume that the litigation system has gone so far askew that it may foreseeably and reasonably require expending more than $595,000 in counsel fees to pursue the 17 small property damage claims which are dismissed in Burgess, or more than $875,000 in counsel fees to pursue the 25 small property damage claims which are dismissed in Broussard. Such a presumption is preposterous.
The Court is cognizant that a $2,000,000 fee petition is presently pending in the Snodgrass case on behalf of ten prevailing plaintiffs who recovered, in the aggregate, less than $200,000. The special circumstances of Snodgrass as a potential nationwide class action in which substantial efforts were devoted to general discovery and creating a national database of thousands of such alleged ignition switch fire incidents, are not applicable here.
Here, plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration merely sets forth their disagreement with the Court's previous decisions of September 30, 2002, and October 8, 2002. Plaintiffs fail to present any controlling decision of law or dispositive factual matter that the Court overlooked. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration will be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the above, plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration of the Court's decision of September 30, 2002, in the Burgess case, and its decision of October 8, 2002, in the Broussard case will both be denied. Plaintiffs have not presented any controlling decision of law or dispositive factual matter that requires reconsideration of the Court's decisions. The accompanying Order will be entered.
ORDER
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration of the Court's Order and Opinion of September 30, 2002, in the Burgess case, and of the Court's Order and Opinion of October 8, 2002, in the Broussard case; and the Court having considered the parties' submissions, including the October 25, 2002 faxed letter and the January 13, 2003 letter from Mr. Philip Licht, Esquire, and Mr. Beverly Moore, Esquire, on behalf of plaintiffs; and for the reasons discussed in the Opinion of today's date; and for good cause shown;
IT IS on this day of May, 2003, hereby
ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the Court's September 30, 2002 decision in the Burgess case [Docket No. 12-1] be, and hereby is, DENIED ; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the Court's October 8, 2002 decision in the Broussard case [Docket No. 9-1] be, and hereby is, DENIED ; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Ford Motor Company shall file an Answer in each case on the remaining claims within 20 days of today's date.