Burger v. Kemp

1,000+ Citing cases

  1. Wiggins v. Smith

    537 U.S. 1231 (2003)   Cited 9,734 times   45 Legal Analyses
    Distinguishing the mitigating evidence presented by Wiggins from the double-edged evidence presented in Burger, 483 U.S. 776, 107 S.Ct. 3114, and Darden, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464

    Indeed, counsel uncovered no evidence in their investigation to suggest that a mitigation case, in its own right, would have been counterproductive, or that further investigation would have been fruitless; this case is therefore distinguishable from our precedents in which we have found limited investigations into mitigating evidence to be reasonable. See, e.g., Strickland, supra, at 699 (concluding that counsel could "reasonably surmise . . . that character and psychological evidence would be of little help"); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987) (concluding counsel's limited investigation was reasonable because he interviewed all witnesses brought to his attention, discovering little that was helpful and much that was harmful); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 186 (1986) (concluding that counsel engaged in extensive preparation and that the decision to present a mitigation case would have resulted in the jury hearing evidence that petitioner had been convicted of violent crimes and spent much of his life in jail). [Had counsel investigated further, they might well have discovered the sexual abuse later revealed during state postconviction proceedings.]

  2. Stouffer v. Reynolds

    168 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 1999)   Cited 78 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Observing that the court's โ€œ โ€˜duty to search for constitutional error with painstaking care is never more exacting than it is in a capital case.โ€™ โ€ (quoting Burger, 483 U.S. at 785, 107 S.Ct. 3114)

    "Our duty to search for constitutional error with painstaking care is never more exacting than it is in a capital case." Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785 (1987). Given that obligation, we VACATE the district court's order denying relief and REMAND for an evidentiary hearing addressing those concerns we have found deficient in the record.

  3. Andrews v. Davis

    866 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2017)   Cited 22 times
    Holding that the petitioner's reference to Jones on appeal did not fundamentally alter his Lackey claim, and therefore exhaustion of his Lackey claim "likewise exhausted his current challenge"

    Moreover, "valid strategic choices are possible even without extensive investigative efforts." Id. (quoting Burger v. Kemp , 483 U.S. 776, 794, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987) ). Finally, "[t]he reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions," and may be "based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant."

  4. In re Andrews

    28 Cal.4th 1234 (Cal. 2002)   Cited 109 times
    Affirming referee's findings that if trial counsel had witnesses testify about "petitioner's mental health, including a diagnosis of a learning disorder, brain impairment and posttraumatic stress disorder," inter alia, "[e]vidence would have been presented detailing the facts of petitioner's prior convictions," and "mental health experts would likely have been called" for rebuttal

    [Citation.]" ( Burger v.Kemp (1987) 483 U.S. 776, 795-796, quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 690, 700.) In Strickland, the Supreme Court specifically addressed counsel's duty to investigate and made clear courts should not equate effective assistance with exhaustive investigation of potential mitigating evidence: "[S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.

  5. Coddington v. Martel

    2:01-cv-01290 KJM CKD (E.D. Cal. May. 3, 2023)   Cited 1 times

    The Court reached a similar result the following year in Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987). Again, defense counsel had presented no evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial and had conducted only a minimal investigation into his client's background prior to electing the penalty-phase strategy.

  6. State v. Davis

    116 N.J. 341 (N.J. 1989)   Cited 179 times
    Holding that "[i]n assessing the adequacy of counsel's performance, strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable"

    Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698. Thus, in Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 793-95, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3125-26, 97 L.Ed.2d 638, 657 (1987), although observing that counsel did not investigate evidentiary material to be presented in mitigation of defendant's sentencing phase, the Court did not invalidate the conviction because it was a strategic decision "supported by reasonable professional judgment" that such investigation "would not have minimized the risk of the death penalty." The Court rejected the argument that a more aggressive defense performance would have made a difference in the face of overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt.

  7. Andrews v. Davis

    944 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2019)   Cited 70 times
    Determining the state court unreasonably denied a habeas claim where the reason given did not support its conclusion

    The happenstance that the aggravating evidence was not presented is therefore not attributable to counsel's strategy and, because we assess a lawyer's choices "from counsel's perspective at the time," Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, it does not factor into our deficiency analysis. The California Supreme Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Burger v. Kemp , 483 U.S. 776, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987), to conclude that counsel's penalty-phase strategyโ€”portraying Andrews as a "follower" and arguing that others, including Andrews's co-defendant Sanders, had received lighter sentencesโ€”was a reasonable strategy. In re Andrews , 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 473, 52 P.3d at 669.

  8. Bryan v. Gibson

    276 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2001)   Cited 14 times
    Concluding that OCCA's resolution of Bryan's claim of ineffective assistance during guilt phase was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent pursuant to ยง 2254(d)

    Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268-69, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981). Where, as here, however, Bryan "raised no objection at trial," Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, he cannot now prevail unless he demonstrates "that counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance," Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987) (further quotation omitted). If he can make that showing, we will presume prejudice to his defense.

  9. Marshall v. Hendricks

    313 F. Supp. 2d 423 (D.N.J. 2004)   Cited 7 times
    Granting Marshall's petition for relief based on ineffectiveness of counsel in the penalty phase

    This element does riot require that a defendant receive perfect representation, but it does require that counsel act within the "wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see also Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987); Kokoraleis v. Cilmore, 131 F.3d 692, 695 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that "[t|he Constitution is satisfied when the lawyer chooses a professional]y competent strategy that secures for the accused the benefit of an adversarial trial"); Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1101 (3d Cir. 1996) (staling "[t]he right to counsel does not require that a criminal defense attorney leave no stone unturned and no witness unpursued"); Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1518 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (finding that "perfection is not required" under the Sixth Amendment). To satisfy the second prong, a "defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."

  10. State v. Mack

    No. CR-2023-0284 (Ala. Crim. App. Dec. 20, 2024)

    Other courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have held that a limited investigation into the defendant's background was reasonable in similar situations. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987), is particularly instructive.