They assert the trial court erred in sustaining demurrers to the petition because all the necessary elements of a slander-of-title action were present. Implicit in the trial court's judgment on the defendants' demurrer to the petition is an adverse ruling on all theories upon which recovery could be sought. If facts are alleged which support any theory of recovery, a general demurrer must be overruled. Burford v. Territorial Land Co., 84 Okla. 102, 204 P. 274, 275 [1922]. Although Reeves may have correctly plead a slander-of-title claim, this issue was neither preserved by the general allegations in their new trial motion nor by specific legal argument at the hearing of that motion.

This is not an action based in any sense of the word upon damages for seduction, and it is not so treated by either of the parties in their briefs, so the action must be treated and considered in the light of the allegations of the plaintiff's petition, and, clearly, if the petition entitled the plaintiff to recover on any theory, or any part or portion of the amount sued for or claimed, it is good as against a general demurrer. Rhode Island Ins. Co. of Providence. R.I., v. Glass et al., 131 Okla. 108, 267 P. 840; Oklahoma Sash Door Company v. American Bonding Company, 67 Okla. 244, 170 P. 511; Watkins v. Yell, Treasurer of Carter County, 73 Okla. 297, 176 P. 390; Burford et ux. v. Territorial Land Co. et al., 84 Okla. 102, 204 P. 274. We must therefore determine one question in this case, and that may be stated as follows: May a woman recover damages from a man who induces her to submit to an operation which produces an abortion where she is of full age and voluntarily consents to the operation?

Our decisions in Eggleston v. Seattle, 33 Wn. 671, 74 P. 806; Niemyer v. Washington Water Power Co., 45 Wn. 170, 88 P. 103; Reeks v. Seattle Elec. Co., 54 Wn. 609, 104 P. 126; Anderson v. Hurley-Mason Co., 67 Wn. 342, 121 P. 815, Ann. Cas. 1913D 148, and Lieske v. Natsuhara, 165 Wn. 270, 5 P.2d 307, clearly sustain the view that, under the circumstances of this case, this portion of the instruction did not constitute error to the prejudice of the investment company. We do not overlook our decisions in Olson v. Erickson, 53 Wn. 458, 102 P. 400; Rastelli v. Henry, 73 Wn. 227, 131 P. 643; Bennett v. Oregon-Wash. R. Nav. Co., 83 Wn. 64, 145 P. 62; Gosa v. Hyde, 117 Wn. 672, 202 P. 274; Estes v. Babcock, 119 Wn. 270, 205 P. 12; Ely v. North Coast Lines, 151 Wn. 137, 275 P. 78, and Burge v. Anderson, 164 Wn. 509, 3 P.2d 131, which may seem to lend support to the argument that this portion of the instruction, of which particular complaint is made, constituted error prejudicial to the investment company. But we think that each of those cases, when critically noticed in view of the particular facts involved therein, is distinguishable from our present case.

The giving of it was therefore error. [Here follow quotations from Bennett v. Oregon-Wash. R. Nav. Co., 83 Wn. 64, 145 P. 62; Estes v. Babcock, 119 Wn. 270, 205 P. 12; and Gosa v. Hyde, 117 Wn. 672, 202 P. 274.] "The instruction in this case goes much further than the one complained of in Jensen v. Schlenz, 89 Wn. 268, 154 P. 159, the giving of which was held not to be error."

While it may appear as if the statement was technically correct nevertheless there was no error in refusing to give the instruction in the form it was presented. As shown in Gosa v. Hyde, 117 Wn. 672, 202 P. 274, a request for instruction as to the effect of mistake in judgment in an emergency is properly refused even though it correctly states the law in so far as it goes, when the request takes no account of the possibility that the jury could find from the evidence that the emergency was created by the defendant himself. There was no error in charging the jury as to law of the road relative to speed.

" In Gosa v. Hyde, 117 Wn. 672, 202 P. 274, it is said: "In the instruction as to the measure of damages, the trial court included mental suffering as an element to be considered in fixing the compensation, and also hospital bills.

Instruction No. 1 was erroneous as it was based upon incompetent evidence, C. N.W.R. Co. v. Ott, 33 Wyo. 200; Derr Co. v. Gelruth, (Okla.) 120 P. 253; Gosa v. Hyde, (Wash.) 202 P. 274; Quinlan v. Jones, 27 Wyo. 410. Instructions on future pain and suffering being speculative should not have been given, Green v. Power Co., 9 A. E. Ann. Cas. 1052; 17 C.J. 764; C.B. Q.R. Co. v. Lampman, 18 Wyo. 106; 8 R.C.L. 206; Ongaro v. Twohy, (Wash.) 94 P. 916; Wilson v. Fleming, (W.Va.) 109 S.E. 810. Where instructions are inconsistent, even though someone correctly stated the law, the appellate court cannot determine whether the jury followed the correct or erroneous statement of the law; Palmer v. State, 9 Wyo. 40; Clay v. State, 15 Wyo. 42; Nagel v. City, (Mont.)

It is unnecessary to discuss the same, as is well known, if a petition states a cause of action, the sustaining of a demurrer there to is error. Burford et ux. v. Territorial Land Co. et al., 84 Okla. 102, 204 P. 274. Let the judgment sustaining the demurrers be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant's motion for a peremptory instruction having been denied, defendant requested instructions numbered 2, 3, 11, 12, 15, 18 and 20 which were refused and defendant excepted; the case was submitted on instructions numbered 8, 17 and 19 over defendant's objection and exceptions. There was a variance between plaintiff's allegations and proof. Searle v. Ry. Co., 229 U.S. 155; Ry. Co. v. Slavin, 236 U.S. 454; defendant's requested instructions should have been given; Ry. Co. v. Tucker, supra; Ry. Co. v. Sylvester, 86 S.E. 275; plaintiff assumed the risks of his employment; Truesdell v. Ry. Co., supra; Cross v. R.R. Co., 177 S.W. 1127; the verdict is so excessive as to show prejudice and passion, 17 C.J. 906; Gregory v. Ry. Co., 8 N.Y.S. 525; the verdict was influenced by plaintiff's evidence of pain and suffering and instruction numbered 12 given over defendant's objection and exception; evidence of repairs or alterations made after an accident are not admissable; Baron v. Redding I. Co., 202 P. 274; Elias v. Lancaster City, 203 P. 638; Morse v. M. St. L.R. Co., 30 Minn. 465; Lally v. Crookston L. Co., 82 Minn. 497; W. A.R. Co. v. Rogers, 104 Ga. 164; C.P. C.M.R. Co., v. Bretton, 3 Kan. App. 292; Howe v. Nedaris, 183 Ill. 288; C. P.S.R. Co. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202; the court erred in receiving improper evidence in rebuttal and in sustaining objection to the testimony of Dr. Childs; Michaeals v. Harvey, 179 S.W. 735; Obrien v. West. I. Mfg. Co., 125 S.W. 804; Elliott v. K.C. (Mo.) 96 S.W. 1023; Priebe v. Crandall, 187 S.W. 605; Heithier v. Johns, (N.Y.) 135 N.E. 603; Dewey v. Co., 155 N.Y.S. 887; Fennelly v. Co., 193 N.Y.S. 641; Krause v. Sobel, 196 N.Y.S. 845; Dahlquist v. Co., 174 P. 833; plaintiff had waived the benefit of privilege, and the testimony of his physician should have been received; King v. Barrett, 11 O.S. 261; the privilege extends to the patient, not to the physician; Moreno v. Co., 170 P. 1088; City v. Wicker, 141 P. 963; Co. v. Mitchell, 132 P. 1104; For

Section 265, Comp. St. 1921. The pleader might be mistaken as to what relief the allegations of the petition entitle him. Upon the demurrer the question is not whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief asked in the prayer, but is he entitled to any relief upon his allegations? This is substantially what was held in Jackson v. Levy, 75 Okla. 256, 183 P. 505; Burford et ux. v. Territorial Land Co. et al., 84 Okla. 102, 204 P. 274; and Bynum v. Strain, Bank Com'r, 95 Okla. 45, 218 P. 883. The rule announced seems to be the universal rule.