Burford v. Commonwealth

57 Citing cases

  1. Craig v. Commonwealth

    14 Va. App. 842 (Va. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 10 times
    Holding in malicious wounding case that "the nature and quality of an overt act cannot be judged in a vacuum" and that "the acts [relied upon] must be viewed through the eyes of the person allegedly threatened" such that victim's cursing and threatening to kill defendant coupled with victim's "[going] to his car, where he reached 'up under his seat,'" and walking toward defendant with one hand behind his back constituted "a sufficient showing of an overt act by [the victim] to admit the excluded evidence" of previous violence against a third person, who was defendant's wife and victim's sister

    By excluding evidence of prior acts as irrelevant, the trial court essentially ruled that acts of violence against third parties were inadmissible to show Craig's apprehension of Walton and his belief that Walton posed an immediate threat to him. Craig argues that this position is contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752 20 S.E.2d 509 (1942), where evidence of specific acts of violence against third parties was held to be admissible to show fear by a defendant, who had pled self defense. We agree.

  2. Watts v. Commonwealth

    189 S.E.2d 346 (Va. 1972)   Cited 2 times
    In Watts v. Commonwealth (1972), 213 Va. 57, 58, 189 S.E.2d 346, 347, the Court stated that under the Virginia statute, the Juvenile Court, when considering the situation of a prior juvenile offender, is "under a duty to certify the case to the court of record for proper criminal proceedings, in the absence of a finding that it would be in the public interest to dispose of the matter in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court."

    " Inasmuch as the judgment entered by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court was void, jeopardy did not attach. Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 75,, 20 S.E.2d 509 (1942); Seay v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1087, 156 S.E. 574 (1931); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 960 (1873).

  3. State v. Vincioni

    30 N.M. 472 (N.M. 1925)   Cited 7 times

    He thereafter obtained orders for grapes from some of the tenants of the company houses, and, while proceeding to deliver the grapes thus ordered, was arrested on the principal street of the camp. [ 1] 1. Upon this record appellant contends that he was entitled to a direct verdict, citing and relying upon Commonwealth v. Burford, 225 Pa. 93, 73 A. 1064. In that case it was held that a statute somewhat similar to ours did not apply under a state of facts quite similar to the facts under consideration.

  4. Carter v. Commonwealth

    Record No. 2261-14-3 (Va. Ct. App. May. 31, 2016)   Cited 2 times

    Cary, 271 Va. at 102, 623 S.E.2d at 914. See also Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752, 767, 20 S.E.2d 509, 515 (1942). Evidence of the victim's propensity for violence is relevant to establish the initial aggressor and whether the defendant reasonably feared for his safety.

  5. Shifflett v. Commonwealth

    Record No. 1675-12-3 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2014)   Cited 1 times

    See id. Until the Code of 1919 was adopted, "a person convicted of a felony was not a competent witness unless such person had been pardoned or punished." Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752, 762, 20 S.E.2d 509, 513 (1942). However, any person convicted of perjury was prohibited from being a witness, "even though pardoned or punished."

  6. Witterman v. Commonwealth

    Record No. 2655-03-2 (Va. Ct. App. Jul. 19, 2005)

    Evidence of a victim's character for violence "is admissible only when the defendant has interposed a plea of self-defense . . ., and when a proper foundation is laid by proof of some overt act justifying such defense." Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752, 767, 20 S.E.2d 509, 515 (1942).

  7. James v. State

    286 S.E.2d 506 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 2 times

    See also State v. Robbins, 37 Wn.2d 492, 224 P.2d 1076 (1951). Only in a few states have the courts proscribed the introduction of a conviction, otherwise admissible for impeachment purposes, on the ground that the conviction was not final. State v. Blevins, 425 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. 1968); Ringer v. State, 137 Tex. Cr. R. 242, 129 S.W.2d 654 (1938); Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752 ( 20 S.E.2d 509) (1942); Foure v. Commonwealth, 214 Ky. 620, 283 S.E. 958 (1926); Adkins v. Commonwealth, 309 S.W.2d 165 (Ky.Ct.App. 1958). This minority rule is reasoned and is founded upon the principle that "... a reversal of a conviction completely wipes out that conviction and makes the situation as though it had not been rendered..."

  8. Schoppel v. United States

    270 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1959)   Cited 27 times
    In Schoppel v. United States, 270 F.2d 413, 418, supra, we found no merit in these same claims which were then raised in the appeal of Gomez' codefendant, Schoppel, because the jurisdiction of the United States over the situs of the offense had in no way been controverted at the trial and because the testimony of the Government's witness was adequate to prove the court's jurisdiction, if the matter was not one of which the court could take judicial notice.

    " The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has held several times that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow police officers and sheriffs to remain in the courtroom after excluding all other witnesses. Campbell v. Commonwealth, 1953, 194 Va. 825, 75 S.E.2d 468, 474; Hampton v. Commonwealth, 1950, 190 Va. 531, 58 S.E.2d 288, 297; Burford v. Commonwealth, 1942, 179 Va. 752, 20 S.E.2d 509, 512. Cf. Plymale v. Commonwealth, 1954, 195 Va. 582, 79 S.E.2d 610, 616 where it was held that the trial court had abused its discretion in refusing to exclude a sheriff, scheduled to testify, and put the jury in charge of a deputy sheriff who was not going to testify. IV. Conduct of the Prosecuting Attorney

  9. Simpson v. Clarke

    1:22cv794 (LMB/IDD) (E.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2023)

    In Virginia, “evidence of conviction of a misdemeanor not involving moral turpitude is ... inadmissible” to impeach a witness. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 345 S.E.2d 303,308 (Va. Ct. App. 1986); see, e.g., Burford v. Commonwealth, 20 S.E.2d 509, 514 (Va. 1942) (“Assault and battery is not a crime involving moral turpitude and hence a conviction therefor is not relevant for purposes of impeachment.”).

  10. Jane Doe v. Delta Airlines, Inc.

    129 F. Supp. 3d 23 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)   Cited 7 times
    Noting defendant-airline was "surely correct" that handling of unruly passengers during boarding procedures constitutes a service

    Under Virginia law, “[c]onvictions of ... drunkenness ... are misdemeanors that do not involve moral turpitude.” Pike v. Eubank, 197 Va. 692, 700, 90 S.E.2d 821 (1956) (citing Taylor v. Commonwealth, 180 Va. 413, 417, 23 S.E.2d 139 (1942); Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752, 20 S.E.2d 509 (1942); Bell v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 526, 189 S.E. 441 (1937)). Nor does the statement on which Doe's defamation claim is based fit within the other categories.