By excluding evidence of prior acts as irrelevant, the trial court essentially ruled that acts of violence against third parties were inadmissible to show Craig's apprehension of Walton and his belief that Walton posed an immediate threat to him. Craig argues that this position is contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752 20 S.E.2d 509 (1942), where evidence of specific acts of violence against third parties was held to be admissible to show fear by a defendant, who had pled self defense. We agree.
" Inasmuch as the judgment entered by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court was void, jeopardy did not attach. Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 75,, 20 S.E.2d 509 (1942); Seay v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1087, 156 S.E. 574 (1931); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 960 (1873).
He thereafter obtained orders for grapes from some of the tenants of the company houses, and, while proceeding to deliver the grapes thus ordered, was arrested on the principal street of the camp. [ 1] 1. Upon this record appellant contends that he was entitled to a direct verdict, citing and relying upon Commonwealth v. Burford, 225 Pa. 93, 73 A. 1064. In that case it was held that a statute somewhat similar to ours did not apply under a state of facts quite similar to the facts under consideration.
Cary, 271 Va. at 102, 623 S.E.2d at 914. See also Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752, 767, 20 S.E.2d 509, 515 (1942). Evidence of the victim's propensity for violence is relevant to establish the initial aggressor and whether the defendant reasonably feared for his safety.
See id. Until the Code of 1919 was adopted, "a person convicted of a felony was not a competent witness unless such person had been pardoned or punished." Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752, 762, 20 S.E.2d 509, 513 (1942). However, any person convicted of perjury was prohibited from being a witness, "even though pardoned or punished."
Evidence of a victim's character for violence "is admissible only when the defendant has interposed a plea of self-defense . . ., and when a proper foundation is laid by proof of some overt act justifying such defense." Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752, 767, 20 S.E.2d 509, 515 (1942).
See also State v. Robbins, 37 Wn.2d 492, 224 P.2d 1076 (1951). Only in a few states have the courts proscribed the introduction of a conviction, otherwise admissible for impeachment purposes, on the ground that the conviction was not final. State v. Blevins, 425 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. 1968); Ringer v. State, 137 Tex. Cr. R. 242, 129 S.W.2d 654 (1938); Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752 ( 20 S.E.2d 509) (1942); Foure v. Commonwealth, 214 Ky. 620, 283 S.E. 958 (1926); Adkins v. Commonwealth, 309 S.W.2d 165 (Ky.Ct.App. 1958). This minority rule is reasoned and is founded upon the principle that "... a reversal of a conviction completely wipes out that conviction and makes the situation as though it had not been rendered..."
" The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has held several times that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow police officers and sheriffs to remain in the courtroom after excluding all other witnesses. Campbell v. Commonwealth, 1953, 194 Va. 825, 75 S.E.2d 468, 474; Hampton v. Commonwealth, 1950, 190 Va. 531, 58 S.E.2d 288, 297; Burford v. Commonwealth, 1942, 179 Va. 752, 20 S.E.2d 509, 512. Cf. Plymale v. Commonwealth, 1954, 195 Va. 582, 79 S.E.2d 610, 616 where it was held that the trial court had abused its discretion in refusing to exclude a sheriff, scheduled to testify, and put the jury in charge of a deputy sheriff who was not going to testify. IV. Conduct of the Prosecuting Attorney
In Virginia, “evidence of conviction of a misdemeanor not involving moral turpitude is ... inadmissible” to impeach a witness. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 345 S.E.2d 303,308 (Va. Ct. App. 1986); see, e.g., Burford v. Commonwealth, 20 S.E.2d 509, 514 (Va. 1942) (“Assault and battery is not a crime involving moral turpitude and hence a conviction therefor is not relevant for purposes of impeachment.”).
Under Virginia law, “[c]onvictions of ... drunkenness ... are misdemeanors that do not involve moral turpitude.” Pike v. Eubank, 197 Va. 692, 700, 90 S.E.2d 821 (1956) (citing Taylor v. Commonwealth, 180 Va. 413, 417, 23 S.E.2d 139 (1942); Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752, 20 S.E.2d 509 (1942); Bell v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 526, 189 S.E. 441 (1937)). Nor does the statement on which Doe's defamation claim is based fit within the other categories.