Whelan's expenses were not recoverable. Although subdivision (c) of section 998 affords the trial court the discretion to award as costs to defendants "a reasonable sum to cover costs of the services of expert witnesses," subdivision (g) of section 998 adds one caveat: the costs for services of expert witnesses at trial may not exceed those specified in Government Code section 68092.5. (§ 998, subd. (g).) Subdivision (a) of Government Code section 68092.5 restricts the allowance of expert fees to those experts who testify solely as to any expert opinion.15 ( Ellenberger v. Karr (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 423, 428 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 583]; Bureau of Medical Economics v. Cossette (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 3-5 [118 Cal.Rptr. 242].) Accordingly, where a witness testifies not only as an expert but also as a percipient witness, the witness is entitled to only ordinary witness fees. (Gov. Code, § 68092.5, subd. (a); Bureau of Medical Economics v. Cossette, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d Supp. at pp. 3-5; see also City County of S.F. v. Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 227, 234 [ 231 P.2d 26, 25 A.L.R.2d 1418].)
1971, ch. 1126, § 1, p. 2140; Stats. 1979, ch. 746, §§ 6, 7, pp. 2593-2594.) As interpreted by Bureau of Medical Economics v. Cossette (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 [118 Cal.Rptr. 242], a doctor providing both expert percipient testimony (i.e., past treatment, diagnoses, and prognoses) and expert opinion could not invoke this statute because the subject of the testimony was not solely expert opinion. In 1978, the Legislature enacted former sections 2037 to 2037.9 as a comprehensive scheme to regulate the discovery of expert witnesses, which would prevail over other inconsistent discovery statutes.
) In Bureau of Medical Economics v. Cossette (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 [118 Cal.Rptr. 242], the court rejected the claims of several doctors, who had treated civil litigants, that they were entitled to expert witness fees because they were subpoenaed for trial or deposition and asked to express their opinions regarding their patients' prognoses. ( Id. at pp. Supp. 2-3, 5.)
In Ellenberger v. Karr (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 423, 428 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 583], expert witness fees identical to these were held not to be recoverable costs under section 998 (4) Section 998, subdivision (g), limits costs to those specified in Government Code section 68092.5. Government Code section 68092.5 permits reasonable expert fees only when the witness testifies "solely" as an expert. We agree with the court in Bureau of MedicalEconomics v. Cossette (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 [118 Cal.Rptr. 242], wherein, after a comprehensive review of the legislative history underlying Government Code section 68092.5, the court states on page 9 of the opinion: "In reviewing the legislative history of this bill it is clear that, as introduced, it was intended to permit the court to compensate any person who qualified as an expert to receive compensation. Apparently the medical profession wanted to limit compensation to merely physicians and surgeons.
It is clear from the record that the witnesses for whom costs are here requested were treating physicians, whose testimony could have been compelled by simple subpoena. Their services are not subject to being charged as costs under section 998 (See Bureau of Medical Economics v. Cossette (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 [118 Cal.Rptr. 242], citing City County of S.F. v. Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 227, 234 [ 231 P.2d 26, 25 A.L.R.2d 1418].) The judgment and the order are affirmed.
Plaintiff points out that Herndon never treated him, but he cites no authority that this is required and it clearly is not. (See Bureau of Medical Economics v. Cossette (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 5 [doctor who testified as expert who had not treated the plaintiff entitled to expert witness fees].) Plaintiff suggests Herndon impeached himself several times in his declaration.