Opinion
Case No. 00-10268-BC
November 19, 2002.
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The petitioner, Dominic Paul Burdis, a state prisoner currently confined at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility in Ionia, Michigan, has filed through counsel a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.316, following a twenty-six day jury trial in the Bay County Circuit Court in 1995 and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The petitioner asserts that his constitutional rights were violated by the trial court's limitation on defense counsel's closing argument at trial. The Court disagrees, and will deny the petition.
I.
The petitioner's conviction arises from the attempted sexual assault and stabbing death of Leona "Patty" Stevenson in her Bay City home on June 17, 1994. When found, Mrs. Stevenson was naked from the waist down and had been beaten with a wrench and stabbed approximately 35 times. The Michigan Court of Appeals summarized the evidence against the petitioner as follows:
Defendant's fingerprints were found on one of two kitchen knives used to kill the victim. Moreover, bloody shoe prints left at the scene were consistent with the pattern on the soles of a pair of shoes that defendant may have had at the time of the murder, and DNA testing revealed defendant's blood mixed with the victim's in a bloodstain found at the scene. In addition, one of defendant's friends, William Price, testified that defendant talked to him about murdering Ms. Stevenson just hours before the killing, and later showed up at Price's house in bloody clothes saying, "I did it. I killed her." Price also testified that, when defendant arrived at his house, defendant's hand was bleeding where he apparently had cut one of his fingers. After his arrest, defendant also made several incriminating statements to police. . . .
Defendant told police that he could only remember "bits and pieces" of what happened because he was high on crack cocaine. He said that he had had dreams about being at the victim's house and about his fingerprints being there. There was testimony that when confronted with the fact that police recovered bloody shoes from Bobby Blair's house, defendant admitted trading shoes with Blair and cleaning blood off the shoes with Windex. When asked if he had gone to the victim's house with the intention of killing her, defendant responded, "I don't know why I went over there." Defendant told police that he had "flipped out" before but "never that bad." In a later interview, defendant told police that he "felt that he had really killed Patty and that he felt bad about it, and that he was sorry for it." Defendant remembered seeing blood on his shorts, his right leg and on the socks and tennis shoes he was wearing.People v. Burdis, No. 202388, 1999 WL 33453403, at *1 n. 1 (Mich.Ct.App. March 19, 1999).
The defense theory of the case was that two other men, Leon Boyd and Bobby Blair, were responsible for Ms. Stevenson's murder. During opening arguments, defense counsel asserted that the petitioner accompanied Leon Boyd and Bobby Blair to Ms. Stevenson's home to steal some of her valuables to sell for money to purchase drugs. Defense counsel admitted that the petitioner was present in the home when the murder occurred, but claimed that Leon Boyd was responsible for the attempted rape and the murder of Ms. Stevenson and that the petitioner tried to stop the murder.
Eight of the twenty-six trial days were devoted to presentation of the defense case. According to the trial judge, the only evidence admitted which supported the defense theory was a bloodstain recovered from a t-shirt found in Ms. Stevenson's home which contained A and B antigens and a PGM marker of +1. Expert testimony established that this blood could have come from Leon Boyd who has blood type AB with a PGM marker of +1, from another person with type AB blood, from a mixture of persons with types A and B blood, or from a non-human source of A antigens mixed with Ms. Stevenson's type B blood. Leon Boyd testified that he was in Saginaw when Ms. Stevenson was killed and denied participating in the murder. He admitted that he disliked the victim's son and once pulled a knife on him. Boyd also informed police that William Price had told him that Price had helped the petitioner burn the bloody clothes on the night of the murder.
At the close of testimony, the trial court ruled that defense counsel could not argue that Leon Boyd committed the murder, finding that there was no evidence that placed him at Ms. Stevenson's home on the night of the murder. The court found that the fact that Mr. Boyd fell within a group of the general population that has type A blood and a PGM of +1 was not evidence that he was present when the murder occurred. The trial court did not preclude the defense from claiming that Bobby Blair and/or another person were responsible for Ms. Stevenson's death. During closing arguments, defense counsel argued that Bobby Blair and another person committed the crime and were framing the petitioner, who had attempted to stop the killing. Defense counsel emphasized and criticized the extent and quality of the blood and fingerprint evidence produced at trial. At several points during closing argument, defense counsel also insinuated that Leon Boyd was involved in the crime, and was permitted to do so over the prosecution's objection.
At the end of the twenty-six day trial, the jury found the petitioner guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
Following his convictions and sentencing, the petitioner filed an appeal as of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals raising several claims of error, including the claim raised in the present petition. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the petitioner's convictions, but remanded the case to the trial court for a correction of the judgment of sentence to reflect one first-degree murder conviction under two separate theories. People v. Burdis, No. 202388, 1999 WL 33453403 (Mich.Ct.App. March 19, 1999). The petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied. People v. Burdis, 461 Mich. 937, 606 N.W.2d 25 (1999).
The petitioner, through legal counsel, filed the present petition for writ of habeas corpus on July 20, 2000 asserting that the trial court violated his due process right to present a defense and his right to the effective assistance of counsel by barring defense counsel from arguing to the jury the defense theory that Leon Boyd committed the murder. The respondent filed an answer to the petition on February 28, 2001 asserting that the petition should be denied for lack of merit.
II.
The petitioner's claims are reviewed against the standards established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA). This Act altered the standard of review federal courts must apply when reviewing applications for a writ of habeas corpus. The AEDPA applies to all habeas petitions filed after the effective date of the Act, April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Because the petitioner's application was filed after that date, the provisions of the AEDPA, including the amended standard of review, apply to this case.
As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim — (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, federal courts are bound by a state court's adjudication of a petitioner's claims unless the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 1998). Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ("In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct."); see also Cremeans v. Chapleau, 62 F.3d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1995) ("We give complete deference to state court findings unless they are clearly erroneous.").
The United States Supreme Court has explained the proper application of the "contrary to" clause as follows:
A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to [the Supreme Court's] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases. . . .
A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court's clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court's] precedent.Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 406 (2000).
With respect to the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should analyze a claim for habeas corpus relief under the "unreasonable application" clause when "a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of this Court to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. The Court defined "unreasonable application" as follows:
[A] federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable . . .
[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law. . . . Under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.Id. at 409, 410, 411. See also Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 418 (6th Cir. 2002).
In this case the petitioner asserts that his constitutional rights were violated by the trial court's limitation on defense counsel's closing argument at trial. The petitioner objects to the fact that the trial court prevented him from specifically arguing that Leon Boyd was the person who murdered Ms. Stevenson. He argues that there was evidence from which the jury could infer that Boyd was the killer, and that the trial judge's limitation of closing argument because of the absence of evidence supporting the defense theory was erroneous. In addition to the blood evidence, the petitioner points to a part of the trial where defense counsel called Boyd down from the witness stand to have him place his hand on the bloody palm impression on the t-shirt found at the scene. He also calls attention to the testimony of William Price that a few days before the murder, Price, the petitioner and Boyd had discussed the idea of killing someone. The defense also offered evidence that Boyd disliked the victim's son, and that Boyd had information concerning the disposal of the petitioner's bloody clothing.
It is well-settled that a criminal defendant has a due process right to a "meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." California v. Trombetta , 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984); see also Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (holding that the defendant was denied the right to present a defense when he was forbidden from cross-examining a key witness and not allowed to call three favorable witnesses). Additionally, under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel, including the delivery of a closing argument which is "a basic element of the adversary factfinding process in a criminal trial." Herring v. New York , 422 U.S. 853, 858 (1975). In Herring , the Supreme Court held that a trial court's refusal to allow defense counsel to present any closing argument in a bench trial contravened the Sixth Amendment, since denying a defendant the opportunity to make final arguments on his theory of the defense denies him the right to assistance of counsel. Id . at 862-63. A trial court, however, has broad discretion over the scope of summations and may limit arguments that are overly time-consuming, "stray unduly from the mark, or otherwise impede the fair and orderly conduct of the trial." Id . at 862; see also Conde v. Henry , 198 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Grabiec , 96 F.3d 549, 552 (1st Cir. 1996); Cole v. Tansy , 926 F.2d 955, 958 (10th Cir. 1991). "Closing arguments may be limited to the facts in evidence and reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. Courts may prohibit arguments that misrepresent the evidence or the law, introduce irrelevant prejudicial matters, or otherwise tend to confuse the jury." Richardson v. Bowersox , 188 F.3d 973, 980 (8th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). In this case, the trial court precluded defense counsel from arguing that Leon Boyd committed the murder of Ms. Stevenson because it determined that "there is not one shred of evidence, whatsoever, that places Leon Boyd at the home of Patty Stevenson on the night that she was killed." The court stated that it "did tell [defense counsel] he could not argue that Mr. Leon Boyd was there, i.e., at the crime scene, at the time Ms. Stevenson was killed. I also told him that he was not restricted, that based on the blood typing, i.e., the ABO test and the PGM test, that someone else could have been there. Quite frankly, the only thing that places or brings Mr. Boyd into this case at all is the opening statement of [defense counsel]." Tr. 10/18/95 at 87-88. The court discounted the blood typing evidence at non-specific. The court found that the mere fact that Leon Boyd fell within a group of the general population that has type A blood and a PGM of +1 was not evidence that Mr. Boyd was present when the murder occurred. Id. at 89-90. On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals found no error requiring reversal, stating:
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in precluding defense counsel from arguing in his closing argument that it was Leon Boyd who killed the victim. During his opening statement, defense counsel acknowledged that defendant, Bobby Blair, and Boyd went to the victim's house planning to rob her. However, defense counsel asserted that Boyd was the one who committed the murder, although at one point he stated that the defense's theory was `that there were two men assaulting and assailing that woman that night, not one, two, Bobby [Blair] and Leon, but not — Dominic.' The trial court later found that there was no evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that Boyd was present at the time of the killing and precluded defense counsel from suggesting in closing arguments that Boyd was the killer. Defendant argues that defense counsel should have been allowed to argue that Boyd was the murderer primarily due to the presence of type A antigen on a bloody t-shirt and a pair of the victim's shorts at the scene, which antigen was consistent with Boyd's blood type and inconsistent with the blood type of both defendant and the victim. Defendant also cites evidence relating to Boyd's possible motive for committing the murder and his knowledge of incidents surrounding it.
We find no error requiring reversal because, while defense counsel was precluded from directly arguing that Boyd was the killer, counsel was permitted to and did argue at length that Bobby Blair and another person were at the scene along with defendant, and that defendant `was set up by someone and Bobby.' In addition, despite the trial court's ruling, defense counsel repeatedly insinuated during his closing argument that Boyd was the third person. These arguments, taken together with defense counsel's opening statement, leave us no doubt that the jury was fully apprised of defendant's theory of the case.Burdis, 1999 WL 33453403, at *1-2 (footnotes omitted).
Having reviewed the record, this Court is unable to conclude that the Michigan Court of Appeals' determination is contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. The Supreme Court endorsed the broad discretion of trial judges in limiting the scope of closing arguments. Herring, 422 U.S. at 863. That discretion is abused when the limitations placed on argument deprives the defendant of a "meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense," Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485, but the assessment of the basic fairness of that opportunity must include consideration of the whole record. Here, there was no solid evidence that placed Boyd in the victim's home on the night of the murder. The blood evidence established only that Boyd was a member of a population group whose blood is composed of A and B antigens and a PGM of +1. There was evidence, however, that someone other than the defendant was there, and that evidence did not rule out Boyd, an idea that was conveyed to the jury by defense counsel's argument. Of course, such an argument would have been more forceful if defense counsel were able to point a finger directly at Boyd, to state unequivocally that he was the killer, not the defendant. But the evidence did not support such an argument, and the trial judge's limitation preventing defense counsel from making that bold assertion did not render the trial fundamentally unfair or undermine defense counsel's effectiveness from a constitutional standpoint.
The petitioner's case presentation consumed eight days in the state trial court. The thrust of the defense was clearly to suggest that another person killed "Patty" Stevenson, thereby creating a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. The trial judge's ruling partially limiting the content of the petitioner's final argument did not deprive him of that trial strategy. Rather, the petitioner's attorney frankly stated that other persons, including Bobby Blair, were responsible for the attempted rape and the murder of Ms. Stevenson. Additionally, despite the trial court's ruling, defense counsel made several references to Leon Boyd's alleged involvement in the crime. The state courts' rulings that the petitioner was not deprived of his right to present a defense or his right to the assistance of counsel by the trial court's restriction on closing argument were not so egregious so as to establish a basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under the more rigorous standards instituted by the AEDPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
III.
The conclusion of the Michigan Court of Appeals that the petitioner's trial was free from constitutional defect was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.