2 Encyclopedia Pl. Pr. 75." Ostlund v. Ecklund, supra, 42 N.D. at page 84, 171 N.W. 857; In re Glavkee's Estate, 75 N.D. 118, 122, 25 N.W.2d 925; Burdick v. Mann, 59 N.D. 611, 615, 231 N.W. 545. Applying the foregoing principles, we held, in Wall v. First National Bank, supra, 49 N.D. 703, 193 N.W. 51, that a motion for judgment on the pleadings does not come within the "merits subdivision", 28-2702, subd. 5, and such ruling was reaffirmed in Torgerson v. Minneapolis, St. P. S. Ste. M. R. Co, 51 N.D. 745, 200 N.W. 1013, and in Ferguson v. Jensen, supra, 76 N.D. at pages 650 and 651, 38 N.W.2d 560 at pages 561 and 562.
The right to appeal from an interlocutory order is statutory. It exists in such cases, and in such cases only, as are prescribed by law. Ellingson v. Northwestern Jobbers Credit Bureau, 58 N.D. 754, 227 N.W. 360; Burdick v. Mann, 59 N.D. 611, 231 NW 545. Under the laws of this state an appeal lies to the Supreme Court only from the following orders made by the district court:
She applied to the court for an order fixing the terms and conditions of a stay bond on appeal, which was likewise denied, and the case then proceeded to trial. The appeals from these orders were later heard and the supreme court in Burdick v. Mann, 59 N.D. 611, 231 N.W. 545, held the orders not appealable but that on appeal from the judgment the errors complained of could be reviewed in this court. It is our view, upon a review of the record, that no error was committed by the trial court in ruling upon any of these motions, and we shall state our reasons briefly.
McKivergin v. Atwood, 63 N.D. 73, 245 N.W. 41 (1932);Burdick v. Mann, 59 N.D. 611, 231 N.W. 545 (1930);Ellingson v. Northwestern Jobbers' Credit Bureau, 58 N.D. 754, 227 N.W. 360 (1929).
This court has had under consideration a similar question, at which time subsections (1) and (5) of Section 28-27-02 were urged as bases for appealing an order denying a motion to dismiss. This court, in McKivergin v. Atwood, 63 N.D. 73, 246 N.W. 41 (1932); Burdick v. Mann, 59 N.D. 611, 231 N.W. 545 (1930); and Ellingson v. Northwestern Jobbers' Credit Bureau, 58 N.D. 754, 227 N.W. 360 (1929), rejected the argument that either subsection (1) or subsection (5) authorized an appeal from an order denying a motion for dismissal. It was, however, pointed out that under what is now Section 28-27-28, N.D.C.C., an order denying a motion for dismissal would be reviewable if it became part of the record on appeal, but such does not make it appealable independently and separately. "If an appeal had been taken from the judgment on the merits of the case this order would have been reviewable."
Even if the orders were not made reviewable by entry of a judgment to enforce them, they would still be reviewable on appeal from a judgment, since nonappealable orders may be reviewed on appeals from judgments. Stormon v. District Court of Pierce County, 76 N.D. 713, 38 N.W.2d 785 (1949); Burdick v. Mann, 59 N.D. 611, 231 N.W. 545 (1930). The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.
This court has had under consideration a similar question, at which time subsections (1) and (5) of Section 28-27-02 were urged as bases for appealing an order denying a motion to dismiss. This court, in McKivergin v. Atwood, 63 N.D. 73, 246 N.W. 41 (1932); Burdick v. Mann, 59 N.D. 611, 231 N.W. 545 (1930); and Ellingson v. Northwestern Jobbers' Credit Bureau, 58 N.D. 754, 227 N.W. 360 (1929), rejected the argument that either subsection (1) or subsection (5) authorized an appeal from an order denying a motion for dismissal. It was, however, pointed out that under what is now Section 28-27-28, NDCC, an order denying a motion for dismissal would be reviewable if it became part of the record on appeal, but such does not make it appealable independently and separately. If an appeal had been taken from the judgment on the merits of the case this order would have been reviewable.
Nordenstrom v. Swedberg, 123 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1963). Such orders, where not made expressly appealable, are reviewable on appeal from the judgment, if the order and the facts essential to the review are embodied in the settled statement of the case and made a part of the record on appeal. Burdick v. Mann, 59 N.D. 611, 231 N.W. 545 (1930). Section 28-27-02, North Dakota Century Code, sets out what orders are appealable. Subsection 7 of that section provides that an order made by the district court or judge thereof, without notice, is not an appealable order; but an order made by the district court after hearing is had upon notice
That case was decided by the Supreme Court of Iowa before the adoption by that court or by our court of rules of civil procedure patterned on the federal rules. Further, apparently, in support of his view that the judgment in the instant case is in effect only a nonappealable order and that nonappealable orders are reviewable on appeal from the judgment, Mr. Mitzel refers us to Nordenstrom v. Swedberg, 123 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1963); City of Minot v. Minot Highway Center, Inc., 120 N.W.2d 597 (N.D. 1963); and Burdick v. Mann, 59 N.D. 611, 231 N.W. 545 (1930). A review of those decisions indicates that none of them involves an appeal from either an order or a judgment resulting from the separate trial of an issue in the case.
The third order relating to the compelling of answers to interrogatories and production of X-rays is closer to the case of West Branch Pants Co. v. Gordon, supra, than either of the others, and again this is clearly a motion relating to pre-trial discovery procedures and is not appealable. The fourth order denies a motion for continuance and places the case on the calendar for trial. A motion for continuance is not appealable. See Burdick v. Mann, 59 N.D. 611, 231 N.W. 545. It would be against all logic and reasoning to make appealable an order respecting continuance, because obviously, by the act of non-continuance, especially in a case like this where the court's order placed the case on the calendar for trial, the action of the court by this order tends to expedite trial of this action on the merits and to cause it to be decided. We cite the excellent discussion on this entire subject of appealability by Neff, Appeal and Error — Decisions Reviewable — The "Reviewable Orders" Statute of North Dakota, 28 N.D.L. Rev. 186 (July 1952).