Burdett Oxygen Co., Clev. v. Employers S.L. I

22 Citing cases

  1. St. Marys Foundry v. Employers Ins. of Wausau

    332 F.3d 989 (6th Cir. 2003)   Cited 52 times
    Finding where an exclusion is unambiguous an insured "may not have the benefit of interpretive doctrines that require us to read an ambiguous exclusion in favor of coverage."

    Ohio courts give the terms of the contract their plain and natural meaning. Burdett Oxygen Co. v. Employers Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 247, 248 (6th Cir. 1969); Essex House v. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co., 404 F.Supp. 978, 986 (S.D.Ohio 1975). Following Ohio law, we must give meaning to every paragraph, clause, phrase, and word. Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 16 F.3d 684, 686 (6th Cir. 1994).

  2. Southeast Mental Health Center v. Pacific Ins. Co.

    439 F. Supp. 2d 831 (W.D. Tenn. 2006)   Cited 21 times   3 Legal Analyses
    In Southeast Mental Health Ctr., Inc., the plaintiff suffered business interruption and economic loss due to storm-related power outages.

    Blaylock Brown Construction, Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., 796 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1990). In construing an insurance contract, "the language of the parties should be given its plain and ordinary meaning," Burdett Oxygen Co. of Cleveland, Inc. v. Employers Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 247, 248 (6th Cir. 1969), and the court must read the insurance contract as a layperson would read it, Paul v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 675 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1984). Further, "the contract should be read as a whole and each word given its appropriate meaning, if possible."

  3. Bailey PVS Oxide LLC v. Plas-Tanks Industries, Inc.

    Case No. 3:02CV7363 (N.D. Ohio Sep. 4, 2003)

    Ohio courts give the terms of the contract their plain and natural meaning. Burdett Oxygen Co. v. Employers Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 247, 248 (6th Cir. 1969); Essex House v. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 978, 986 (S.D. Ohio 1975). Following Ohio law, we must give meaning to every paragraph, clause, phrase, and word. Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 16 F.3d 684, 686 (6th Cir. 1994).

  4. American National Property and Casualty Company v. Williamson

    547 F. Supp. 3d 741 (S.D. Ohio 2021)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that a homeowner's policy using the undefined term "dwelling" refers to a singular structure because such a construction is "a more natural fit" and consistent with the modern "concept of a ‘residence’ " that "more naturally brings to mind a single structure, rather than a sprawling estate with several buildings"

    When determining the meaning of an insurance contract, "the contract should be read as a whole and each word given its appropriate meaning, if possible." Burdett Oxygen Co. of Cleveland v. Emps. Surplus Lines Ins. Co. , 419 F.2d 247, 248 (6th Cir. 1969). Ambiguity exists "only where a term cannot be determined from the four corners of the agreement or where contract language is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations."

  5. Lincoln Elec. Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins.

    993 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1998)   Cited 3 times

    When interpreting the plain meaning of an insurance contract or policy, "the contract should be read as a whole and each word given its appropriate meaning." Burdett Oxygen Co. v. Employers Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 247, 249 (6th Cir. 1969). Furthermore, a court "must adopt the construction of the insurance contract which most nearly corresponds with the intention of the parties as ascertained from the words employed by them in their plain, ordinary and usual meaning."

  6. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. Phoenix Assur. Co.

    936 F. Supp. 534 (S.D. Ill. 1996)   Cited 12 times
    In Phoenix, each farmer supplied a product (grain) that a dealer then resold to the insured, ADM. The court held that the policy covered business interruption losses to ADM caused by property damage to the farmers because the policy did not limit this coverage to suppliers in direct contractual privity with ADM. Phoenix, 936 F.Supp. at 544.

    However, because the Court finds the policy language to be unambiguous, the contra proferentum doctrine does not apply. USG Interiors, Inc. v. Commercial and Architectural Prods, Inc., 241 Ill. App.3d 944, 182 Ill.Dec. 277, 281, 609 N.E.2d 811, 815 (1st Dist. 1993) (citations omitted); accord Bunge Corp. v. Northern Trust Co., 252 Ill. App.3d 485, 191 Ill.Dec. 195, 200, 623 N.E.2d 785, 790 (4th Dist. 1993) (observing that contra proferentum doctrine is "a secondary rule of interpretation, a last resort which may be invoked after all the ordinary interpretative guides have been exhausted."). Plaintiffs also rely on Burdett Oxygen Company of Cleveland, Inc. v. Employers Surplus Lines Insurance Company, 419 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1969), which involved a claim for costs incurred when a piece of machinery broke down. The first section of the policy in question covered the insured's real and personal property against "`all risks of direct physical loss of or damage to the property insured,' subject to certain specific exceptions for which the insurer offers no coverage."

  7. Libbey-Owens-Ford v. Insurance Co. of N. America

    9 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 1993)   Cited 38 times
    Explaining that a party failing to timely file a motion for a directed verdict is foreclosed from bringing a post-trial motion because "[i]t is too late to complain of the submission of an issue to the jury after a litigant has taken a chance on what the jury will do and after the jury has resolved the issue against him"

    These cases are inapposite because they construe "ensuing loss" clauses, not unless clauses like the one at issue here. Adams, 891 F.2d at 777 n. 3 (cases construing ensuing loss clauses not applicable). LOF's argument is additionally unpersuasive because, while LOF argues that the unless clause is unambiguous and should be interpreted according to its plain meaning, LOF also contends that cases that find in favor of the insured due to the ambiguity of the policy should be applied, citing Lake Charles, Farmers Chemical, and Burdett Oxygen Co. v. Employers Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1969). An ensuing loss clause provides, for example, that the policy excludes loss caused by mechanical breakdown, "unless an insured peril ensues, and then only for the actual loss or damage caused by such ensuing peril."

  8. Messer v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co.

    884 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1989)   Cited 5 times

    "In determining the plain meaning of an insurance contract, the contract should be read as a whole and each word given its appropriate meaning, if possible." Burdett Oxygen Co. of Cleveland v. Employers Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 247, 248 (6th Cir. 1969) (citing Farmers' Nat'l Bank v. Delaware Ins. Co., 83 Ohio St. 309, 94 N.E. 834 (1911)). Where a policy is ambiguous, it is to be liberally construed in favor of the insured.

  9. U.S. v. A.C. Strip

    868 F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1989)   Cited 66 times
    Holding that extension of the reporting period prescribed in "claims-made" policy would "require the insurer to provide coverage for risks not assumed"

    "In determining the plain meaning of an insurance contract, the contract should be read as a whole and each word given its appropriate meaning, if possible." Burdett Oxygen Co. of Cleveland v. Employers Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 247, 248 (6th Cir. 1969) (citing Farmers' Nat'l Bank v. Delaware Ins. Co., 83 Ohio St. 309, 94 N.E. 834 (1911)). Where a policy is ambiguous, it is to be liberally construed in favor of the insured.

  10. Farmers Chemical Ass'n v. Maryland Cas. Co.

    421 F.2d 319 (6th Cir. 1970)   Cited 21 times
    In Farmers Chem. Ass'n v. Maryland Casualty Co., 421 F.2d 319 (6th Cir. 1970) — a diversity case governed, like the case now before us, by Tennessee law — a panel of this court was presented with a closely analogous question.

    The fact that an experienced District Judge reached divergent consecutive conclusions concerning the policy provision in question lends support to our determination as to its ambiguity. See, e.g., Burdett Oxygen Co. v. Employers Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 419 F.2d 247 (6th Cir., decided December 10, 1969); Space Conditioning, Inc. v. Insurance Company of America, 419 F.2d 836 (6th Cir., decided January 13, 1970); Fidelity Deposit Company v. Friedlander, 101 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1939); American Central Life Insurance Company v. American Trust Company, 5 F.2d 71 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 559, 46 S.Ct. 20, 70 L.Ed. 411 (1925); American Casualty Company v. Cutshall, 205 Tenn. 234, 326 S.W.2d 443 (1959); Alvis v. Mutual Benefit Health Accident Association, 201 Tenn. 198, 297 S.W.2d 643 (1956). Turning to the second appeal, it is first noted that in a diversity case such as this, Federal Courts are bound by state law on the question of interest prior to judgment.