The numerous cases relied upon by plaintiff in support of her contention that CPLR 204 (a) tolls the 2-year period set forth in RPTL 1136 (7) do not suggest a contrary conclusion. Indeed, the stays or statutory prohibitions involved in those cases are provided by statutes other than CPLR 5519 (a) (1) (see, Matter of Pan Am. World Airways v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 61 N.Y.2d 542 [Executive Law § 297 (9)]; Burcroff v. County of Orleans, 83 A.D.2d 779 [Highway Law § 139]; Serravillo v. New York City Tr. Auth., 51 A.D.2d 1027, affd 42 N.Y.2d 918 [Public Authorities Law § 1212]; Ellis Hosp. v. Symonds, 96 Misc.2d 643 [Workers' Compensation Law § 13-f (1)]) and are not controlling here. Having held that plaintiff was entitled to commence this action during the pendency of the prior appeal, the argument that defendants' delay in perfecting that appeal equitably estops them from raising RPTL 1136 (7) as a bar is similarly unavailing.