Opinion
Cause No. IP 00-1267-C H/G
August 2, 2001
ENTRY ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On August 5, 1999, a Richmond police officer stopped plaintiff David Burch for failing to wear his seat belt. A routine check indicated that Burch was wanted on two arrest warrants issued by the Fayette Circuit Court. Burch was arrested and transported to Fayette County. After Burch had been in custody about six hours, Fayette County authorities released him when they realized that both warrants should have been recalled earlier. Both arrest warrants had been issued in cases for which Burch had already been sentenced.
Asserting that the arrest violated his federal Fourth Amendment rights and resulted from official negligence under state law, Burch has sued a number of officials and offices in this action. At this point, the only remaining defendant is the Sheriff of Fayette County. The Sheriff has moved for summary judgment on all claims. Burch has responded with his own motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The parties agree to an extraordinary degree about the facts, though the agreement is not complete. Both sides agree that the warrants in question should have been recalled when Burch had been sentenced on those cases, but they disagree about where responsibility for the failure lies and whether a legal remedy is available.
As explained below, the undisputed facts show no basis for holding the Sheriff liable for any violation of Burch's federal constitutional rights. In addition, Burch has failed to show how the Sheriff could be held liable under state law. Accordingly, defendant Sheriff's motion for summary judgment is granted and plaintiff Burch's motion for summary judgment is denied.
Burch's motion was also untimely under the case management plan submitted by counsel and adopted by the court, but the motion is being denied on the merits.
Undisputed Facts
I. Arrest Warrant in the 164Case On August 13, 1997, the Fayette County Prosecutor's Office filed an information in Cause No. 21C01-9708-DF-164 ("the 164 case") charging David Wayne Burch with dealing in marijuana as a Class D felony, and alleging specifically that Burch had a previous conviction for the same offense. Also on August 13, 1997, the Fayette Circuit Court ordered issuance of an arrest warrant, which was served on the same day.
On July 10, 1998, Burch pled guilty in the Fayette Circuit Court to dealing in marijuana as a Class D felony with a prior conviction. He received "alternate misdemeanor sentencing" under a plea agreement that provided for a sentence of one year in the county jail, but under which Burch was allowed to serve the sentence with electronically monitored home detention.
On September 25, 1998, a petition was filed charging Burch with violating his probation in the 164 case. That same day, the Fayette Circuit Court issued a second arrest warrant in the 164 case.
On January 15, 1999, Burch appeared in court in the 164 case, apparently without having been arrested on the second arrest warrant. Burch admitted the probation violation. The Fayette Circuit Court ordered a six month continuation of Burch's probation.
The court's order directing continuation of Burch's probation did not order the Fayette County Sheriff's Department to recall the second warrant that had been issued September 25, 1998. The docket sheet in the 164 case also does not indicate that the second arrest warrant issued September 25, 1998, was ever recalled.
II. Arrest Warrant in the 204 Case
On the same day, September 25, 1998, the Fayette County Prosecutor's Office filed a two-count information in Cause Number 21C01-9809-DF-204 ("the 204 case") charging Burch with driving while his license was suspended. That same day, the Fayette Circuit Court issued an arrest warrant for Burch in the 204 case.
When Burch appeared before the Fayette Circuit Court on January 15, 1999, he also pled guilty in the 204 case to a Class A misdemeanor of driving with a suspended license. The same day, the court sentenced Burch in the 204 case to one year in the Fayette County Jail, which was to run consecutive to the sentence in the 164 case. The court also ordered Burch to pay court costs and suspended his driver's license for 90 days. As with the 164 case, the court allowed Burch to serve his sentence in the 204 case with electronically monitored home detention. The court remanded Burch to the custody of the sheriff for execution of the judgment through the county's home detention program.
The sentencing order in the 204 case did not order the Fayette County Sheriff's Department to recall the arrest warrant that had been issued September 25, 1998. The docket sheet in the 204 case also does not indicate that the arrest warrant issued September 25, 1998, was ever recalled.
During Burch's hearing before the Fayette Circuit Court on January 15, 1999, in both the 164 case and the 204 case, a deputy sheriff was present and later escorted Burch to the jail.
III. Burch's Arrest on August 5, 1999
Burch was driving in Richmond, Indiana, at about 7:00 a.m. on August 5, 1999. A Richmond police officer lawfully stopped Burch for not wearing his seat belt. In the course of the traffic stop, the officer checked for outstanding arrest warrants. The officer arrested Burch and told him there were two outstanding arrest warrants for him. The officer had probable cause for the stop and brief detention that occurred before discovery of the warrants. The officer handcuffed Burch, placed him in the back of a police car, and transported him to the Wayne County Jail in Richmond.
An officer from the Fayette County Sheriff's Department picked up Burch at the Wayne County Jail at approximately 9:45 a.m. and transported him to the Fayette County Jail. Burch was served with both the second arrest warrant from the 164 case and the warrant from the 204 case, though the record does not clearly show when that service occurred. Burch was released from custody at about 1:00 p.m. The record does not indicate exactly how or by whom it was determined that Burch should be released.
IV. The Fayette Circuit Court's Procedures and Practices for Issuing and Recalling Arrest Warrants
Arrest warrants in Fayette County are issued and recalled by the Fayette Circuit Court, not by the Sheriff's Department. The Fayette Circuit Court does not have a "tickler system" to remind the court that outstanding warrants remain pending. The judge of the court conducts a periodic manual review of arrest warrants but had not conducted such a review in the two years before Burch's arrest. There are no local court rules regarding the recall of warrants.
When the Fayette Circuit Court recalls an arrest warrant, the court issues a written order and transmits a copy to the Sheriff's Department. On occasion, arrest warrants are recalled by oral orders that are later memorialized with written orders.
When the Sheriff's Department receives an order recalling an arrest warrant, the Department physically returns the actual arrest warrant to the Circuit Court, makes an appropriate notation and entry regarding the cancellation in its own records, and sees to it that an entry is made in the computer system used by the Department and other law enforcement agencies.
If the court does not issue an order recalling an arrest warrant, the Sheriff's Department does not learn that the court has determined that the warrant should be recalled. The judge's sentencing orders do not advise when arrest warrants remain pending and do not include instructions to recall any arrest warrants that may be outstanding. Arrest warrants typically are recalled well in advance of a judgment of conviction.
There is no evidence that the Sheriff's Department's methods of handling arrest warrants and recall orders have resulted in systemic problems. Burch has not identified any other instances of arrests on Fayette County arrest warrants that should have been recalled. The number of criminal cases and dispositions in Fayette County would make it burdensome to require the Sheriff's Department to search for and request cancellation of arrest warrants in each case in which the Department receives a judgment of conviction.
In 1999, the Fayette Superior Court disposed of 2,838 criminal cases, of 2 which 76 were felonies, 634 were misdemeanors, and 2,128 were infractions (some of which involved arrest warrants). During 1999, the Fayette Circuit Court disposed of a total of 417 felony and misdemeanor criminal cases.
Discussion
I. Plaintiff Burch's Federal ClaimBurch claims the arrest and detention violated his Fourth Amendment rights. He seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Several key points are not in dispute. The Richmond police officer had probable cause to stop Burch. The officer was also entitled to rely on the information he received to the effect that Fayette County had two outstanding warrants to arrest Burch. There also is no doubt that the two arrest warrants were outstanding.
It is clear, however, that Burch should not have been arrested. He had already been convicted and sentenced in the cases in which both warrants had been issued. This case presents "an arrest that should never have taken place." Harris v. City of Marion, 79 F.3d 56, 57 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment for defendants where plaintiff had been arrested and detained three days on warrant that should have been recalled when earlier matter was resolved). Nevertheless, finding a damages remedy for the mistake is not a simple matter, as was evident in Harris.
In his summary judgment brief, plaintiff Burch has made it clear that he is not asserting a claim against Fayette County Sheriff Frank Jackson in his individual capacity. Accordingly, Burch can establish a claim under the Fourth Amendment against the Sheriff in his official capacity only if he can show that his rights were violated as a result of a custom or policy of the Sheriff's Department. See generally Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Harris, 79 F.3d at 58.
The difference between individual capacity claims and official capacity 3 claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 involves more than mere "form," as Burch suggests. In cases seeking redress for violations of constitutional rights, the difference is central to the doctrinal framework erected by the Supreme Court since Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), through Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and subsequent cases. The applicable legal standards are different, the available remedies are different, the available defenses are different, and there is a significant practical difference as to whether the individual person or the governmental entity is legally responsible for paying an adverse judgment, fees, and costs. See generally Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1985) (explaining principal differences between official capacity and individual capacity suits). Further, when a plaintiff fails to specify clearly the capacity in which he is suing a defendant under Section 1983, that ambiguity poses a problem for the defense. The defendant Sheriff handled the problem appropriately in this case.
The facts in the Seventh Circuit's decision in Harris are remarkably similar to this case. The plaintiff in Harris summoned police to help him with a domestic problem on April 1, 1994. En route to Harris's home, a police officer checked for outstanding warrants. The dispatcher told the officer that Harris was wanted on a warrant. The officer arrested Harris. Harris and his girlfriend then determined that the warrant had been issued in 1992 in connection with a charge of driving with a suspended license. That case had been resolved with a guilty plea to a lesser offense, a fine, and a further license suspension, but the court had never recalled the original warrant. Harris was arrested on a Friday night. He stayed in jail until Monday morning when the problem was straightened out.
Harris sued the arresting officer, the sheriff, and the city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted summary judgment on all claims, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Judge Wood explained for the court that Harris had failed to show any custom or practice of arresting people on warrants that should have been recalled. 79 F.3d at 58. Harris argued that the relevant policy was the failure to implement effective procedures to prevent such arrests, and that the failure amounted to deliberate indifference to citizens' constitutional rights. See id. at 59, citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (recognizing policy and custom claims under § 1983 where failure to adopt policy reflects deliberate indifference to constitutional rights).
The problem for Harris was that the evidence indicated only one similar error in the past 18 years. That simply was not sufficient to establish a pattern sufficient to support an inference of deliberate indifference. Harris, 79 F.3d at 59. The court explained:
The Supreme Court in Canton distinguished between a city's deliberate or conscious choice not to have a training program, which can fairly be characterized as a municipal policy, and the city's occasional negligent administration of an otherwise sound program. At most, we have here an example of the second type of problem.
Id.
The same conclusion applies here. Although Burch should not have been arrested on August 5, 1999, he has not come forward with evidence that the Fayette County Sheriff's Department employed unconstitutional policies or procedures that exhibited deliberate indifference toward constitutional rights. To prove an unconstitutional custom or policy, Burch must come forward with evidence not only of his own case but with evidence of a "pattern or series of incidents of unconstitutional conduct or a clear constitutional duty to take action because the situation was certain to recur." Harris, 79 F.3d at 58-59. Burch has not identified any other cases like his. The system was not perfect, and it failed Burch. But that is not enough to show an unconstitutional custom or policy.
To decide the motions for summary judgment in this case, this court need not attempt to ascertain exactly how responsibility might be allocated as between the Circuit Court and the Sheriff's Department (or the Prosecutor's Office) to identify the risk, at the time of sentencing, that an earlier arrest warrant remains outstanding. See Harris, 79 F.3d at 59 (also not reaching the issue). An error or oversight in a particular case does not show a violation of the Constitution. Burch has simply failed to come forward with evidence of an unconstitutional custom or policy that would be actionable under § 1983, so the Sheriff is entitled to summary judgment on the claim.
II. Burch's State Law Claim for Negligence
Burch also asserts a claim against the Fayette County Sheriff's Department under state tort law for negligence. This claim falls within this court's supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The general rule is that when federal claims drop out of a case before trial, the federal district court should relinquish jurisdiction over supplemental claims. Van Harken v. Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1354 (7th Cir. 1997). However, "if the supplemental claim is easily shown to have no possible merit, dismissing it on the merits is a time saver for everybody." Boyce v. Fernandes, 77 F.3d 946, 951 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of supplemental state law claim). The district court has some discretion in deciding whether to decide such a claim or to relinquish jurisdiction. Van Harken, 103 F.3d at 1354.
The Sheriff contends there is no evidence of negligence by his department. He also relies on an exception under the Indiana Tort Claims Act: "A governmental entity . . . is not liable if a loss results from . . . the adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce a law (including rules and regulations), unless the act of enforcement constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment." Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(7).
The Sheriff is entitled to immunity, but perhaps on a slightly different ground. In Grant County Comm'rs v. Cotton, 677 N.E.2d 1103 (Ind.App. 1997), the plaintiff had been arrested on an arrest warrant that a court had issued after the plaintiff had already posted bond in the underlying criminal case. He was taken into custody and held at the county jail until it could be determined that the arrest warrant should not have been issued. The plaintiff sued under state law, and the trial court denied the sheriff's motion for summary judgment on an immunity theory. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the sheriff "was entitled to immunity for actions taken in detaining Cotton until the validity of the arrest warrant could be ascertained." 677 N.E.2d at 1105. The court reasoned that the sheriff essentially shared in full judicial immunity during the time he enforced a facially valid court-issued arrest warrant, at least for a reasonable time while the underlying error was ascertained. Id.
That reasoning applies here. In addition, Burch has not offered evidence of negligence under Indiana law. Although a deputy sheriff was present in the court hearing that resolved Burch's cases, Burch has not offered any basis for concluding that the deputy had a legally enforceable obligation to check the docket sheets to determine whether the sentencing court had overlooked any outstanding arrest warrants.
In fact, Burch has not even responded to the Sheriff's arguments under state law. In the absence of a substantial argument under state law, the court deems it appropriate to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the negligence claim and to grant summary judgment on Burch's state law claim.
Accordingly, the defendant Sheriff's motion for summary judgment is hereby granted, and plaintiff Burch's motion for summary judgment is denied.
This decision resolves the final remaining claims, so final judgment shall issue immediately.
So ordered.