Bunton v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.

42 Citing cases

  1. Hedge v. Midwest Contractors Equipment Co.

    202 N.E.2d 869 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964)   Cited 19 times

    A consideration of all the instructions demonstrates that the jury was not misled on the case as a whole. Johnson v. Jackson, 43 Ill. App.2d 251, 259, 193 N.E.2d 485 (1963); Meyer v. Williams, 15 Ill. App.2d 513, 522, 146 N.E.2d 712 (1958); Bunton v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 15 Ill. App.2d 311, 329, 146 N.E.2d 205 (1957). This case was fairly tried, the jury was cognizant of all the issues and returned a verdict supported by the evidence.

  2. Johnson v. Jackson

    43 Ill. App. 2d 251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963)   Cited 12 times

    Modern tendency favors a liberal application of the harmless error doctrine to instructions when it appears the rights of the complaining party have in no way been prejudiced. Bunton v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 15 Ill. App.2d 311, 146 N.E.2d 205; Kavanaugh v. Washburn, 320 Ill. App. 250, 50 N.E.2d 761; Reivitz v. Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 327 Ill. 207, 158 N.E. 380. All of the instructions given by the trial court, those for plaintiff and those for defendant, should be considered together if, when so considered, they fairly state the law of the case, they are sufficient and omissions of one party's instructions may be cured by the instructions given by the other.

  3. Welsh v. Pritchett

    187 N.E.2d 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963)   Cited 1 times
    In Welsh, the defendant stopped his vehicle on a highway and started to back up. A line of four cars approached the defendant's vehicle from the rear.

    [5-8] The law in Illinois is that contributory negligence on the part of a plaintiff is a matter of fact for the jury to determine, and it becomes a question of law only when the evidence is so clearly insufficient to establish due care that all reasonable minds would reach the conclusion that there was contributory negligence. Geraghty v. Burr Oak Lanes, Inc., 5 Ill.2d 153, 162, 125 N.E.2d 57; Bunton v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 15 Ill. App.2d 311, 320, 146 N.E.2d 205. A judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, is only permitted where there is no evidence to support the finding of the jury. All the evidence tendered in support of the verdict must be considered in its most favorable intendments to the verdict.

  4. Sphatt v. Tulley

    38 Ill. App. 2d 229 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962)   Cited 16 times

    However, assuming but not admitting that there was some error, it was at most harmless and not prejudicial. As stated in Kavanaugh v. Washburn, 320 Ill. App. 250, 50 N.E.2d 761 and reiterated in the recent case of Bunton v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 15 Ill. App.2d 311, 146 N.E.2d 205: "Modern tendency favors a liberal application of the harmless error doctrine to instructions when it appears the rights of the complaining party have in no way been prejudiced." We also observed in Jepsen v. Sprout Davis, 330 Ill. App. 448, 71 N.E.2d 542: "The trend of judicial opinion reveals a reluctance to reverse cases on the ground of technical errors in instructions; hence, courts have reiterated that the instructions will be considered as a whole, and where the jury has not been misled, and the complaining party's rights have not been prejudiced by minor irregularities, such errors will not be deemed grounds for reversal."

  5. Pree v. Hymbaugh

    162 N.E.2d 297 (Ill. App. Ct. 1959)   Cited 14 times
    In Pree v. Hymbaugh, 23 Ill.App.2d 211, 162 N.E.2d 297 (1959), the appellate court of Illinois held that the driver of a truck loaded with gravel which was to be spread upon a road several miles distant from the scene of an accident was not exempted from the rules of the road by a statute similar to ours, "Since defendant was not then actually engaged in work upon the surface of the highway".

    [3] It is a well established rule that the question as to whether or not a plaintiff has been guilty of contributory negligence is a matter of fact for the jury to determine and becomes a question of law only when the evidence is so clearly insufficient to establish due care that all reasonable minds in the exercise of fair and honest judgment would reach the conclusion that there was contributory negligence. Pinkerton v. Oak Park Nat. Bank, 16 Ill. App.2d 91; Lasko v. Meier, 394 Ill. 71; Bunton v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 15 Ill. App.2d 311. The facts surrounding the occurrence are in dispute.

  6. Davis v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R. Co.

    172 F. Supp. 752 (S.D. Ill. 1959)   Cited 3 times

    Under those circumstances, the driver entered upon the crossing and was struck by a train traveling at a speed in excess of 70 miles per hour. Finally in Bunton v. Illinois Central R. Co., 15 Ill.App.2d 311, 146 N.E.2d 205, it appeared that the view of the direction from which the train came was obstructed by buildings and parked freight cars until the plaintiff reached a point approximately 14 feet from the point of impact. It further appears that the plaintiff stopped his car before entering the crossing, saw or heard nothing, then entered upon the crossing and was struck by a train which the train crew estimated to have been traveling at a speed in excess of 80 miles per hour.

  7. Schaffner v. Chicago N.W. Transp. Co.

    161 Ill. App. 3d 742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 31 times
    Holding evidence of prior accidents admissible to help prove negligence provided circumstances are similar

    A party's interrogatory answers which admit there are certain witnesses is of no relevance unless it is shown they were under that party's control. ( Bunton v. Illinois Central R.R. Co. (1957), 15 Ill. App.2d 311, 146 N.E.2d 205.) We have found that Forrester and McClellan were under the railroad's control.

  8. Wetherell v. Matson

    52 Ill. App. 3d 314 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)   Cited 28 times
    In Wetherell, however, the questioned procedure involved X-ray films received in evidence, but not allowed to go to the jury room, the precise opposite to the facts in this case.

    • 5 It has been held that where a party fails to show that the missing witness was under the opposing party's control, the court may refuse to allow comment on the subject. ( Foerster v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 656, 315 N.E.2d 63; Bunton v. Illinois Central R.R. Co. (1957), 15 Ill. App.2d 311, 146 N.E.2d 205; Wofford v. DeVore (1966), 73 Ill. App.2d 92, 218 N.E.2d 649.) Given the relatively low verdict, we hold that defense counsel's improper comment on Dr. Schrodt's failure to testify was reversible error. While it could have had no bearing on liability, it arguably contributed to the size of the verdict and warrants a new trial on damages.

  9. Loring v. Yellow Cab Co.

    33 Ill. App. 3d 154 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)   Cited 8 times

    "`* * * contributory negligence on the part of a plaintiff is a matter of fact for the jury to determine unless the question has become one of law, in that all reasonable minds would reach the conclusion that there was contributory negligence. Bunton v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 15 Ill. App.2d 311, 146 N.E.2d 205; Thomas v. Buchanan, 357 Ill. 270, 192 NE 215; Geraghty v. Burr Oak Lanes, Inc., 5 Ill.2d 153, 125 N.E.2d 47.'" ( 48 Ill. App.2d 81, 89.) We do not believe that all reasonable minds would conclude from the facts presented by plaintiff in this case that he was guilty of contributory negligence and, therefore, hold that this issue should have been determined by the jury.

  10. Foerster v. Ill. Bell Telephone

    315 N.E.2d 63 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974)   Cited 23 times
    In Foerster v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 656, 315 N.E.2d 63, the defendant similarly claimed that the court had erred in closely monitoring and interrupting the testimony of defense witnesses.

    However, before the defendant could comment upon the plaintiff's failure to produce Tina, the record must show that Tina was under the control of the plaintiff or not as available to the defendant. ( Bunton v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. (1957), 15 Ill. App.2d 311, 146 N.E.2d 205; Wofford v. DeVore (1966), 73 Ill. App.2d 92, 218 N.E.2d 649; Goshey v. Dunlap (1973), 16 Ill. App.3d 29, 305 N.E.2d 648.) There was no such evidence in the record and therefore, the trial court did not err in not permitting the defendant to make this argument. • 9 The defendant also maintains that the trial court erred in sustaining objections to defense counsel's argument as to how the plaintiff had characterized the cable and when defense counsel hypothesized as to how the plaintiff may have gotten her foot caught in the cable attached to the phone on Tina's desk.