At trial, Abney tendered an instruction to the court regarding the element of causation which was modified by the trial court before being given. The instruction included language from both Micinski v. State, 487 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. 1986) and Bunting v. State, 731 N.E.2d 31 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000), trans. denied. These cases comprise the leading authority in Indiana on the level of causation required when an individual is charged with driving under the influence and being involved in an accident which leads to death.
And, [w]hile we seldom reverse for insufficient evidence, in every case where that issue is raised on appeal we have an affirmative duty to make certain that the proof at trial was, in fact, sufficient to support the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." Bunting v. State, 731 N.E.2d 31, 35 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000), trans. denied. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses.
Rather, the State needed to prove only that (1) Cross-Malone operated the vehicle with an ACE of .08 or more, and (2) Cross-Malone's conduct in operating the vehicle caused the injury to Harris. Id.; see also Bunting v. State, 731 N.E.2d 31, 34 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000) (citing Micinski, 487 N.E.2d at 154) ("[I]f the driver's conduct caused the injury, she commits the crime; if someone else's conduct caused the injury, she is not guilty."), trans. denied.
While we seldom reverse for insufficient evidence, we have an affirmative duty to make certain that the proof at trial is sufficient to support the verdict. Bean v. State, 818 N.E.2d 148, 150 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004) (citing Bunting v. State, 731 N.E.2d 31, 35 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000), trans. denied). [¶9] The lynchpin of this case and the convictions is Officer Maddix's identification of the driver of Johnson's car as Kelley.
But the mere suspicion or possibility of guilt is not sufficient to sustain a conviction. Bunting v. State, 731 N.E.2d 31, 35 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied.
However, when evidence conflicts, as it does here, “we are bound to view only that evidence which is most favorable to the verdict and all reasonable inferences therefrom.” Bunting v. State, 731 N.E.2d 31, 33 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied.
See id. While we seldom reverse for insufficient evidence, in every case where that issue is raised on appeal we have an affirmative duty to make certain that the proof at trial was, in fact, sufficient to support the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt. See Bunting v. State, 731 N.E.2d 31, 35 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000), trans. denied.
See id. While we seldom reverse for insufficient evidence, in every case where that issue is raised on appeal we have an affirmative duty to make certain that the proof at trial was, in fact, sufficient to support the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt. See Bunting v. State, 731 N.E.2d 31, 35 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000), trans. denied. The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution protects an accused against conviction "except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."
Id. While we seldom reverse for insufficient evidence, in every case where that issue is raised on appeal we have an affirmative duty to make certain that the proof at trial was, in fact, sufficient to support the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. Bunting v. State, 731 N.E.2d 31, 35 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000), trans. denied.
See id. While we seldom reverse for insufficient evidence, in every case where that issue is raised on appeal we have an affirmative duty to make certain that the proof at trial was, in fact, sufficient to support the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt. See Bunting v. State, 731 N.E.2d 31, 35 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000), trans. denied.