Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-0137-G
February 27, 2002
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is the motion of the defendants, Dallas Police Officers Frank Duncan ("Duncan"), Keith Allen ("Allen"), and Manuel Maldonado ("Maldonado"), (collectively, "the defendants"), for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
On the evening of January 20, 1999, the plaintiff, Troy Bunch ("Bunch"), attended a Dallas Stars hockey game at Reunion Arena in Dallas. Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Response") ¶ III(1). After the game ended, Bunch went to the Stars Club at Reunion Arena with his friend Rick Verdine. Id. Duncan and Allen were working off-duty security outside the Stars Club that evening. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion") ¶ III(1). According to Duncan and Allen, while Bunch was drinking at the Stars Club, private security officers asked Bunch to leave, and Bunch refused. Id. III(2). The private security officers called Duncan and Allen to physically remove Bunch from the club. Id. ¶ III(3). Bunch acknowledges that he was asked to leave the Stars Club but contends that he left willingly, depositing his cup of wine in the trash on the way out. Response ¶ III(2, 3). In doing so, some wine spilled onto Duncan. Id. ¶ III(3). Bunch alleges that Duncan and Allen then arrested Bunch for public intoxication without probable cause, handcuffing him and refusing both to acknowledge Bunch's statement that the handcuffs hurt his wrists and to provide a sobriety test when Bunch requested one. Id. ¶ III(4, 5).
Duncan and Allen, however, contend that Bunch threw his drink onto Duncan, not in the trash, when they approached him in the Stars Club and that Bunch struggled with both Duncan and Allen as they removed him from the premises. Motion ¶ III(3). According to Duncan and Allen, they arrested and handcuffed Bunch, using only the amount of force necessary to protect themselves and others from Bunch. Id. ¶ III(4). Following the arrest, Duncan and Allen brought Bunch to the detoxification center for the night. Response ¶ III(6).
During his stay at the detoxification center, Bunch claims that Maldonado abused him on two occasions. Id. ¶ III(7). The first occasion caused damage to Bunch's ankle, knee, and right hip, and the second occasion resulted in a torn ligament in Bunch's shoulder as well as a re-injury to his shoulder. Id. ¶ III(8, 9). Maldonado contends that, upon completion of the release process, Bunch attempted to leave the building but walked in the direction opposite the exit. Motion ¶ III(7). When Maldonado tried to guide Bunch in the right direction, Bunch shoved Maldonado. Id. Maldonado took Bunch in an arm lock to escort him outside the building, then released him. Id. ¶ III(8). According to Maldonado, he employed "only the amount of force reasonably necessary to escort [Bunch] from the detoxification center and protect himself from [Bunch's] use of force." Id. Bunch, however, alleges that two officers physically carried him out of the detoxification building, slamming his body against a door jamb in the process and causing injury to his head and chest. Response ¶ III(9). These officers then threw Bunch onto the sidewalk outside the building. Id.
The defendants maintain that they were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority as police or detention officers. Motion ¶ III(10). Response ¶ III(10). They argue that the use of force they each employed upon Bunch was objectively reasonable and consistent with clearly established federal and state law and with their training. Motion ¶ III(10). Bunch argues that the actions of the defendants were unreasonable and that the three officers each violated clearly established law. Response ¶ III(10).
II. ANALYSIS A. Evidentiary Burdens on Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence on file show that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. The movants make such a showing by informing the court of the basis of their motion and by identifying the portions of the record which reveal there are no genuine material fact issues. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits, if any, must demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
The disposition of a case through summary judgment "reinforces the purpose of the Rules, to achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of actions, and, when appropriate, affords a merciful end to litigation that would otherwise be lengthy and expensive." Fontenot v. Upjohn Company, 780 F.2d 1190, 1197 (5th Cir. 1986).
Once the movants make this showing, the nonmovant must then direct the court's attention to evidence in the record sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. To carry this burden, the "opponent must do more than simply show . . . some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Company, Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the nonmovant must show that the evidence is sufficient to support a resolution of the factual issue in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
While all of the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the motion's opponent, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress Company, 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)), neither conclusory allegations nor unsubstantiated assertions will satisfy the non-movant's summary judgment burden. Little v. Liquid Air Corporation, 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc); Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 825 (1992). Summary judgment in favor of the movant is proper if, after adequate time for discovery, the motion's opponent fails to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and as to which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
B. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
The threshold question the court must answer with regard to Bunch's claims is whether the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-33 (1991), and Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 820 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1123 (1994)). This question may appropriately be addressed on a motion of summary judgment. Id. at 1014-15. To avoid summary judgment on this ground, Bunch must allege particularized facts which, if proved, would defeat a qualified immunity defense. See Brown v. Glossip, 878 F.2d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Geter v. Fortenbeny, 849 F.2d 1550 (5th Cir. 1988); Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985); and Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1986)); see also Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[W]hen a plaintiff sues a public official under § 1983, the district court must insist on heightened pleading by the plaintiff.") (citing Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Babb v. Donnan, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994)). The existence of qualified immunity is a policy decision which weighs the vindication of individuals' rights against society's needs for effective government. See Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1476-78. The need for effective government outweighs individual rights to this extent — some justified claims will necessarily be dismissed in the interest of freeing public officials "to exercise their duties and functions without fear of having their attentions distracted by the subsequent claims of unhappy or unsuccessful litigants." Id. at 1478.
Where civil rights violations of the sort involved here are asserted, a government official is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable official could have believed his actions to be lawful "in light of clearly established law [at the time] and the information the [official] possessed." Babb, 33 F.3d at 477 (quotations omitted); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-40 (1987); Matherne v. Wilson, 851 F.2d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that the court must measure the "law's certainty" against "an objectively reasonable view of the facts facing an official"). The contours of the plaintiffs rights must have been clear enough for a reasonable official to have understood that he was violating those rights. See Johnston v. City of Houston, Texas, 14 F.3d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Texas Faculty Association v. University of Texas at Dallas, 946 F.2d 379, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1991)). Thus, in light of the preexisting law, the unlawfulness of a defendant's acts must have been apparent. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638-40; Hodorowski v. Ray, 844 F.2d 1210, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1988).
"The qualified immunity defense `gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by protecting `all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Gibson, 44 F.3d at 277 (citation omitted). Government officials are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity "if their decision was reasonable, albeit mistaken." Lampkin v. City of Nacogdoches, 7 F.3d 430, 435 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1019 (1994). Moreover, the court is to determine as a matter of law if an official's acts were reasonable. Mangieri, 29 F.3d at 1015-16; Lampkin, 7 F.3d at 434-35.
1. Probable Cause
First, Bunch alleges that the defendants violated his fights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments based on unlawful search and seizure. Plaintiffs Original Complaint for False Arrest and Use of Excessive Force ("Complaint") ¶ 22. "[Q]uestions regarding qualified immunity are resolved on the face of the pleadings." Babb, 33 F.3d at 477 (quoting James v. Sadler, 909 F.2d 834, 838 (5th Cir. 1990)). Bunch's allegations fail to defeat Duncan's and Allen's qualified immunity from such a claim because the pleadings do not "state with factual detail and particularity the basis for the claim which necessarily includes why the defendant-official cannot successfully maintain the defense of immunity." Elliot, 751 F.2d at 1473. To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must plead, "specific facts, not merely conclusory allegations." Id. at 1479. Here, Bunch has simply made the conclusory allegation that Duncan and Allen arrested him for public intoxication without probable cause. Complaint ¶ 13. Bunch's allegation does not satisfy the heightened pleading standard necessary to defeat an official's qualified immunity. Thus, any claim that Bunch bases on an illegal search must be dismissed.
2. Excessive Force
Next, Bunch alleges that the force used against him during his arrest and while he was in the detoxification center was excessive and violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Complaint ¶¶ 14, 17, 18, 22. Bunch's complaint fails to include factual allegations showing that a reasonable officer could not have believed that Maldonado's actions were lawful — a showing necessary to defeat the qualified immunity defense. See Babb, 33 F.3d at 477. Thus, because Bunch has failed to allege particularized facts concerning his claims of excessive force that, if proved, would defeat the Maldonado's qualified immunity, those claims must also be dismissed.
Bunch has submitted no affidavits to support his opposition to the defendants' summary judgment motion.
3. State Law Claims
Lastly, Bunch alleges that the defendants' activities constitute false arrest and imprisonment, and assault and battery under Texas law. Complaint ¶ 24. Federal court jurisdiction exists over an entire action, including state law claims, when the federal and state law claims "`derive from a common nucleus of operative fact' and are `such that [a plaintiff] would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.'" Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349 (1988) (quoting United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)). Yet supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is a "doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiffs right." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Consequently, "a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court involving pendent state-law claims." Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350.When the federal claims are dismissed before trial and only state law claims remain, the balance of factors to be considered under the supplemental jurisdiction doctrine weighs heavily in favor of declining jurisdiction; therefore, the federal court should usually decline the exercise of jurisdiction over the remaining claims and send them to state court. See id. at n. 7. According to the Fifth Circuit, "[o]ur general rule is to dismiss state claims when the federal claims to which they are pendent are dismissed." Parker Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Industries, 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1989)).
Here, the federal claims against all of the defendants have been dismissed and only state law claims remain. Because the federal claims are being dismissed before trial, the factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity suggest that this court ought to decline jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims against these defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Those claims are therefore dismissed without prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
Because Bunch has failed to plead his claims under federal law with factual specificity, the defendants' motion for summary judgment on those claims is GRANTED. Judgment will be entered that Bunch take nothing from the defendants on those claims.
The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Bunch's claims under state law. Those claims will be dismissed without prejudice to their being refiled in an appropriate state forum.
SO ORDERED.