Opinion
Argued November 5, 1999
December 13, 1999
In an action to recover damages for wrongful death, the defendant Korean Presbyterian Church of New York appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Berke, J.), dated February 19, 1999, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.
Michael E. Pressman, New York, N.Y. (Robert Fischler of counsel), for appellant.
Fein Jakab, New York, N.Y. (Peter Jakab of counsel), for plaintiff-respondent.
SONDRA MILLER, J.P., CORNELIUS J. O'BRIEN, LEO F. McGINITY, SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the appellant's motion is granted, the complaint and cross claims are dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant, and the action against the remaining defendant is severed.
The decedent, a member of the defendant Korean Presbyterian Church of New York (hereinafter the Church), was standing on the steps of the Church when he was struck by a car driven by a fellow church member, the defendant Sam Koo. The accident occurred when Koo exited his vehicle while on church property. Upon attempting to reenter his vehicle as it rolled forward, Koo stepped on the gas pedal instead of the brake, causing the car to accelerate forward and mount the steps of the Church, where the decedent was standing. The decedent's injuries resulted in his death later that day.
A landowner has a duty to maintain his or her property in reasonably safe condition and the question of "[w]hat safety precautions may reasonably be required of a landowner is almost always a question of fact for the jury" (Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 507, 520, n 8; see, Arena v. Ostrin, 134 A.D.2d 306 ). However, "[t]here will ordinarily be no duty imposed on a defendant to prevent a third party from causing harm to another unless the intervening act which caused the plaintiff's injuries was a normal and foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant's negligence" (Rivera v. Goldstein, 152 A.D.2d 556, 557 ). "Liability may not be imposed upon a party who `merely furnished the condition or occasion for the occurrence of the event' but was not one of its causes" (Shatz v. Kutshers Country Club, 247 A.D.2d 375 , quoting Sheehan v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 496, 503 ).
Here, the accident was not a normal and foreseeable consequence of any actions of the Church. The Church merely provided an area to drop off passengers, thereby furnishing the condition for the accident, but not a cause.
S. MILLER, J.P., O'BRIEN, McGINITY, and FEUERSTEIN, JJ., concur.