Opinion
5-19-0498WC
10-08-2021
JOHN DAN BUMPHUS JR, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (Unique Personnel Consultants, Appellee).
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed by Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison County No. 19-MR-1315 Honorable David W. Dugan, Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justices Hoffman, Hudson, and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
BARBERIS, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The order of the circuit court dismissing plaintiffs petition for judicial review for lack of jurisdiction is affirmed, where plaintiff failed to file the petition within 20 days of receiving notice of the final decision of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission.
¶ 2 Plaintiff, John Dan Bumphus Jr., appeals the Madison County circuit court's order dismissing his petition for judicial review for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the motion of Unique Personnel Consultants (Employer). On appeal, Bumphus argues that the court erred in finding that he failed to timely file his petition within 20 days of receiving notice of the final decision of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission). For the following reasons, we affirm.
The circuit court's order granted Employer's motion to dismiss, which erroneously referenced section 19(f)(1) of the Workers' Compensation Act, rather than section 19(f)(1) of the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act. Regardless, section 19(f)(1), as provided in both statutes, requires that "[a] proceeding for review shall be commenced within 20 days of the receipt of notice of the decision of the Commission." 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(1) (West 2014); 820 ILCS 310/19(f)(1) (West 2014).
¶ 3 I. Background
¶ 4 In 2015, Bumphus filed an application for adjustment of claim (2015 claim) for benefits pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2014)), alleging that he sustained "sudden, severe emotional shock," manifesting on July 17, 2015, and alleging that Employer caused the condition through a "gradual, insidious process," which included, among other things, making repeated requests that Bumphus work overtime and failing to accommodate his medical condition. The arbitrator, following a hearing, denied Bumphus's claim on April 25, 2016. The Commission later affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision on April 19, 2017. See Bumphus v. Unique Personnel Consultants, Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, No. 15-WC-27577 (Apr. 19, 2017). Bumphus then sought judicial review in the circuit court of Madison County.
¶ 5 On September 29, 2017, while the 2015 claim was pending before the circuit court, Bumphus filed a second application for adjustment of claim (2017 claim) pursuant to the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act (Diseases Act) (820 ILCS 310/1 et seq. (West 2014)), alleging that his previously diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) condition was "provoked and exacerbated" while working for Employer. Bumphus alleged the same factual bases, symptoms, and July 17, 2015, manifestation date in his 2017 claim as alleged in his 2015 claim.
¶ 6 On November 17, 2017, while Bumphus's 2017 claim was pending before the arbitrator, the circuit court entered an order confirming the Commission's April 19, 2017, decision denying Bumphus benefits related to the 2015 claim. Bumphus did not file an appeal.
¶ 7 On May 8, 2018, the arbitrator issued a decision dismissing Bumphus's 2017 claim, finding the claim barred by res judicata because the issues had been previously adjudicated in the final disposition entered by the circuit court on November 17, 2017, regarding the 2015 claim. The arbitrator also found that Bumphus was precluded from amending his previous claim because he failed to amend it before the court entered its final disposition.
¶ 8 On June 1, 2018, Bumphus filed a motion to reinstate the 2017 claim with the Commission. Bumphus later hand-delivered the motion to the arbitrator. The arbitrator issued a handwritten order denying the motion on June 19, 2018, which was also stamped with the arbitrator's official Commission stamp.
¶ 9 On June 14, 2018, Bumphus sought review of the arbitrator's decision before the Commission. The Commission also received a letter from Bumphus on July 16, 2018, setting forth Bumphus's complaints about the arbitrator and the arbitrator's decision. The Commission treated the letter as a timely request for review of the arbitrator's June 19, 2018, denial of the motion to reinstate.
¶ 10 On August 20, 2019, the Commission issued a decision affirming and adopting the arbitrator's decision dismissing the 2017 claim. In doing so, the Commission noted that Bumphus, rather than moving to amend his 2015 claim, filed a new claim in 2017 alleging the same factual bases, symptoms, and July 17, 2015, manifestation date as alleged in his 2015 claim. Regarding Bumphus's motion to reinstate, the Commission found that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to reinstate Bumphus's claim, and that Bumphus had failed to timely file for review of the arbitrator's denial order. For that reason, the Commission concluded that it also lacked jurisdiction to reinstate the claim. The Commission sent its decision to the parties via email on August 28, 2019.
¶ 11 On September 18, 2019, Bumphus filed a petition for judicial review in the circuit court of Madison County. Shortly thereafter, on October 10, 2019, Employer filed a motion to dismiss Bumphus's petition, alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction because Bumphus had failed to file his petition within 20 days of receiving the Commission's decision, as required by section 19(f) of the Act (see supra ¶ 2 n. 1).
¶ 12 On October 23, 2019, Bumphus filed an answer to Employer's motion to dismiss. Bumphus admitted that his petition was not filed within the 20-day period as statutorily required; however, citing to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b) (eff. July 1, 2007), he asserted that he had exercised "reasonable diligence."
¶ 13 On October 25, 2019, the circuit court held a hearing on Employer's motion to dismiss. Employer argued that Bumphus failed to file his petition by September 17, 2019, which was the last day of the 20-day period. The court then asked Bumphus for his response, and the following colloquy occurred:
"MR. BUMPHUS: I have no objection to the fact that I did receive the e-mail on the 28th, which places it one day outside of the timeframe.
In making my appearance here, I've been doing it by hand, coming through the court instead of trying to e-file, because I didn't know e-filing was available for me as a pro se litigant in this court, although I am in on the Odyssey e-file in two other appellate courts. So I just discovered that the other day.
My position is that the Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b) dismissal for lack of diligence reads: If the plaintiff fails to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain service on defendant prior to the expiration of the applicable statute limitations, the action as to that defendant may be dismissed with prejudice.
* * *
On September 17th, which was the date, the due date, 2019, I presented the 7-page packet of documentation containing my complaint for administrative review.
* * *
I gave this to *** the e-file clerk downstairs at this courthouse. The clerk posted it at that time on the date, September 17th, informed me that my completed complaint for
administrative review required that the defendant's mailing addressing be affixed to the complaint document signed page in order to be accepted for filing. I was doing it by hand, I wasn't doing it by e-file where I could check the sources to see who I could include, so I left with the package, I went home, made my decision, put the addresses on the complaint and returned the very next afternoon with the required addresses written onto the signature page. That is my effort to get it here on time.
So that's all I really have to say in my defense of the motion to dismiss.
THE COURT: So you met with the clerk on the 17th of September?
MR. BUMPHUS: Yes, I was here in the building with everything I needed, I just did not have the date-I just did not have the addresses on the signature page, and when [the clerk] told me *** I needed to have the addresses on it, I had to leave with it and come back the next day with the addresses on it, but everything else that I described was-
THE COURT: But you left with the documents?
MR. BUMPHUS: Yes, because I didn't file it until the next day. I didn't have the completion of the addresses on the complaint. It was one day later.
THE COURT: I'll take what you say at face value.
MR. BUMPHUS: All right."
The circuit court then informed Bumphus that Rule 103(b) did not pertain to his situation, given there had been a delay in timely filing the action, not a delay in service.
¶ 14 Following further discussion, the circuit court ruled that Bumphus failed to file his complaint for judicial review within 20 days of receiving the Commission's decision, which deprived the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus, the court granted Employer's motion and dismissed Bumphus's petition. Bumphus timely appealed.
¶ 15 II. Analysis
¶ 16 On appeal, Bumphus challenges the dismissal of his petition for judicial review, arguing that he exercised "reasonable diligence toward making a timely filing," pursuant to Rule 103(b). We disagree.
¶ 17 "The circuit court's competence to review Commission decisions is statutorily created." Perusky v. Industrial Comm'n, 72 Ill.2d 299, 301 (1978). "Where the legislature has prescribed certain prerequisites for the maintenance of a statutorily created cause of action, all parties, pro se or represented, must be held to the same degree of literal compliance with the legislature's dictates." Id. at 302. Section 19(f)(1) of the Diseases Act sets forth the requirements for seeking judicial review of a decision of the Commission. 820 ILCS 310/19(f)(1) (West 2014). Section 19(f) (1) provides, among other things, that "[a] proceeding for review shall be commenced within 20 days of the receipt of notice of the decision of the Commission." Id. Therefore, "to perfect jurisdiction in the circuit court, the appellant must file a written request for summons within 20 days after receiving the Commission's decision." Springfield Coal Co. v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2016 IL App (4th) 150564WC, ¶ 9. The Illinois Supreme Court has consistently held that one requirement required to vest the circuit court with jurisdiction is a timely request for summons. Jones v. Industrial Comm'n, 188 Ill.2d 314, 320 (1999). Strict compliance with this provision is necessary and must affirmatively appear in the record. See Springfield Coal Co., 2016 IL App (4th) 150564WC, ¶ 28 (holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction under section 19(f)(1) of the Diseases Act, where the claimant's request for summons was file-stamped more than 20 days after receipt of the Commission's decision). Issues involving questions of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Act are reviewed de novo. Id. ¶ 11.
¶ 18 Here, it is undisputed that Bumphus's petition for judicial review was untimely. However, under Bumphus's reading of Rule 103(b), the circuit court should not have dismissed his case because he demonstrated due diligence. As the circuit court correctly noted, however, Bumphus's reliance on Rule 103(b) is misplaced. Rule 103(b) sets forth a due diligence requirement for service of process when a complaint is timely filed pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure.
¶ 19 The problem with Bumphus's argument is that the delay in filing his appeal pertains not to the due diligence requirement for service of process under Rule 103(b) but to the jurisdictional requirements of section 19(f)(1) of the Diseases Act. Rule 103(b) merely permits a diligent plaintiff to serve a defendant outside the limitations period where the complaint naming that defendant was timely filed. Morton v. Madison County Nursing Home Auxiliary, 198 Ill.2d 183, 191 (2001). In other words, Rule 103(b) is designed to prevent a plaintiff from timely filing a suit then intentionally taking no action to effectuate service on the defendant until the plaintiff is ready to proceed with litigation. Wilk v. Wilmorite, Inc., 349 Ill.App.3d 880, 887 (2004). Thus, we reject Bumphus's assertion that the due diligence requirement set forth in Rule 103(b) serves to circumvent the procedural requirements for filing a petition for review under section 19(f)(1) of the Diseases Act. Because Bumphus concedes, and the record confirms, that his petition for judicial review was filed after the 20-day time period prescribed in section 19(f)(1) of the Diseases Act, we find that he failed to strictly comply with the statutory requirements.
¶ 20 Based on the foregoing, we hold that Bumphus failed to confer the circuit court with subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, we affirm the court's October 25, 2019, order dismissing Bumphus's petition for judicial review.
¶ 21 III. Conclusion
¶ 22 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court's October 25, 2019, order dismissing Bumphus's petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
¶ 23 Affirmed.