Opinion
04-21-00518-CV
02-08-2023
BULVERDE VILLAGE PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, Appellant v. BULVERDE VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. a/k/a The Point, Appellee
From the 288th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2020CI03243 Honorable Laura Salinas, Judge Presiding.
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice, Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Beth Watkins, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Beth Watkins, Justice.
Appellant Bulverde Village Property Owners Association (the POA) appeals the trial court's judgment in favor of appellee Bulverde Village Homeowners Association, Inc. a/k/a The Point. We deny The Point's motion to dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. We affirm the trial court's judgment in favor of The Point in part, reverse the judgment and render judgment in favor of the POA in part, and remand this cause to the trial court for reconsideration of the parties' attorney's fees.
Background
Bulverde Village is a master planned community in San Antonio made up of four subdivisions: The Point, Blackhawk, Creekhaven, and Stratford. Each subdivision is internally governed by its own homeowners' association, and residents of each subdivision pay assessments to those HOAs. The residents also pay assessments to a separate entity, the POA, which makes decisions on issues that apply to Bulverde Village as a whole. The POA's powers are set forth in several governing documents, including the POA's Articles of Incorporation and a "Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Bulverde Village." Each HOA has a seat on the POA board of directors.
When The Point filed this lawsuit, it sought declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the POA's authority to pay for maintenance or improvements on a tract the parties refer to as the Invitation Oaks property. The Point amended its petition to seek additional declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the POA's obligation, if any, to: (1) maintain and irrigate landscaping at two entrances into The Point, which are located off of a main road called Wilderness Oak (collectively, the Wesley Park and Willard Path entrances); and (2) maintain two other tracts that The Point refers to as "greenbelt" properties. The Point also alleged the POA had breached the master declaration, a May 4, 2010 deed, and an agreement referred to in the deed. The POA filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that the master declaration did not prohibit it from owning, maintaining, or improving the Invitation Oaks property.
The Point also asserted claims regarding a tract the parties refer to as Goat Hill. The POA does not challenge the trial court's resolution of the Goat Hill issues.
After the parties tried their claims to the bench, the trial court signed a final judgment declaring:
(1) "the POA may not hereafter spend any POA funds to landscape or place improvements on the Invitation Oaks Property";
(2) "the landscaping of entrances into The Point from Willard Path and Wesley Park is the financial responsibility and obligation of the Defendant POA under" both the master declaration and a May 2010 deed; and
(3) "it is currently the obligation of the POA to minimally maintain [the "greenbelt"] properties in a manner required by Bexar County (in terms of occasional clearing and animal control so as to avoid fines from Bexar County), and to address drainage issues on such properties as it may affect the entirety of the Bulverde Village."
The trial court awarded The Point $5,500 in damages for amounts it had paid to maintain the Wesley Park and Willard Path entrances and the greenbelt properties, $83,000 in attorney's fees through trial, and $35,000 in contingent appellate attorney's fees. The trial court also enjoined the POA "from cutting off water, water controllers, water irrigation infrastructure, maintenance, and ceasing the landscaping to any of the entrances into the Point from Wilderness Oak."
The POA filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled by operation of law. At the POA's request, the trial court signed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The POA timely filed this appeal. The Point subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the appeal.
Analysis
The Point's Motion to Dismiss
Before reaching the merits of this dispute, we must address The Point's motion to dismiss the POA's appeal for want of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). The Point argues that only a vote of the POA's board of directors, held during an open meeting after notice to the members of the POA, could authorize an appeal of the trial court's judgment. It contends that without evidence of such a vote, we must dismiss the appeal because the attorney who filed the notice of appeal cannot show he had authority to do so. See In re H.J.V., No. 04-08-00360-CV, 2008 WL 2515710, at *1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio June 25, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam).
We review questions of our own jurisdiction de novo. See IFS Sec. Grp., Inc. v. Am. Equity Ins. Co., 175 S.W.3d 560, 562 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). The Point's arguments in favor of dismissal are analogous to a trial court motion to show authority under Rule 12 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 12. There is a rebuttable presumption that an attorney who files documents on a party's behalf is acting with authority. See, e.g., Pessara v. Seidler, No. 01-06-01035-CV, 2008 WL 2756589, at *5 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 17, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.). But when an attorney's authority is challenged, the attorney bears the burden "to show sufficient authority to prosecute or defend the suit on behalf of" the putative client. Tex.R.Civ.P. 12. If the attorney fails to meet that burden, "the court shall refuse to permit the attorney to appear in the cause, and shall strike the pleadings if no person who is authorized to prosecute or defend appears." Id.
Here, the attorney who filed the notice of appeal on the POA's behalf also defended the POA against The Point's claims in the trial court. The POA's liability insurer, Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, chose that attorney to represent the POA. The Point did not challenge the attorney's authority below, and in this court, it essentially concedes that attorney had authority to represent the POA at trial. It argues, however, that the decision to appeal an adverse judgment is "fundamentally different" from the decision to defend against a claim at trial and that Philadelphia-and, by extension, the attorney Philadelphia chose-cannot pursue this appeal without the POA board's express approval. In response to The Point's motion to dismiss, the POA presented a copy of a liability insurance policy issued to the POA by Philadelphia. The POA argues the policy shows it contractually relinquished its right to control its defense in this case. The Point contends, however, that the policy's terms are irrelevant because only the POA's board can determine whether this appeal is in the POA's best interest.
Texas law recognizes "'a broad freedom of contract'" that permits parties to contractually waive many substantive and procedural rights. Shields Ltd. P'ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 482 (Tex. 2017) (quoting Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 95 (Tex. 2011)). An insured may validly relinquish the right to control its own defense-including the right to choose an attorney and "to make other decisions that would normally be vested in the insured"-to its insurer. See, e.g., N. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davalos, 140 S.W.3d 685, 688 (Tex. 2004). "Whether an insurer has the right to conduct its insured's defense is a matter of contract." Id. Accordingly, we are required to consider the terms of the POA's insurance policy in our jurisdictional analysis, and we reject The Point's arguments to the contrary. See id.
The Point does not dispute that the POA's board agreed to the terms of the insurance policy, nor does it suggest the board lacked authority to do so. The evidence attached to The Point's motion to dismiss shows the POA's bylaws empowered the board to obtain liability insurance on the POA's behalf and "[t]o enter into contracts within the scope of the duties and powers of the Board of Directors and the [POA]." The policy itself shows the POA's board agreed Philadelphia would have "the right and duty . . . to defend any Claim" and further agreed to a definition of "Claim" that included, inter alia, "the commencement of a civil or criminal judicial proceeding or arbitration against [the POA] . . . including any appeal therefrom." The policy further provides that the POA may not "assume any obligation . . . with respect to any Claim" without Philadelphia's written consent.
To the extent board action was required to consent to this appeal, that requirement was satisfied by the board's acceptance of the policy terms described above. See id. By signing and filing a response to The Point's motion that highlighted those terms, the attorney Philadelphia chose to represent the POA met his burden to show he had authority to file the notice of appeal. Cf. Tex. R. Civ. P. 12.
We therefore deny The Point's motion to dismiss the appeal.
The POA's Issues on Appeal
In three issues, the POA challenges the trial court's declaratory judgments in favor of The Point. In its fourth issue, the POA challenges the award of attorney's fees to The Point under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
The master declaration is a dedicatory instrument that contains several restrictive covenants governing the POA's ability to use and maintain the land in Bulverde Village. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 202.001(1) (defining dedicatory instrument); id. § 202.001(4) (defining restrictive covenant); Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass'n, Inc., 556 S.W.3d 274, 279 (Tex. 2018). Restrictions in "a dedicatory instrument are treated as contracts between the parties." Mitchell v. LaFlamme, 60 S.W.3d 123, 128 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). Accordingly, the master declaration is subject to the general rules of contract interpretation. See, e.g., Pilarcik v. Emmons, 966 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex. 1998).
As with any contract, "[a] paramount concern when construing covenants is giving effect to the objective intent of the drafters of the restrictive covenant as it is reflected in the language chosen." Tarr, 556 S.W.3d at 280. We may not construe the master declaration in a way that enlarges, extends, stretches, or changes its terms, and we must avoid interpreting provisions in a way that nullifies or renders meaningless any other provisions. JBrice Holdings, L.L.C. v. Wilcrest Walk Townhomes Ass'n, Inc., 644 S.W.3d 179, 183-84 (Tex. 2022). "When terms are defined, those definitions control," but undefined terms must be given their plain and ordinary meaning unless the document "shows them to be used in a technical or different sense." Hicks v. Falcon Wood Prop. Owners Ass'n, No. 03-09-00238-CV, 2010 WL 3271723, at *6 (Tex. App.-Austin Aug. 19, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.).
We review the trial court's interpretation of the master declaration de novo. Tarr, 556 S.W.3d at 279. The trial court's underlying findings of fact are entitled to the same deference as a jury's verdict, and we review those findings for legal and factual sufficiency. See Ski Masters of Tex., LLC v. Heinemeyer, 269 S.W.3d 662, 667 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, no pet.). "Findings that are supported by competent evidence are ordinarily binding on an appellate court." Id.
Application Invitation Oaks
In its first issue, the POA challenges the trial court's declaration that the POA "may not hereafter spend any POA funds to landscape or place improvements on the Invitation Oaks property" without amending the master declaration. The Invitation Oaks property is an approximately 1.9-acre tract in the Creekhaven subdivision that one of the developers of Bulverde Village, Centex Homes, deeded to the POA in 2018. The POA still owned the Invitation Oaks property at the time of trial.
The master declaration defines the three homebuilders that developed Bulverde Village as "Declarants."
On appeal, the POA suggests that because it did not pay for the Invitation Oaks property and has not constructed improvements on that tract, The Point's request for declaratory relief on this issue was not justiciable. "A declaratory judgment is appropriate only if a justiciable controversy exists as to the rights and status of the parties and the controversy will be resolved by the declaration sought." Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex. 1995). It is undisputed that the POA spent approximately $1,100 of POA funds to clear brush and remove a fallen tree from the Invitation Oaks property. In light of this expenditure, The Point's assertion that the master declaration barred the POA from spending POA funds on that tract presented "a real and substantial controversy involving genuine conflict of tangible interests[.]" See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The declaration The Point sought would resolve that controversy. See id. The trial court therefore had jurisdiction to consider The Point's claim. See, e.g., Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Lynch, 595 S.W.3d 678, 685-86 (Tex. 2020).
Turning to the merits of this dispute, we note that the trial court's findings of fact show the court found: (1) at least one member of the POA's board had discussed using POA funds to build a swimming pool, soccer field, or other similar improvement on the Invitation Oaks tract; and (2) due to the location of the Invitation Oaks property, construction of an improvement "such as a pool or park on" that tract would "disproportionately benefit members of Creekhaven" over the other three subdivisions. The trial court did not find, however, that the POA's board had ever constructed or voted to construct any improvements on the Invitation Oaks property. Moreover, the final judgment does not merely bar the POA from spending POA funds to build permanent improvements like a swimming pool, soccer field, or park; instead, the judgment declares that the POA may never spend POA funds to perform any landscaping or improvements on the Invitation Oaks property. We must therefore determine whether the master declaration, when construed as a whole, supports that declaration. See Tarr, 556 S.W.3d at 280.
Several provisions of the master declaration are relevant to this analysis:
• Section 3.7 states in part, "The area located beyond the right-of-way is the responsibility of the individual HOA." Similarly, Section 4.4 provides, "Neither Declarants nor the POA shall have any responsibility or obligation to maintain any part of any Development Unit." It is undisputed that the Invitations Oaks property is "located beyond the right-of-way" and is "part of [a] Development Unit."
• Section 3.5(h) provides that, in addition to the other maintenance obligations identified in Section 3.5, the POA will be responsible for "maintenance and improvements within the Property as the Board of the POA, in its sole and absolute discretion, may from time to time deem necessary or desirable in the furtherance of this Master Declaration, including, without limitation, the construction and maintenance of any drainage areas and/or easements within the Property[.]" The master declaration specifically defines "Property," and it is undisputed that the Invitation Oaks property falls within that definition.
• Section 3.5(f) provides that the POA will be responsible for "[s]uch other purposes as the Board of the POA, in is sole and absolute discretion, from time to time deems reasonable and in furtherance of the purposes of this Master Declaration[.]"
• Finally, Section 5.2 states that "[a]ssessments levied by the POA shall not be used for any functions or purposes intended to be performed by any HOA for any Development Unit, including, but not limited to . . . services and facilities devoted and which are intended for the specific use of any Development Unit."
The remainder of Section 3.7 establishes the POA's obligation to maintain areas known as the Parkway and the Parkway Pedestrian, Landscape and Utility Easement. It is undisputed that the Invitation Oaks property is not located in those areas.
The master declaration defines "Development Unit" as "any specific part of the Property developed as a separate residential development and which has or is contemplated to have a separate Unit Declaration and a separate HOA."
Sections 3.7, 4.4, and 5.2 appear, at first glance, to mandate a conclusion that the POA may not use POA funds to maintain or improve land that is "located beyond the right-of-way" or "part of [a] Development Unit," as the Invitation Oaks property is. But we must, if possible, harmonize those provisions with the seemingly contrary provisions of Sections 3.5(f) and (h), which give the POA "sole and absolute discretion" to assume additional maintenance obligations the POA's board deems to be "in furtherance of" the master declaration. See Rakowski v. Comm. to Protect Clear Creek Vill. Homeowners' Rights, 252 S.W.3d 673, 676 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied). Additionally, because the POA owns the Invitation Oaks property, we may not limit its use of that property unless the master declaration or another governing document plainly prohibits that use. See JBrice Holdings, 644 S.W.3d at 183-84. We must also construe the master declaration "in favor of the free and unrestricted use of the premises." C.A.U.S.E. v. Vill. Green Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 531 S.W.3d 268, 275 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2017, no pet.).
Our principal task, though, "is to determine the drafter's intent" based on the words used in the master declaration. Rakowski, 252 S.W.3d at 676. Neither Section 3.7 nor Section 4.4 explicitly provide that the POA "shall not" or "may not" spend POA funds to landscape, improve, or otherwise maintain land it owns. See JBrice Holdings, 644 S.W.3d at 183-84. Instead, those provisions establish that in general, the land located within an individual HOA will be maintained by that HOA. While Section 5.2 prohibits the use of POA funds for "functions or purposes intended to be performed by any HOA for any Development Unit," it does not bar the POA from determining whether a particular action was "intended to be performed by" a single HOA or whether the action benefits the Bulverde Village community as a whole and is therefore a proper expenditure of POA monies. Indeed, allowing the POA's board to make such a determination is consistent with Section 3.5(h), which expressly permits the POA to perform maintenance "within the Property" for which the POA otherwise would not be responsible if the board determines "in its sole and absolute discretion" that such maintenance is "necessary or desirable in furtherance of [the] Master Declaration."
When read as a whole, the master declaration does not support a conclusion that its drafters intended to categorically bar the POA from using POA funds to landscape or otherwise maintain or improve the Invitation Oaks property. See, e.g., id.; Rakowski, 252 S.W.3d at 676. Accordingly, we sustain the POA's first issue. We therefore reverse the trial court's declaration that the POA "may not hereafter spend any POA funds to landscape or place improvements on the Invitation Oaks property" and render judgment that the POA may maintain or improve the Invitation Oaks property if the POA's board determines: (1) the maintenance or improvement does not serve "functions or purposes intended to be performed by any HOA for any Development Unit"; and (2) such maintenance or improvement is necessary or desirable in furtherance of the master declaration.
The "Greenbelt" Properties
In its third issue, the POA challenges the trial court's declaration that "it is currently the obligation of the POA to minimally maintain" two tracts The Point refers to as greenbelt properties. The POA argues this declaration must be reversed because: (1) these tracts are owned by The Point and have never been specifically dedicated to the POA as greenbelt; and (2) the board never voted to assume maintenance responsibility for these tracts.
We refer to these tracts as greenbelt properties solely for the sake of brevity. We express no opinion on whether the tracts are true "greenbelt" as that term is used in the master declaration or any applicable law.
For the purposes of this appeal, we need not decide whether these tracts were specifically dedicated to the POA as greenbelt. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. This is because, despite the POA's argument to the contrary, the trial court found that credible evidence showed the POA's board voted to maintain the greenbelt properties and never rescinded that vote. The Point's Exhibit 8 shows that on May 8, 2019, a majority of the board "voted on and approved" "[p]roperty maintenance responsibility by [the POA]" for several tracts, including "The Point/end of Wilderness Oak (behind Willard Path)-[Bexar County Appraisal District] Property ID: 1044830" and "The Point/End of Valencia Peak-[Bexar County Appraisal District] Property ID: 1044831." The parties agree that "Property ID: 1044830" and "Property ID: 1044831" are the greenbelt properties. While the POA presented testimony that the board did not intend for its May 2019 vote on that issue to be final, the trial court, as factfinder, has the sole authority to determine the weight and credibility of conflicting evidence. See, e.g., City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005); Ski Masters, 269 S.W.3d at 667.
On the same day, a majority of the POA's board also voted for the "POA to be responsible for maintenance on" the Invitation Oaks tract.
The trial court explicitly found that the greenbelt properties "have drainage implications that can affect the overall drainage of Bulverde Village." The trial court identified these "drainage implications" as the growth of "brush and high grass and weeds" that can potentially "impede drainage flow." For the reasons explained in our analysis of the Invitation Oaks issues above, we hold that these findings support a conclusion that the May 2019 vote was a proper exercise of the POA board's authority under Section 3.5(h) to assume "such additional maintenance and improvements within the Property as the Board of the POA, in its sole and absolute discretion, may from time to time deem necessary or desirable in the furtherance of this Master Declaration, including, without limitation, the construction and maintenance of any drainage areas[.]"
We therefore overrule the POA's third issue.
Wesley Park and Willard Path Entrances
In its second issue, the POA challenges the trial court's conclusion that the POA is obligated to maintain and irrigate landscaping at the Wesley Park and Willard Path entrances to The Point. The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law show it determined that this obligation arose from Sections 3.7 and 6.2 of the master declaration and "independently because" the POA agreed to accept that obligation in connection with a May 4, 2010 deed from The Point to the POA.
As noted above, Section 3.7 requires the POA to maintain areas known as the Parkway and the Parkway Pedestrian, Landscape and Utility Easement. Section 6.2 requires the POA to maintain certain Declarant-installed fencing and "vegetation and landscaping between the fence and right of way[.]"
The evidence shows that from 2007 until 2010, the POA maintained and paid for irrigation of the landscaping and monuments at the entrances to all four subdivisions, including The Point. At that time, The Point owned the land on which the Wesley Park and Willard Path entrances are located. In early 2010, the POA stopped maintaining the Wesley Park and Willard Path entrances, The Point complained, and The Point's HOA board met with the then-president of the POA to discuss the issue. During a subsequent meeting, the POA's board "discussed taking over the maintenance of the entries to include monuments, irrigation, softscape, hardscape of [The Point] entries off of Wilderness Oak"-i.e., the Wesley Park and Willard Path entrances. Following this discussion, Patricia Tschirhart, a representative of the POA, sent an email to the then-president of The Point's board stating, "[T]he POA BOD is requesting that the [The Point] HOA deed the monument areas over to the POA and they will maintain all (softscape, irrigation, hardscape and maintenance) for these areas."
On May 4, 2010, The Point executed a deed conveying three tracts of land to the POA. Two of those tracts include the Wesley Park and Willard Path entrances. The May 4, 2010 deed provides that as consideration for the conveyance, the POA agreed "to maintain, operate, manage and improve the Property described herein and repair and replace any improvements situated thereon (including the monument signs)[.]" Following execution of the deed, The Point's then-representative on the POA's board, Michael Cisneros, "informed [The Point's] Board that the POA will resume maintenance duties for the [Wesley Park and Willard Path] entrances and have the governing documents changed to reflect that it is the POA's responsibility." The trial court heard evidence that from November of 2010 until the fall of 2020, the POA paid to maintain and irrigate all the landscaping at the Wesley Park and Willard Path entrances.
Based on this evidence, the trial court found that the POA accepted the May 4, 2010 deed "as part of an agreement between the POA and The Point for the POA to pay the cost of maintenance of" the Wesley Park and Willard Path entrances. Because the POA has not challenged this finding on appeal and the finding is supported by some evidence, we must defer to it. See, e.g., Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518, 523 (Tex. 2014). The POA argues, however, that the deed it accepted and the agreements it made cannot require it to pay for landscaping at the Wesley Park and Willard Path entrances unless that maintenance falls within the obligations established by Section 3.7 or 6.2 of the master declaration. It also argues the trial court's ruling is contrary to the master declaration's "anti-waiver" provision.
For several reasons, we disagree. First, Section 3.3 of the master declaration provides that the POA's affairs "shall be managed by the Board in accordance with the terms of this Master Declaration, the Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, and other governing documents of the POA." As the POA itself notes on appeal, the Articles of Incorporation give the POA authority to "[a]cquire (by gift, purchase or otherwise), own, hold, improve, build upon, operate, maintain, convey, sell, lease, transfer, dedicate for public use or otherwise dispose of real or personal property in connection with the affairs of the Association." The POA acquired the Wesley Park and Willard Path entrances "by gift, purchase or otherwise," and the evidence shows it agreed to maintain those entrances. Cf. Norhill Energy LLC v. McDaniel, 517 S.W.3d 910, 919 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2017, pet. denied) (noting "the fundamental premise that 'parties should be bound by their express agreements'") (quoting Fortune Prod. Co. v. Conoco, Inc., 52 S.W.3d 671, 684 (Tex. 2000)). The POA's Articles of Incorporation and Section 3.3 of the master declaration gave the POA authority to enter into-and be bound by-that agreement.
Second, even if we accept the POA's argument that the maintenance in question is not required by Sections 3.7 or 6.2 of the master declaration, we have already held that Section 3.5(h) gives the POA's board "sole and absolute discretion" to agree to perform maintenance within Bulverde Village that is not required by other provisions of the master declaration. Because neither party sought or obtained a finding that the POA's acceptance of the May 4, 2010 deed and the agreements it made in connection with the execution of that deed were arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory, the Texas Property Code requires us to presume that those exercises of the POA's discretionary authority were reasonable. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 202.004(a) (presuming reasonable an exercise of discretionary authority by a property owners' association absent finding "that the exercise of discretionary authority was arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory").
Third, we do not agree with the POA's suggestion that the trial court's judgment conflicts with the master declaration's anti-waiver provision. That provision provides, "Failure by the Declarants or the POA or by any Owner to enforce any covenant or restriction herein contained shall in no event be deemed a waiver of the right to do so thereafter[.]" As explained above, the evidence shows the POA voluntarily agreed to maintain the Wesley Park and Willard Path entrances by accepting the May 4, 2010 deed. The trial court's conclusion that the POA is bound by that agreement is not contingent on a finding that the POA's pre-2010 maintenance of those areas constituted a failure "to enforce any covenant or restriction" in the master declaration.
Finally, the POA suggests that the master declaration prohibits it from paying for most of the landscaping at the Wesley Park and Willard Path entrances because such maintenance does not benefit Bulverde Village as a whole. This assertion is inconsistent with the trial court's explicit finding that maintenance of those entrances "aesthetically benefitted the overall development known as Bulverde Village." Sufficient evidence supports this finding. For example, a video exhibit shows that all the landscaping at the Wesley Park and Willard Path entrances is visible from Wilderness Oak, a dedicated right-of-way that is used by the general public. The trial court also heard evidence that the POA pays for the landscaping at entrances to the other three subdivisions in Bulverde Village. Finally, the trial court heard testimony that "[t]here's not a separate entrance when you move in from one HOA to the other," which supports a conclusion that it is possible for visitors to enter Bulverde Village at the Wesley Park or Willard Path entrances even if they intend to visit subdivisions other than The Point. Because the evidence supports the trial court's finding that all of Bulverde Village benefits from the POA's maintenance the Wesley Park and Willard Path entrances, we must defer to that finding. See Ski Masters, 269 S.W.3d at 667.
The POA concedes it is required to maintain the portions of the Wesley Park and Willard Path entrances that fall within a thirteen-foot strip the master declaration defines as the "Parkway Pedestrian, Landscape and Utility Easement."
In short, we see nothing in the record or the authority cited by the POA that requires or permits the POA to unilaterally abandon the agreements it made in connection with the May 4, 2010 deed. The trial court therefore did not err by concluding the POA is required to pay for maintenance and irrigation of the landscaping at the Wesley Park and Willard Path entrances. See id.; cf. Norhill, 517 S.W.3d at 919. We overrule the POA's second issue.
Attorney's Fees
In its fourth issue, the POA challenges the trial court's award of attorney's fees to The Point. The trial court awarded those fees under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, which permits a trial court to award court costs and reasonable attorney's fees "as are equitable and just." See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.009. The determination of whether a fee award is equitable is "addressed to the trial court's discretion." Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998). Because we have reversed part of the trial court's declaratory judgment, we also reverse its award of attorney's fees to The Point and remand that issue to allow the trial court to award equitable and just attorney's fees in light of this new disposition of the parties' claims. See id.; Lemus v. Aguilar, 491 S.W.3d 51, 61 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2016, no pet.). We therefore sustain the POA's fourth issue.
Conclusion
We deny the Point's motion to dismiss this appeal. We affirm the trial court's judgment regarding the "greenbelt" properties and the landscaping at the Wesley Park and Willard Path entrances, including the associated monetary and injunctive relief. We reverse the trial court's declaration that the POA lacks authority to landscape or improve the Invitation Oaks tract. We render judgment declaring that, in addition to the maintenance obligations specifically enumerated in the master declaration, the POA may perform other maintenance and improvements within the Property where the POA's board determines: (1) the maintenance or improvement at issue does not serve "functions or purposes intended to be performed by any HOA for any Development Unit"; and (2) such maintenance or improvement is necessary or desirable in furtherance of the master declaration. We reverse the trial court's award of attorney's fees to The Point and remand that matter for further consideration consistent with this opinion.