Opinion
CV-24-00520-TUC-SHR
11-05-2024
Brenna Bullock, Plaintiff, v. Arizona Board of Regents, et al., Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING TRO AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Honorable Scott H. Rash United States District Judge.
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's “Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (With Notice)” (“TRO Motion”) (Doc. 2) filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 on October 24, 2024. (See also Doc. 10 (providing proof of service on Defendant Arizona Board of Regents).) Also pending is Plaintiff's “Application for Order to Show Cause Regarding Issuance of an Injunction.” (Id.) Defendants have not responded. For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant Plaintiff's TRO Motion and issue an Order to Show Cause.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff began her residency in the University of Arizona College of Medicine's Ophthalmology Residency Program (the “Program”) in July 2021. (Doc. 1 at 2-3.) Plaintiff was the only female resident in her Program year. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff expected to graduate from the Program in 2025 and planned to apply for a vitreoretinal surgery fellowship. (Id.) She had “never received complaints or had any issues in the Program,” and instead had received only positive feedback regarding her professionalism and interpersonal, clinical, and surgical skills. (Id. at 3, 5; Doc. 2 at 3-4.)
In April 2023, during her fourth year in the Program, Plaintiff first expressed concerns to her program supervisor, Defendant Todd Altenbernd, M.D., about receiving fewer surgical training opportunities than the male students in her Program year and other “general disparate treatment.” (Doc. 1 at 2, 3; Doc. 2 at 2-3.) Altenbernd did not address Plaintiff's concerns, and Plaintiff continued to raise issues of sex discrimination in her Program, alleging, among other things, several physicians had suggested she should pursue a non-surgical specialty based on her gender, while others had “excluded her from education and training opportunities,” instead “focusing their efforts on [her] male peers.” (Doc. 1 at 4-5; Doc. 2 at 3.)
On June 12, 2023, “immediately after [Plaintiff] complained to a faculty member that she was receiving fewer surgical opportunities,” Defendant Altenbernd placed Plaintiff on administrative leave and required her to undergo a behavioral health evaluation. (Doc. 1 at 5; Doc. 2 at 3.) No deficits in Plaintiff's performance were communicated to her and she “was not placed on any sort of performance improvement plan (PIP), probation, or remediation.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) Plaintiff returned to her clinical duties in July 2023 and was treated with hostility “for her gender discrimination complaint.” (Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 2 at 4.) After raising this issue with Defendants Altenbernd and Jonathan Holmes, M.D., they informed Plaintiff she would be dismissed from the Program if she continued to complain and “began to accuse [her] of unprofessional behavior and unwillingness to accept feedback in response to her attempts to explain her position or when she asked questions for clarification.” (Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 2 at 4.) In July, Plaintiff received her “first negative evaluation for two professionalism milestones from” Holmes based on “a report of discrimination she experienced in a prior rotation.” (Doc. 1 at 6-7; Doc. 2 at 4.) Despite working with four faculty members “while on her inpatient consult rotation”-two of whom had previously given Plaintiff positive evaluations-she “only received evaluations from” Altenbernd and Holmes, who “had already targeted and retaliated against” her. (Doc. 1 at 7; Doc. 2 at 4.)
In November 2023, Plaintiff met with Defendant Conrad Clemens, M.D.-the Designated Institutional Officer-to report ongoing gender discrimination and retaliation. (Doc. 1 at 8.) Clemens recommended Plaintiff submit a report to the University's Office of Institutional Equity (OIE) but did not make any such reports himself. (Id.) After this meeting, Plaintiff again experienced increased “discriminatory and retaliatory behavior from faculty and staff in the Program.” (Id.) While on rotation with another physician, Plaintiff was subjected to “repeated belittlement, intimidation, and exclusion from training opportunities.” (Id.) The physician told her she “should expect this treatment from faculty due to her reputation” for raising gender discrimination concerns. (Id.) During a December meeting with Defendant Holmes, he berated Plaintiff and called her “stupid” and an “idiot.” (Id.) Later that month, Plaintiff emailed the OIE “to inquire about submitting a complaint and stated her fear of further retaliation should she submit a complaint.” (Id. at 9.)
In January 2024, the day after Plaintiff filed two complaints against trauma service residents for pressuring her to “perform procedures on intoxicated and violent patients,” Defendant Altenbernd arranged a meeting with Plaintiff to discuss an “action plan.” (Doc. 1 at 9.) At the meeting on January 11, Altenbernd gave Plaintiff a “letter of concern” and informed her for the first time that she was deficient in meeting her competency milestones. (Id.) Plaintiff responded she believed the letter of concern was “in retaliation for her recent complaints to Dr. Clemens, her stated intent to file a complaint with the OIE, and reporting professionalism complaints and safety issues.” (Id.) Later that day, Altenbernd called Plaintiff and placed her on administrative leave, subsequently providing an official letter stating the “leave was necessary to review her statements that she felt unsafe in the workplace.” (Id. at 9-10.)
In February 2024, after approximately three weeks of leave, Plaintiff was required to undergo a psychiatric evaluation. (Doc. 1 at 10.) The psychiatrist, who had received a report from Defendant Altenbernd before evaluating Plaintiff, deemed her “unfit for duty.” (Id.) Later that month, Plaintiff was informed she would be required to undergo therapy with a psychiatrist before returning to work. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff complied with this requirement and returned to work in April 2024. (Id.) Upon her return, she was subjected to a one-month informal evaluation period, during which she worked “more than 85 hours per week” and was “placed on excessive primary call” to “make up” for the call she had missed while on medical leave. (Id. at 11-12; Doc. 2 at 7.) Altenbernd required Plaintiff to achieve certain ratings on faculty evaluations during this period, and Plaintiff met this requirement on all evaluations except those from Defendants Altenbernd and Holmes. (Doc. 1 at 12.)
Following the evaluation period, Plaintiff continued her clinical assignment and received positive feedback from other faculty. (Doc. 1 at 12.) On June 5, 2024, Plaintiff performed her first cataract surgery entirely on her own. (Id.) On June 6, Defendants Altenbernd and Holmes met with Plaintiff and issued a Notice of Recommended Disciplinary Action (the “Notice”) informing Plaintiff the Program was “considering dismissal due to allegations of unprofessional conduct.” (Id.) The Notice identified complaints “primarily based on nonclinical interactions,” such as Plaintiff's “email communications with” Altenbernd and Holmes. (Id.) Although Plaintiff had been informed complaints dated prior to the evaluation period would not be used in judging her progress going forward, the Notice referred to several old complaints. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff appealed the Notice to the Clinical Competency Committee and presented a statement to contest the recommended dismissal. (Id.) Holmes, the Chair of the Department of Ophthalmology, was present at the meeting. (Id. at 2, 13.)
On June 26, 2024, Defendant Altenbernd issued a Notice of Final Disciplinary Action dismissing Plaintiff from the Program. (Doc. 1 at 13.) Plaintiff appealed to Defendant Clemens, asserting, among other things, Altenbernd had acted in retaliation “for concerns raised by [Plaintiff] throughout her time in the Program.” (Id.) Plaintiff asked Clemens to obtain an “advisory opinion” from the Graduate Medical Education Committee (GMEC), and GMEC issued an advisory opinion recommending reversal of Plaintiff's dismissal from the Program. (Id. at 13-14.) On August 12, 2024, Clemens issued a decision reversing Plaintiff's dismissal, noting she had not been afforded a sufficient opportunity to remediate the deficiencies identified in the Notice. (Id.) Plaintiff asked Clemens to allow her to participate in a non-disciplinary PIP, but Clemens instead imposed a six-month probationary period that would appear on her permanent record, be disclosed to future employers, and be reported to the Arizona Medical Board. (Id.) Clemens had offered Plaintiff an alternative option requiring her to take an additional six months of leave to avoid probation, but, based on “the significant gaps in her training resulting from medical leave and the 3 month-long dismissal appeal process,” she “elected to return immediately but attempted to negotiate probation terms prior to doing so.” (Id.)
Between August 12 and September 9, 2024, the parties' counsel communicated about Plaintiff's return to the program and revision of the probation terms. (Doc. 1 at 14.) Specifically, Plaintiff questioned the need for probation as she had never undergone a non-disciplinary remediation or PIP to address the alleged deficiencies and asked that a member of the GMEC be assigned to act as her mentor to help her successfully complete the Program. (Id. at 15.) On August 26, 2024, Defendant Altenbernd issued a letter outlining the terms of Plaintiff's probation, including that she work directly with, and be evaluated by, Altenbernd. (Id.) The terms also provided Plaintiff would be retained as a third-year resident for four months despite being in her fourth year of residency, and her six-month probationary period would not be considered towards the requirements for medical board eligibility. (Id.)
Plaintiff was scheduled to return to the Program on September 1, 2024. (Doc. 1 at 15.) Before her return, Plaintiff informed Defendant Clemens she was concerned about retaliation by Defendant Altenbernd. (Id.) On August 30, Clemens informed Plaintiff her administrative leave would be extended while her concerns were investigated and requested she provide a statement addressing her specific concerns about working with Altenbernd. (Id. at 16.) On September 6, Plaintiff provided the requested information along with a list of questions regarding her return to the Program. (Id.) On September 9, Clemens issued a second Final Decision rescinding the offer for Plaintiff to return on probation and upholding Altenbernd's dismissal decision because Plaintiff had questioned the probation terms. (Id.) Plaintiff requested to appeal the decision, and Clemens denied her request. (Id.) On October 2, Plaintiff filed claims of sex discrimination and retaliation for reporting gender discrimination with the Arizona Civil Rights Division, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the OIE. (Id.)
On October 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court, asserting claims of sex discrimination and retaliation under Title IX against Defendant ABOR and claims of violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Altenbernd, Holmes, and Clemens. (Doc. 1 at 17, 18.) The same day, Plaintiff filed the instant TRO Motion asking the Court to temporarily enjoin the University and its faculty “from imposing [her] dismissal . . . from the University's medical resident program” and “from further discriminating] and retaliating] against” her. (Doc. 2 at 1.)
II. JURISDICTION
Because this case raises federal questions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title IX, this Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A TRO is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008); see also Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting TROs are analyzed in substantially the same way as preliminary injunctions). A plaintiff seeking a TRO must establish: (1) she is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in her favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. The court is to apply a “sliding scale” approach to these factors; a strong showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 31 F.4th 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2022). When the government is a party, the last two of the four factors-the balance of the equities and the public interest-merge. Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014). The first factor, likelihood of success on the merits, is “the most important” Winter factor. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc)). However, in the Ninth Circuit, a temporary restraining order is also warranted where “serious questions going to the merits” exist and a “hardship balance . . . tips sharply toward the plaintiff”-provided the other two elements of the Winter test are also met. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing serious questions going to the merits as “a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits”). Regardless of which standard applies, the movant carries the burden of proof on each element of either test. See Los Angeles Mem 'I Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 1980).
Injunctive relief-whether obtained by TRO or preliminary injunction-can be classified into two categories: mandatory or prohibitory. A mandatory injunction commands a party to do some positive act, while a prohibitory injunction prohibits a party from engaging in further acts and “preserve[s] the status quo pending a determination of the action on the merits.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The “status quo” refers to “the legally relevant relationship between the parties before the controversy arose.” Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2014); see GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing the status quo as “the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy” (citation omitted)). Because a mandatory injunction alters the status quo, a request for mandatory injunctive relief “is subject to heightened scrutiny and [the injunction] should not be issued unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party.” Dahl v. HEM Pharms. Corp., 7 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1993). Indeed, when “a party seeks mandatory preliminary relief that goes well beyond maintaining the status quo,” the Ninth Circuit has warned courts to “be extremely cautious.” Martin v. Int'l Olympic Comm., 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1984).
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff contends her reinstatement in the Program is necessary to maintain the “status quo.” (Doc. 2 at 9.) Plaintiff asserts the “status quo” is her “enrollment in the Program . . . before Defendant dismissed her.” (Doc. 2 at 70.) The Court agrees. When granting prohibitory relief, a court can still order a party to take certain affirmative actions required to reinstate the status quo. See, e.g., GoTo.com, 202 F.3d at 1210 (affirming preliminary injunction enjoining Disney from using infringing logo and finding the status quo “existed before Disney began using its allegedly infringing logo”). As such, the Court finds Plaintiff seeks a prohibitory injunction.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Likelihood of Success
The first step in determining whether Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief requires only that she demonstrate “a fair chance of success” on the merits of her claims. Republic of the Phil. v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1362 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (citation omitted). At a minimum, and only if Plaintiff also demonstrates the “hardship balance” tips in her favor, Plaintiff must demonstrate “serious questions going to the merits” of her claim. All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131-32. Plaintiff argues she is likely to succeed on the merits of both of her claims under Title IX: sex discrimination and retaliation. The Court considers each in turn.
1. Sex Discrimination
Title IX is a broad-reaching statute prohibiting a recipient of federal education funding from discriminating based on sex, which encompasses intentional discrimination, deliberate indifference, and sexual harassment. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173-74 (2005) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)). To prevail on a Title IX sex discrimination claim, a plaintiff need only show (1) the educational institution received federal funding, (2) the plaintiff was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of an educational program, and (3) the educational institution in question discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of gender. Schwake v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 967 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2020).
Here, Plaintiff alleges the University of Arizona receives federal funding, pointing to the Title IX Non-Discrimination Statement available on the University's website. (Doc. 2 at 10.) Plaintiff asserts she received “fewer surgical training opportunities” than the male students in the Program, resulting in deficiencies in her “case log numbers for oculoplastic surgery, cataract surgery, anterior and posterior segment lasers, and glaucoma surgery, which male residents in the same year do not have,” and, absent an injunction, she will be completely “excluded from the benefits of an educational program.” (Id. at 2-3, 10) Plaintiff further claims (1) a supervising physician told her she “should choose a nonsurgical subspecialty of ophthalmology because she is female”; (2) “another attending physician ridiculed her for stating her intent to go into vitreoretinal surgery (a male-dominated subspecialty) and stated that pediatric ophthalmology would be a better fit because she is female”; and (3) “Dr. Holmes pressured [Plaintiff] on multiple occasions to choose pediatric ophthalmology because she is a female, despite her well-known intent to go into vitreoretinal surgery.” (Id. at 4-5; Doc. 2 at 3.) And, Plaintiff alleges, male residents were not subjected to administrative leave or psychiatric evaluation for behavioral issues, including sending threatening messages to a female senior resident, safety complaints, and clinical deficiencies. (Doc. 1 at 5-6; Doc. 2 at 4.) On this record, the Court finds Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of this claim.
2. Retaliation
When a person has complained of sex discrimination and faces retaliation for those complaints, she has a right of action for intentional sex-based discrimination. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173-74. To prevail on a retaliation claim under Title IX, the Court applies the framework used to decide retaliation claims under Title VII. Emeldi v. Univ. of Or., 698 F.3d 715, 724 (9th Cir. 2012). Under this framework, a plaintiff who lacks direct evidence of retaliation must first make out a prima facie case of retaliation by showing (1) she was engaged in protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse action, and (3) there was a causal link between the two. Id.
Plaintiff correctly asserts she was engaged in protected activity when she complained to Program faculty regarding her exclusion from surgical training opportunities in favor of male residents. See Grabowski v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 69 F.4th 1110, 1121 (9th Cir. 2023) (“In the Title IX context, speaking out against sex discrimination is protected activity.”). And, as Plaintiff alleges, she suffered adverse action when, after reporting specific instances of gender discrimination, she was forced to take administrative leave and undergo behavioral health evaluations. See Emeldi, 698 F.3d at 726 (noting an action is adverse when “a reasonable person would have found the challenged action materially adverse,” such that it would “dissuade[] a reasonable person from making or supporting a charge of discrimination” (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (cleaned up))). Plaintiff also received negative evaluations on professionalism and interpersonal nonclinical communications from Defendants Altenbernd and Holmes and was ultimately dismissed from the Program. Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding adverse action when an employee received undeserved poor performance ratings); Grabowski, 69 F.4th at 1121 (finding plaintiff's scholarship cancellation and dismissal from athletic team constituted an adverse action). Plaintiff had previously received only positive feedback in these areas. (Doc. 1 at 5.)
Plaintiff has demonstrated a causal link between her reports of gender discrimination and these adverse actions. “We construe the causal link element of the retaliation framework broadly; a plaintiff merely has to prove that the protected activity and the adverse action are not completely unrelated.” Grabowski, 69 F.4th at 1122 (quoting Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist., 768 F.3d 843, 869 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff points to the timing of several of the adverse actions in relation to her complaints of gender discrimination. See id. (“[P]roximity in time between the protected action and the alleged retaliatory decision can provide circumstantial evidence of causation.”). According to Plaintiff, she was placed on administrative leave the same day she first reported gender discrimination to Defendant Altenbernd in June 2023 and was again placed on administrative leave in January 2024 after raising concerns about gender discrimination. (Doc. 2 at 13.) And, within days of raising her fear the probation terms offered in lieu of dismissal “would allow the Program Director to retaliate against her for reports of discrimination by giving her a negative evaluation,” Plaintiff was dismissed from the Program. (Doc. 2 at 14.) Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff has shown she is likely to prevail on the merits of this claim.
B. Irreparable Harm
“An irreparable harm is one that cannot be redressed by a legal or equitable remedy following trial.” Optinrealbig.com LLC v. Ironport Sys., Inc., 323 F.Supp.2d 1037, 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Courts will not grant relief “based only on a possibility of irreparable harm,” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, and a plaintiff must instead show immediate threatened harm, Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.”). Beyond showing likely irreparable injury, a plaintiff must also establish a “sufficient causal connection” between the harm and the conduct she seeks to enjoin. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2011).
The loss of opportunity to pursue one's chosen profession due to alleged discrimination is widely recognized as constituting an irreparable injury. See, e.g., Enyart v. Nat'l Conf. of Bar Exam'rs, Inc., 630 F.3d 1153, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2011) (Plaintiff “demonstrated irreparable harm in the form of the loss of opportunity to pursue her chosen profession. . . . If she fails the Bar Exam or scores too low on the MPRE to qualify for admission, [she] cannot be licensed to practice law in California.”); Maczaczyj v. State of New York, 956 F.Supp. 403, 408 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding exclusion from masters program “will most likely affect plaintiff's ability to engage in the future employment of his choice”); see also Tanner v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 433 F.Supp.2d 117, 125 (D.D.C. 2006) (“The loss of specific job opportunities, training and competitive advantages can constitute irreparable harm.” (citing Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 89 n.16 (1981))). While purely economic harms that may later be compensated monetarily are not irreparable, “[t]he lost opportunity to engage in one's preferred occupation goes beyond monetary deprivation.” Bonnette v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 796 F.Supp.2d 164, 186 (D.D.C. 2011). Lost eligibility and opportunity to compete is a cognizable and irreparable harm in and of itself. See Tanner, 433 F.Supp.2d at 125 (finding loss of eligibility to participate in vocational training program irreparable, though the benefits of participation itself and any job opportunities to be derived therefrom were too speculative).
While a plaintiff's delay is not alone determinative in assessing whether she will be irreparably harmed, it still “weighs against the immediacy of the harm.” AK Metals, LLC v. Norman Indus. Materials, Inc., 2013 WL 417323, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2013) (twomonth delay); see Oakland Trib., Inc. v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Plaintiff's long delay before seeking a preliminary injunction implies a lack of urgency and irreparable harm.”). Here, Plaintiff was dismissed from the Program on June 26, 2024. The dismissal was subsequently reversed, and Plaintiff was scheduled to return to the Program on September 1, 2024, before her reinstatement conditioned upon a term of probation was rescinded. Plaintiff acknowledges her delay in requesting injunctive relief “weigh[s] against irreparable harm,” explaining her initial counsel “failed to recognize” her Title IX claim. (Doc. 2 at 16.)
Plaintiff nevertheless argues she will suffer irreparable harm without the Court's intervention because “[n]o amount of money could sufficiently compensate [her] for the dismissal from her final year of residency.” (Doc. 2 at 14.) She claims it is “impossible” to find an opening in a residency program for a fourth-year student like herself and “cannot begin another four [year] program anew, even if she could find” one. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts “any further delay in returning to her Program will result in significant training gaps that will impair ability to continue her education in a fellowship program.” (Id. at 15.) Specifically, she argues her “training includes technical surgical skills that she must practice regularly” and “will have to explain any training gaps to any fellowship program” she will attend following residency. (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiff argues, she should be permitted to return to the Program without probationary status because the harm and resulting damage to her “professional reputation by having a permanent disciplinary action (probation or dismissal) on her residency record” poses an “insurmountable barrier” to “highly competitive vitreoretinal surgery fellowship positions.” (Id. at 15-16.)
The Court agrees the denial of Plaintiff's TRO Motion will likely cause her irreparable harm. Plaintiff's dismissal from the Program effectively denies her the benefit of the work already performed in her fourth year of residency and will delay or prevent her completion of the Program. And, although Plaintiff has already been dismissed from the Program, her dismissal, or, alternatively, her placement on probation, will appear on her record, which will impact her ability to enroll at another institution or her future career possibilities. See Doe v. Pa. State Univ., 276 F.Supp.3d 300, 302 & n.1, 306, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (finding student in a seven-year pre-med program temporarily barred from participating after another student accused him of sexual assault would be irreparably harmed by two-year suspension gap as “he would forever be forced to explain his lengthy tenure within this program and, ultimately, his delayed entry in the professional workforce”). Indeed, if Plaintiff is not permitted to return to the Program without probationary status pending resolution of her claims, she will, in all likelihood, be prevented from becoming a vitreoretinal fellow or surgeon. Plaintiff's continued enrollment in the Program after over two months of administrative leave in early 2024, as well as Defendants' proposed reinstatement of Plaintiff nearly three months after her dismissal, suggest Plaintiff's temporary absence will not prevent her from catching up on missed clinical hours and assignments. Despite Plaintiff's delay in seeking injunctive relief, the Court finds this factor weighs in favor of granting the TRO Motion.
C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest
Plaintiff asserts the harm in delaying her completion of her final year of residency “far outweighs any damage that the University could possibly conceive,” asserting her readmission does not “pose any harm to the Program or patients.” (Doc. 2 at 16.) Further, she argues, public policy favors her reinstatement because (1) it will “encourage other students to report . . . discrimination”; (2) it will allow her to continue “providing] her diverse perspectives and mentorship to patients and . . . colleagues”; and (3) it will allow her to continue to provide care in a “medically underserved area in Southern Arizona.” (Id. at 17.)
“[U]pholding the goals of Title IX” is in the public interest. Mayerova v. E. Mich. Univ., 346 F.Supp.3d 983, 999 (E.D. Mich. 2018); see also Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1115 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (“The public interest in remedying gender discrimination is strong and promoting compliance with Title IX is an important societal value.”). Although it is also in the public's interest for university officials to be afforded some level of deference in their decisions and processes, there is no evidence Defendants will be harmed by allowing Plaintiff to remain in the Program pending resolution of her claims. See Doe v. Horne, 683 F.Supp.3d 950, 976 (D. Ariz. 2023) (“[A] preliminary injunction would not harm Defendants because it would merely maintain the status quo while Plaintiffs pursue their claims.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1145 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding defendants “cannot suffer harm from an injunction that merely ends an unlawful practice”). According to Plaintiff, she has “never received a patient complaint or made a mistake detrimental to patient care,” and she had not received any negative evaluations regarding professionalism and interpersonal communications prior to her reports of gender discrimination. (Doc. 1 at 3; Doc. 2 at 12.) The Court finds these factors weigh in favor of granting Plaintiff's TRO Motion.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the information the Court has before it, the Court finds a temporary restraining order is warranted. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED Plaintiff's TRO Motion (Doc. 2) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiff shall be reinstated in the Program without probationary status effective immediately.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED this TRO shall expire on Tuesday, November 19, 2024, at 4:00 p.m. unless extended by the Court for good cause. ....
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Defendants must show cause in writing why a preliminary injunction should not issue no later than Tuesday, November 12, 2024. If Defendants file a Response to Plaintiff's TRO Motion by this date, the Court will set an evidentiary hearing on whether to convert the TRO to a preliminary injunction.