Bell Cab and U Drive- It Co. v. Sloan, 193 Tenn. 352, 246 S.W.2d 41 (1952); Moore v. Union Chevrolet Co., 46 Tenn.App. 206, 326 S.W.2d 855 (1958); McMahan v. Tucker, 31 Tenn.App. 429, 216 S.W.2d 356 (1948). See also the recent case of Bullington v. Whitson, 223 Tenn. 315, 444 S.W.2d 152 (1969).          Defendant has met her burden of rebutting the presumption involved in the statute so that plaintiff is left to rely upon the bare allegations of the pleadings.

Fred Massengill, claims manager for Malone Freight Lines, testified as to the procedure used in connection with its regular 30-day inspection; however, Jackie Donaldson, the employee who made the inspection, was not called to testify. Although as indicated, no Tennessee cases have dealt with the exact factual situation here presented, the Tennessee courts have applied the doctrine in other situations involving motor vehicles — unattended vehicle rolling down incline, Bullington v. Whitson, 223 Tenn. 315, 444 S.W.2d 152 (1969); Roberts v. Ray, 45 Tenn. App. 280, 322 S.W.2d 435 (1958); vehicle being operated off travel portion of the road, Hudson v. Stepp, 54 Tenn. App. 640, 393 S.W.2d 301 (1965); Sullivan v. Crabtree, 36 Tenn. App. 469, 258 S.W.2d 782 (1953). In Hudson, supra, Judge Parrott of this Court restates the doctrine and its procedural effect (54 Tenn. App. at 643, 393 S.W.2d at 302):

, 385 S.W.2d 130, 142; Womac v. Casteel, 200 Tenn. 588, 292 S.W.2d 782, 788; Dorrity v. Mann, 43 Tenn. App. 554, 310 S.W.2d 191, which hold, among other things, that when a party is of the opinion the instructions given by the court do not cover all phases of the case, he should call the attention of the trial judge to that fact and tender other and fuller instructions; otherwise, he cannot predicate error upon omissions in or meagerness of the charge as given. McClard v. Reid, 190 Tenn. 337, 229 S.W.2d 505, 507, which is the most often cited case dealing with remote contributory negligence, is not in conflict with the above cases, but merely holds that where the trial judge undertakes to charge the doctrine, it is prejudicial error for him to fail "to tell the jury that the remote contributory negligence, if any, must be taken in mitigation of damages" and to affirmatively charge, in effect "that remote contributory negligence is not to be considered by the jury." Of like import is Bullington v. Whitson, 223 Tenn. 315, 444 S.W.2d 152. We think this assignment of error must be overruled for the further reason that there is no affirmative showing that the failure to charge on remote contributory negligence affected the results of the trial.