Opinion
Case No. 99-4098-DES
July 6, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendant's Renewal of its Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Or, in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial or Remittitur (Doc. 77). Plaintiff has filed a Response (Doc. 84), and defendant has filed its Reply (Doc. 86). On May 10, 2001, the court issued an Order (Doc. 83) granting defendant's request for a stay of execution pending the disposition of the motion presently before the court. After consideration of the parties' filings, defendant's motion is hereby denied.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case arises from an injury plaintiff sustained while employed by the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") as a slaughter/safety inspector. On the day of his injury, plaintiff was working as an inspector in defendant's Emporia, Kansas, beef processing plant. While inspecting beef carcasses in the "high-trim" section of the plant, plaintiff was cut on the hand by a knife wielded by Welner Lopez ("Lopez"), an employee of defendant. Plaintiff alleged defendant was liable for the negligence of Lopez and for its own negligence in failing to properly train and/or supervise Lopez. Defendant argued plaintiff was responsible for his injury, and that the USDA was negligent in failing to properly train plaintiff.
Following a two-day trial, on April 4, 2001, the jury returned a verdict allocating fault as follows:
Plaintiff 5%
USDA 25%
Defendant 70%
The jury found plaintiff's damages to be:
Noneconomic loss to date $125,000
Future noneconomic loss $100,000
Medical expenses to date $ 24,435
Economic loss to date $ 15,224
Total Damages $265,224
The court entered its amended judgment in favor of plaintiff on April 9, 2001, in the amount of $185,656.80.
Defendant now moves the court to set aside the judgment in favor of plaintiff and enter judgment for defendant. In the alternative, defendant moves for a new trial or for remittitur of the jury award.
DISCUSSION
At the close of plaintiff's evidence and at the close of all the evidence at trial, defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law on all issues pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court denied defendant's motions. Defendant now renews its motion for judgment as a matter of law as to all issues pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Standard of Review
Judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) "should be cautiously and sparingly granted." Lucas v. Dover Corp., 857 F.2d 1397, 1400 (10th Cir. 1988). The jury's verdict must be affirmed if, "viewing the record in the light most favorable to [the nonmoving party], there is evidence upon which the jury could properly return a verdict for [the nonmoving party]." Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1546 (10th Cir. 1996). A court does not weigh the evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute its conclusions for those of the jury. Id. See also Wolfgang v. Mid-America Motorsports, Inc., 111 F.3d 1515, 1522 (10th Cir. 1997). On the other hand, judgment as a matter of law must be granted if there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis with respect to a claim or defense under the controlling law. Harolds, 82 F.3d at 1546-47 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)). A legally sufficient basis requires more than "a scintilla of evidence" favoring the nonmoving party. Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir. 1988).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the court to grant a new trial "for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States." Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). Motions for new trial are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984). A new trial is not to be granted unless the court finds that prejudicial error has occurred or substantial justice has not been done. Johnson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 609 F. Supp. 776, 779 (D.Kan. 1985), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1530 (10th Cir. 1986). "Neither an error in the admission or exclusion of evidence nor an error in a ruling or order of the court, nor anything done or omitted by the court, can be grounds for granting a new trial unless the error or defect affects the substantial rights of the parties." Courtney v. Safelite Glass Corp., 811 F. Supp. 1466, 1471 (D.Kan. 1992).
Sufficiency of the Evidence Lopez's Negligence
Defendant first argues there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of Lopez's negligence. In particular, defendant asserts the medical testimony offered by Dr. Thomas Frazier contradicted plaintiff's own description of how his hand was injured. Plaintiff testified he was cut by Lopez as he pointed out a piece of contaminant for Lopez to remove from a carcass. According to plaintiff, the knife entered through the side of his left index finger, traveled down the finger, and stopped when it hit the bone of his curled middle finger. In plaintiff's own words, his finger was filleted by the knife. Lopez, on the other hand, testified plaintiff was injured while he cupped his hands under Lopez's knife in an effort to catch the piece of contaminant. Lopez could not, however, give any opinion as to where or how plaintiff was cut. Dr. Thomas testified plaintiff "sustained a laceration to the palmar surface of his index finger. . . . He also sustained a laceration over the top of his left middle finger . . . ." (Frazier Dep. at 8-9).
The jury was shown a video tape of Dr. Frazier's deposition.
As interpreted by the court, defendant's argument is centered on the difference between being cut on the palmar surface of a finger as compared to being cut through the palmar surface of a finger. In essence, defendant argues that because Dr. Thomas's testimony indicated a laceration on the palmar surface and plaintiff testified to being cut through or within the palmar surface, the medical testimony is inconsistent with plaintiff's version of where his hand was in relation to the carcass and Lopez. The court finds, however, the subtle distinction being presented by defendant is not reasonably borne out by the medical testimony. In any event, the jury was offered two differing factual accounts of the accident and evidently chose to believe plaintiff's version. The court will not, at this time, supplant its determination over that of the jury's. The medical testimony reveals plaintiff suffered a laceration on the palmar surface of his left finger. Notwithstanding defendant's attempted differentiation, this is relatively consistent with plaintiff's assertion. Viewing such evidence in favor of plaintiff, the court finds there was sufficient evidence presented for the jury to reach its conclusion, and defendant's motion will be denied as to this issue.
IBP's Negligence
Defendant next asserts there was insufficient evidence presented regarding defendant's own negligence in training Lopez. Defendant directs the court to the evidence it presented detailing the varied and intensive training Lopez had regarding proper knife handling and general safety issues. Plaintiff argues he offered his own opinion that because Lopez was a relatively junior employee he was unqualified to fulfill the duties of "high-trimmer." Although presenting a close call, the court finds sufficient evidence was placed before the jury to support plaintiff's allegation.
In the alternative, the court will not disturb a general verdict of negligence when sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding as to at least one theory of liability. Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Lumbert, 401 F.2d 699, 701 (10th Cir. 1968) ("In the absence of a pertinent objection to the charge or a request for a specific interrogatory a general verdict is upheld where there is substantial evidence supporting any ground for recovery in favor of an appellee.") (internal citations omitted). See also Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1522 n. 18 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding nonobjected-to general verdict should be upheld "if the proof on various theories is sufficient to sustain the general verdict"), aff'd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985). In the present case, not only did defendant not object to the use of the general verdict, defendant actually objected to plaintiff's own attempt to introduce a special verdict form, which would have required the jury to differentiate between defendant's fault under the respondeat superior theory and defendant's own negligence in failing to properly train or supervise Lopez. (Tr. Vol. III at 388). In accordance with Kansas law, the court instructed the jury that they need not agree as to which of defendant's specific acts or omissions caused plaintiff's injuries. See PIK-Civil 3d 106.01. Therefore, having found sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding as to Lopez's negligence and in light of defendant's failure to object, the court will uphold the jury's general verdict in favor of plaintiff.
Exclusion of Evidence
Defendant next asserts the court erred in ruling certain evidence inadmissible. In particular, defendant attempted to cross-examine plaintiff regarding the USDA's subsequent measure to provide protective gloves to all USDA inspectors in beef processing facilities. Additionally, defendant moved for the admission of a purported USDA "newsletter." The document, dated June 1997, describes how the USDA "is proposing a policy under which all inspectors assigned to high-speed red meat slaughtering plants will be provided with protective gloves." (Def. Mem. Ex. D). After a side-bar conference, the court sustained plaintiff's objections. Defendant was permitted to make a proffer regarding the evidence while plaintiff was on the stand. (Tr. Vol. II at 227-31).
Defendant argues the court improperly sustained plaintiff's objections under Rules 407 and 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Defendant makes several arguments for why the USDA's action or policy was not a subsequent remedial measure as defined by Rule 407. The court declines, however, to consider the propriety of its ruling because even assuming arguendo that the ruling was erroneous, the court finds the ruling failed to affect defendant's substantial rights.
Defendant argues the excluded evidence went directly to the issue of feasibility. Plaintiff testified that he did not wear safety gloves while working in the high-trim position because it hampered his ability to properly palpate the moving carcasses. Defendant asserts the excluded evidence would have demonstrated the feasibility to the jury of palpating organs while wearing safety gloves, and defendant contends the evidence demonstrated that the USDA had since required the use of the gloves while inspectors worked at the heart, lung, and liver stations. Plaintiff testified on redirect, however, that while inspecting at the "pluck" and liver stations, he did wear safety gloves, and plaintiff further described that these stations did require the palpation of the carcass's internal organs. (Tr. Vol. II at 241-43). The court is perplexed as to what additional impact defendant believes the excluded evidence would have had on the jury in light of plaintiff's testimony.
While not directly defined, the court assumes the "pluck" refers to the heart and lungs of the carcass.
As to the issue of making the gloves mandatory, plaintiff testified during defendant's proffer that while the gloves were mandatory at the heart, lung, and liver inspecting stations, the USDA had not made the gloves mandatory at the high-trim position. No evidence was offered, which indicated that the USDA had at any time made the wearing of the gloves mandatory for high-trim inspectors. At best, the evidence demonstrated that the gloves, while certainly valuable, were only an available option for inspectors at the high-trim position. The admission of such information would have had little impact, for it was never asserted by plaintiff that the gloves were not available. In fact, plaintiff testified at length to his familiarity with, and the availability of, the safety gloves. The court finds the hypothetical impact of the excluded evidence on the issues before the jury was minimal and any error in excluding the evidence failed to affect the substantial rights of defendant. Therefore, the court declines to set aside the jury's verdict.
Excessive Damage Award
Defendant asserts the amount of noneconomic damages awarded to plaintiff was excessive and asks the court to grant a new trial or remit the award. In considering this issue, the court is ever cognizant that the jury "`is clothed with a wide latitude and discretion in fixing damages pursuant to the court's instructions, deemed proper to fairly compensate the injured party.'" Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 948 F.2d 1546, 1559 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Bennett v. Longacre, 774 F.2d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 1985)), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 910 (1992). However, if the amount of a jury's damages award is "so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience and to raise an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption or other improper cause invaded the trial," the court must order a new trial. Palmer v. City of Monticello, 31 F.3d 1499, 1508 (10th Cir. 1994). See also Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc., 703 F.2d 1152, 1168 (10th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (plurality), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 824 (1983). In such a case, a new trial is necessary because the improper cause may have invaded the liability determinations as well as the damage calculations. A verdict, however, that is excessive but is not the result of passion, prejudice, or another improper cause does not necessitate a new trial. Mason, 948 F.2d at 1560. When the jury errs only as to its assessment of damages, the court may order a complete new trial, order a new trial limited to the issue of damages, or condition the denial of a new trial on the plaintiff's acceptance of a remittitur. Id. Finally, the court notes that "general damages for pain and suffering . . . are not susceptible to proof by a set dollar amount." Blanke v. Alexander, 152 F.3d 1224, 1237 (10th Cir. 1998).
In the present case, defendant argues the award is excessive in light of the limited evidence presented detailing plaintiff's damages. The court disagrees. The jury heard detailed testimony regarding plaintiff's accident and the pain associated with such an injury. Plaintiff has undergone two surgeries and physical therapy to rehabilitate his hand. The medical procedures, however, were unsuccessful in completely restoring plaintiff, for he testified to a continuing reduction in flexibility, sensation, general dexterity, and a sensitivity to cold temperatures. Additionally, the jury was able to view plaintiff's scars and disfigurement resulting from his injury, and the jury heard plaintiff's description of his continuing pain. For such past and future damages, the jury awarded plaintiff $225,000. The court acknowledges that such an amount is large, yet the award by no means "shocks the judicial conscience." The court sees no justification for finding such an award was the product of passion or prejudice. Nor does the court find the award excessive in relation to the evidence presented at trial, so the court need not reduce the jury's determination via remittitur.
CONCLUSION
After proper consideration, the court finds all of defendant's arguments lacking in merit, so the court is compelled to deny defendant's requests for post-trial relief.
IT IS THEREFORE BY THIS COURT ORDERED that defendant's Renewal of its Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Or, in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial or Remittitur (Doc. 77) is denied.
DES:MSC