Defendant argues that plaintiffs do not plead their claim for intentional misrepresentation with the adequate level of specificity as required for claims of fraud because the advice defendant gave was approved by the NYSDT, Under New York law, to plead misrepresentation or fraud, "...though there is no requirement of "unassailable proof' at the pleading stage," the complaint must allege facts that "suffice to permit a reasonable inference of the alleged misconduct," (see Eurycleia Partners, LP v Seward & Kissel, LLP, 12 N.Y.3d 553, 559 [2009]). "'[A]t the pleading stage of a fraud case against an accountant, the plaintiff need not be able to make an evidentiary showing of exactly what the accountant knew as to falsehoods in the certified financial statements'" (Bullen v Cohn Reznick, LLP, 194 A.D.3d 637, 637 [1st Dept 2021] [internal citation omitted]). "[A]ctual knowledge[,] [however,] need only be pleaded generally, [given], particularly at the prediscovery stage, that a plaintiff lacks access to the very discovery materials which would illuminate a defendant's state of mind [citation omitted]" (Cohen Brothers Realty Corp, v Mapes, 181 A.D.3d 401, 403-404 [1st Dept 2020]).

The allegation further lacks any specific facts that indicate the alleged misrepresentation was intentional. Bullen v. Cohn Reznick, LLP, 194 A.D.3d 637, 637 (1st Dep't 2021). Plaintiff thus fails to plead the claim with the specificity sufficient to satisfy C.P.L.R. § 3016(b).