Opinion
9873.
03-14-1934
BULLARD v. LIFE & CASUALTY INS. CO.
Fariss & Langford and Rosser & Shaw, all of La Fayette, for plaintiff in error. Sizer, Chambliss & Kefauver and McClure & McClure, all of Chattanooga, Tenn., for defendant in error.
Syllabus by the Court.
Where a policy of accident insurance carries a provision that the insurer is liable for any injury to the insured for any accident caused "by the collision of or by any accident to any private horse-drawn or private motor-driven automobile in which the insured is riding or driving," this does not include an injury to one riding on a motorcycle where it collides with another motor-driven vehicle or automobile.
Certified Question from Court of Appeals.
Proceeding by J. C. Bullard, by next friend, against the Life & Casualty Insurance Company, etc. To review the judgment, the first named party brings error to the Court of Civil Appeals, which certifies a question.
Question answered.
Fariss & Langford and Rosser & Shaw, all of La Fayette, for plaintiff in error.
Sizer, Chambliss & Kefauver and McClure & McClure, all of Chattanooga, Tenn., for defendant in error.
GILBERT, Justice.
A policy of life insurance is a contract. Civil Code 1910, § 2496. The cardinal rule for the construction of the contract is to ascertain the intention of the parties. Section 4266. In arriving at the true interpretation of a contract, words usually bear their "usual and common signification." In common parlance, or according to usual signification of the word, an "automobile" is not a "motorcycle." Both are "motor-driven" vehicles, but not all "motor-driven" vehicles are "automobiles," nor are all "motorcycles." Had it been the intention of the parties that the insurance should cover accidents in riding a motorcycle, the policy would properly have used the words "motor-driven vehicles." That phrase would have been broad enough to include both "automobiles" and "motorcycles." When the word "automobile" is added to the words "motor-driven," so as to make the phrase "motor-driven automobile," the general term "motor-driven vehicle" is so restricted as to include only "automobiles" and to exclude "motorcycles." The Motor Vehicle Law (Ga. Laws 1927, p. 226), which provides for registration of "motor-vehicles, tractors, trailers, dealers," etc., defines the words "motor-vehicle" generally, and then contains a definition for the word "motorcycle." The license fees are so graduated and separated as to provide a different schedule of fees for the "motorcycle" from that of "passenger-carrying motor-vehicles," as follows: "Motorcycle $5.00. *** Passenger-carrying motor-vehicles *** $11.25," minimum fee, with an ascending scale according to gross weight of the vehicle. So that the General Assembly, in providing license taxes, separated motorcycles from the general class of motor vehicles.
The Court of Appeals calls our attention to certain decisions of that court and to authorities of other jurisdictions. The decisions of the Court of Appeals are not in conflict with what is here said, and it is unnecessary to discuss outside authorities.
All the Justices concur.