Opinion
2533N.
Decided December 18, 2003.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Jane Solomon, J.), entered August 29, 2003, which, inter alia, granted defendant's cross motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), unanimously affirmed, with costs.
Jerome Tarnoff, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Norman A. Senior, for Defendant-Respondent.
Before: Mazzarelli, J.P., Saxe, Lerner, Marlow, JJ.
A claim such as plaintiff's, based upon an alleged expectancy under a will, is not recognized in this State. Although such a claim is recognized under Illinois law, which plaintiff contends should govern, the motion court correctly concluded, after an interest analysis, that New York rather than Illinois law is applicable, particularly since both parties are domiciled in this State and any economic injury to plaintiff would be sustained here ( see Padula v. Lilarn Props. Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 519, 521; Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 197; Ackerman v. Price Waterhouse, 252 A.D.2d 179, 192-193). It may be noted that, even if Illinois law did apply, plaintiff would have no claim thereunder since his complaint, even when liberally construed ( see Polonetsky v. Better Homes Depot, Inc., 97 N.Y.2d 46, 54), fails to allege the necessary tortious conduct, reasonable certainty of the potential inheritance, and damages ( see Greene v. First Natl. Bank of Chicago, 162 Ill. App.3d 914, 923, 516 N.E.2d 311, 317, lv denied 119 Ill.2d 556, 522 N.E.2d 1244).
We have considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.