One component is the average annual rate of "regular compensation" over a three-year period. See Bulger v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 447 Mass. 651, 654 (2006). CRAB referred the matter to the division of administrative law appeals (DALA); the administrative magistrate affirmed the decision of the Teachers' Retirement Board, and CRAB affirmed the DALA decision.

We begin with the language of the statute. See Bulger v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 447 Mass. 651, 657, 856 N.E.2d 799 (2006). General Laws c. 32, § 1, defines "[r]egular compensation," in relevant part, as "compensation received exclusively as wages by an employee for services performed in the course of employment for his employer."

G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7). See Bulger v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 447 Mass. 651, 658–659, 856 N.E.2d 799 (2006); Brackett v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 447 Mass. 233, 241–242, 850 N.E.2d 533 (2006); Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 425 Mass. 615, 618–619, 682 N.E.2d 624 (1997). We set aside a CRAB decision only if it is legally erroneous or not supported by substantial evidence.

The payment of retirement deductions on the value of the personal use of the automobile, or the tax status of that use, is not determinative of whether the use falls within the definition of "[r]egular compensation," G.L. c. 32, § 1, for purposes of calculating an applicant's retirement benefit. See Bulger v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 447 Mass. 651, 659-660 (2006), and cases cited. The plaintiff sought an administrative appeal from the board's decision, pursuant to G.L. c. 32, § 16, but was informed by CRAB that a hearing on his appeal would not take place for approximately eleven or twelve months.

Pelonzi decided that the value of a retiree's personal use of a motor vehicle, furnished to him during his service as the commissioner of public safety, by his municipal employer (city of Beverly), did not qualify as "regular compensation," within the meaning of § 1. Pelonzi, supra at 478, 482. Guided by case precedent under G.L. c. 32, § 1, including but not limited to Bulger v. ContributoryRetirement Appeal Bd., 447 Mass. 651, 658 (2006), the Supreme Judicial Court stated: "The Legislature has carefully set out what may be included in the calculation of a public employee's retirement allowance.

This uniform construction is consistent with our past opinions interpreting the limits of "regular compensation" as defined in § 1, without restriction to a specific type of retirement. See, e.g., Rotondi v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 463 Mass. 644, 652-654 (2012) (determining meaning of "fixed annual compensation" for purposes of membership eligibility under § 3 [2][d] not substantially different from meaning of "regular compensation" in § 1, without consideration of future retirement type); Pelonzi v. Retirement Bd. of Beverly, 451 Mass. 475, 482 (2008) (determining "regular compensation" excludes value of employee's use of automobile provided by employer in appeal from § 5 retirement allowance calculation, but relying on apparent intent of "entire statutory scheme" and making no distinction for other retirement types); Bulgerv. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 447 Mass. 651, 661 (2006) (determining "regular compensation" excludes particular annuity payments in appeal from § 5 retirement allowance calculation, without distinction from other retirement types). To the extent any ambiguity remains in the face of the plain language applying a uniform definition of "regular compensation" throughout the statutory scheme, we resolve it to similar effect.

This uniform construction is consistent with our past opinions interpreting the limits of "regular compensation" as defined in § 1, without restriction to a specific type of retirement. See, e.g., Rotondi v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 463 Mass. 644, 652-654, 977 N.E.2d 1042 (2012) (determining meaning of "fixed annual compensation" for purposes of membership eligibility under § 3 [2] [d ] not substantially different from meaning of "regular compensation" in § 1, without consideration of future retirement type); Pelonzi v. Retirement Bd. of Beverly, 451 Mass. 475, 482, 886 N.E.2d 707 (2008) (determining "regular compensation" excludes value of employee's use of automobile provided by employer in appeal from § 5 retirement allowance calculation, but relying on apparent intent of "entire statutory scheme" and making no distinction for other retirement types); Bulger v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 447 Mass. 651, 661, 856 N.E.2d 799 (2006) (determining "regular compensation" excludes particular annuity payments in appeal from § 5 retirement allowance calculation, without distinction from other retirement types). To the extent any ambiguity remains in the face of the plain language applying a uniform definition of "regular compensation" throughout the statutory scheme, we resolve it to similar effect.

Springfield v. Department of Telecomm. & Cable, 457 Mass. 562, 567 (2010), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). "We exercise de novo review of legal questions, however, and we must overturn agency decisions that are not consistent with governing law." Bulger v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 447 Mass. 651, 657 (2006), citing Plymouth v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 426 Mass. 1, 5 (1997). The specific issue in this case -- whether Misiaszek's limited power of appointment renders the value of the trust corpus a countable asset for purposes of determining her MassHealth eligibility -- is a question of law, and thus is subject to de novo review.

Springfield v. Department of Telecomm. & Cable, 457 Mass. 562, 567, 931 N.E.2d 942 (2010), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). "We exercise de novo review of legal questions, however, and we must overturn agency decisions that are not consistent with governing law." Bulger v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 447 Mass. 651, 657, 856 N.E.2d 799 (2006), citing Plymouth v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 426 Mass. 1, 5, 686 N.E.2d 188 (1997). The specific issue in this case -- whether Misiaszek's limited power of appointment renders the value of the trust corpus a countable asset for purposes of determining her MassHealth eligibility -- is a question of law, and thus is subject to de novo review.

Thus, under the plain language of G. L. c. 151, § 2, the type of work that the plaintiffs performed, i.e., cleaning, sorting, and packaging the sprouts, does not fall within the scope of the statute. See Bulger v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 447 Mass. 651, 660, 856 N.E.2d 799 (2006), quoting Perez v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 413 Mass. 670, 675, 602 N.E.2d 570 (1992) ("[statutory] definition [that] declares what a term means ... excludes any meaning that is not stated").b. Legislative history. A narrow interpretation of the agricultural exemption is supported by the legislative history of the minimum wage and overtime statutes.