Isolated incidents of mail mishandling do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Buie v. Jones, 717 F.2d 925, 926 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that “a few isolated instances of plaintiff's mail being opened out of his presence” that were “either accidental or the result of unauthorized subordinate conduct ... were not of constitutional magnitude”); Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[A]n isolated incident of mail tampering is usually insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.”).

Defendant cites several Fourth Circuit cases as authority for this proposition. (Id. at 5-6; see Buie v. Jones, 717 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1983); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791 (4th Cir. 1994); Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984). However, the Court is not persuaded by the sources cited by Defendant.

Further, isolated incidents of mail mishandling do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Buie v. Jones, 717 F.2d 925, 926 (4th Cir. 1983) ("few isolated instances of plaintiff's [legal] mail being opened out of his presence" that were "either accidental or the result of unauthorized subordinate conduct ... were not of constitutional mandate."); Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003) ("an isolated incident of mail tampering is usually insufficient to establish a constitutional violation."); Pearson v. Simms, 345 F.Supp.2d 515, 519 (D. Md. 2003), aff'd, 88 F. App'x 639 (4th Cir. 2004) ("occasional incidents of delay or non-delivery of mail are not actionable under § 1983"). Qualified immunity "shields police officers who commit constitutional violations from liability when, based on clearly established law, they could reasonably believe that their actions were lawful."

Isolated incidents of mail mishandling do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Buie v. Jones, 717 F.2d 925, 926 (4th Cir. 1983) ("a few isolated instances of plaintiff's [legal] mail being opened out of his presence" that were "either accidental or the result of unauthorized subordinate conduct ... were not of constitutional mandate."); Pearson v. Simms, 345 F.Supp. 2d 515, 519 (D. Md. 2003), aff'd, 88 Fed. Appx. 639 (4th Cir. 2004) ("occasional incidents of delay or non-delivery of mail are not actionable under § 1983). (3) Due Process

Moreover, where a prisoner complains of "a few isolated instances of [his] mail being opened out of his presence[,]" the allegations do not rise to the level of a First Amendment violation, particularly where the incidents were contrary to prison policy, accidental, or committed by an "unauthorized subordinate." Buie v. Jones, 717 F.2d 925, 926 (4th Cir. 1983). Here, the record establishes plaintiff's legal mail was opened once outside his presence by Mosall.

Moreover, isolated incidents of mail mishandling do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Buie v. Jones, 717 F.2d 925, 926 (4th Cir. 1983) (finding isolated incidents of opening of legal mail does not state a cognizable § 1983 claim). Thus, plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation on this ground.

Moreover, isolated incidents of mail mishandling do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Buie v. Jones, 717 F.2d 925, 926 (4th Cir. 1983) (finding isolated incidents of opening of legal mail does not state a congnizable § 1983 claim). Thus, the court finds this claim meritless.

Accepting as true Plaintiff's allegation that the correspondence from the District Court in Texas was legal mail and that it was opened and inspected outside his presence, he, nevertheless, fails to state a claim for relief. See Buie v. Jones, 717 F.2d 925, 926 (4th Cir. 1983) (a few isolated instances of improper handling of inmate's mail, such as opening it out of his presence, did not raise a claim of constitutional magnitude).

First, it is not likely that Plaintiff will be transferred back to the YCDC in the foreseeable future, which is a prison for pretrial detainees. See Buie v. Jones, 717 F.2d 925, 927 (4th Cir. 1983) ("[A] convicted prisoner under a life sentence plus, cannot reasonably be expected within the foreseeable future to be transferred back to . . . a place of confinement for pretrial detainees."). Plaintiff is currently an inmate with the SCDC, and his expected release date is not until July of 2015.

Thus, “isolated incidents of legal mail being opened outside an inmate's presence do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Cuozzo, 2022 WL 3579905, at *7-8 (citing Buie v. Jones, 717 F.2d 925, 936 (4th Cir. 1983)).