BUICK v. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SEC

7 Citing cases

  1. Autoliv ASP, Inc. v. Department of Workforce Services

    2001 UT App. 198 (Utah Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 18 times
    Concluding that emailing sexually explicit jokes, pictures, and videos in the workplace "constitutes a flagrant violation of a universal standard of behavior"

    '" Id. (second alteration in original) (quotingProfessional Staff Mgmt., 953 P.2d at 79-80 (quoting Allen v. Department of Employment Sec., 781 P.2d 888, 890 n. 4 (Utah Ct.App. 1989))). Thus, we will "`uphold [the Board's] decision so long as it is within the realm of reasonableness and rationality.'"Buick v. Department of Employment Sec., 752 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) (quoting Grinnell v. Board of Review, 732 P.2d 113, 115 (Utah 1987)); see also Albertsons, Inc. v. Department of Employment Sec., 854 P.2d 570, 573 (Utah Ct.App. 1993). JUST CAUSE TERMINATION

  2. Magnuson v. Department of Workforce Services

    2000 UT App. 269 (Utah Ct. App. 2000)

    The credibility of her testimony that a department employee told her the decision was a mistake and would be taken care of is for the Board, not this court, to evaluate. See Jim Whetton Buick v. Department of Employment Sec., 752 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) ("It is not this Court's role to decide which testimony is more credible."). We see no error in the Board's discounting her testimony in this regard.

  3. Albertsons, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security

    854 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 34 times
    Observing that it is the employer's burden to prove just cause for terminating the employee

    "It is the province of the Board, not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the Board to draw the inferences." Id. Accord Logan Regional Hosp. v. Board of Review, 723 P.2d 427, 428 (Utah 1986); Buick v. Department of Employment Sec., 752 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah App. 1988). Accepting Fullerton's testimony, as did the ALJ and the Board, there is substantial evidence to support a finding the incident was an accident and Fullerton did not willfully destroy Albertsons's property.

  4. Grace Drilling v. Board of Review

    776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 121 times
    Holding that the Board did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen the record to consider evidence where the party had “ample opportunity to present its case”

    See also, e.g., West Jordan v. Department of Employment Sec., 656 P.2d 411, 413 (Utah 1982) (findings of fact are conclusive "if supported by evidence of any substance"); Taylor v. Department of Employment Sec., 647 P.2d 1, 1 (Utah 1982). Accord Grinnell v. Board of Review, 732 P.2d 113, 115 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); Terminal Serv. Co. v. Board of Review, 714 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); Mayes v. Department of Employment Sec., 754 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah Ct.App. 1988); Jim Whetton Buick v. Department of Employment Sec., 752 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah Ct.App. 1988); Stegen v. Department of Employment Sec., 751 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). However, there are also a number of Utah decisions that, without elaboration, have used different terminology in discussing the applicable standard for reviewing the Board's findings of fact. For example, in Northwest Foods Ltd. v. Board of Review, 731 P.2d 470, 471 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court declared that the Board's findings of fact "are conclusive and binding, and are to be sustained if supported by competent and substantial evidence in the record."

  5. ADELE'S HOUSEKEEPING v. DEPT. OF EMP. SEC

    757 P.2d 480 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 7 times

    Rather, Adele's challenges the Board's application of the law to the facts. We defer to the Board's interpretation and application of the operative provisions of the Employment Security Act so long as the Board's decision is reasonable and rational, i.e., the findings of fact support the Board's conclusion. Buick v. Department of Employment Sec., 752 P.2d 358 (Utah App. 1988); Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983). We recognize that the Utah Supreme Court enunciated a less deferential standard of review in Bennett v. Industrial Commission, 726 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986):

  6. MAYES v. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SEC

    754 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 6 times
    In Mayes, then, we should have clarified that findings of fact "cannot be based exclusively on inadmissible hearsay evidence" because admissible hearsay evidence is "evidence competent in a court of law."

    This provision is interpreted to mean the greatest degree of deference will be extended to the Commission's findings on questions of basic fact and are to be sustained if supported by evidence of any substance whatever. Jim Whetton Buick v. Department of Employment Sec., 752 P.2d 358 (Utah App. 1988). Regarding the interpretation of operative provisions of the Employment Security Act, we give "the construction of statutes by governmental agencies charged with their administration . . . considerable weight. . . ."

  7. PRITCHER v. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SEC

    752 P.2d 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 4 times

    However, the issue before us is whether the appeal referee's findings unfavorable to petitioner and adopted by the Board are supported by "evidence of any substance," and, if they are, whether the referee's decision is "within the realm of reasonableness and rationality." E.g., Stegen v. Department of Employment Sec., 751 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Utah Ct.App. 1988); Jim Whetton Buick v. Department of Employment Sec., 752 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). It is clear that the referee found petitioner's stated reasons for leaving to be unbelievable. As petitioner himself testified, he stayed on at Safeway long after concluding his work environment was incurably miserable and some weeks after deciding to retire early.