Opinion
No. TTD CV 07-5001261-S
July 10, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE
This case is an action by Buguruka Orphans and Community Economic Development, Inc. (BOCED) against Bishop Michael Cote of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Norwich. The Complaint is in two counts: Count One alleges Tortious Interference in Business Relationship; Court Two alleges Defamation. Bishop Cote moves to strike both counts. For the following reasons, the court grants the Motion to Strike as to the First Count. As to the Second Count, the Motion is denied.
I
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Greco v. United Technologies Corp., 277 Conn. 337, 347, 890 A.2d 1269 (2006). "A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Emphasis in original; citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Asylum Hill Problem Solving Revitalization Ass'n v. King, 277 Conn. 238, 246, 890 A.2d 522 (2006).
II
Bishop Cote argues that Count One is defective in that it fails to allege all of the elements of the tort of Tortious Interference in Business Relationships. The court agrees.
"[I]n order to recover for a claim of tortious interference with business expectancies, the claimant must plead and prove that: (1) a business relationship existed between the plaintiff and another party; (2) the defendant intentionally interfered with the business relationship while knowing of the relationship; and (3) as a result of the interference, the plaintiff suffered actual loss." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawton v. Weiner, 91 Conn.App. 698, 706, 882 A.2d 151 (2005). It is "clear that not every act that disturbs a contract or business expectancy is actionable . . . [F]or a plaintiff successfully to prosecute such an action it must prove that the defendant's conduct was in fact tortious. This element may be satisfied by proof that the defendant was guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation or molestation . . . or that the defendant acted maliciously." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Blake v. Levy, 191 Conn. 257, 260-61, 464 A.2d 52 (1983). "In the terminology of the Restatement [(Second) of Torts], the test is whether the actor's behavior is improper." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 261. "The plaintiff in a tortious interference claim must demonstrate malice on the part of the defendant, not in the sense of ill will, but intentional interference without justification." Daley v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., 249 Conn. 766, 805, 734 A.2d 112 (1999). (Quoting 4 Restatement (Second), Torts § 766, comment (s) (1979)).
Bishop Cote argues that the First Count fails these requirements in three respects. He argues that it fails to allege the existence of any contractual or business relationship; fails to allege whether he had any knowledge of any such a contractual or business relationship; and it fails to allege whether he acted with the required improper motive or improper means necessary to prove malice.
The Revised Complaint, dated May 9, 2007, alleges that BOCED is a non-profit charitable organization operating for the purpose of fund-raising. Count One, para. 2. It alleges that the Bishop is an employee of the Roman Catholic Church. Para 3. It alleges that the Bishop wrote a letter to parishioners of the church in February 2005, asserting that there were financial irregularities in BOCED and that he contended that he had assembled an 800-page file substantiating his concerns, Count One, para. 6. And, it alleges that before a meeting of parishioners, he orally stated that BOCED was ineffectively managed. Count One, para. 8. BOCED alleges that the statements about financial irregularities are untrue and it is untrue that BOCED is ineffectively managed. First Count, paras. 7 and 9. It alleges that its ability to raise funds has been undermined, and that it has sustained pecuniary loss proximately caused by the Bishop's statements. First Count, para. 10.
These allegations fail to state a claim. There is no allegation that BOCED ever solicited donations from parishioners in the Norwich Diocese, let alone that it had an existing donation relationship with any parishioners. The Revised Complaint does not allege that the Bishop knew of any existing relationship nor that he intentionally interfered with that relationship. It does not allege whether the Bishop knew or should have known that his statements were untrue nor does the complaint allege any other factual basis permitting proof of malice.
BOCED argues that the allegations should suffice because it is a non-profit that fund-raises at Catholic Churches in the Norwich Diocese, and the Bishop is clearly aware of this relationship and he illegally interfered in that relationship. That BOCED may be able to make such claims in its memorandum in opposition to the Motion to Strike is of no avail. At this stage in the litigation, the court is confined to reading the Complaint. Such allegations in the form of factual allegations should be in the Complaint. The present Complaint does not make such allegations sufficient to state a claim by its plain words or by inference.
Accordingly, the court grants the Motion to Strike as to Count One.
III
Next, Bishop Cote argues that Count Two is insufficient in that it fails to plead, with sufficient specificity, facts stating a cause of action for defamation. The Motion on this ground is denied.
"Defamation is comprised of the torts of libel and slander . . . Slander is oral defamation . . . Libel . . . is written defamation." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gambardella v. Apple Health Care, Inc., 86 Conn.App. 842, 850, 863 A.2d 735 (2004). Both types are alleged in Count Two.
"To establish a prima facie case of defamation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant published a defamatory statement; (2) the defamatory statement identified the plaintiff to a third person; (3) the defamatory statement was published to a third person; and (4) the plaintiff's reputation suffered injury as a result of the statement." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagnon v. Housatonic Valley Tourism District Commission, 92 Conn.App. 835, 846, 888 A.2d 104 (2005). "A defamatory statement is defined as a communication that tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from association or dealing with him." (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.) Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chemical Co., 267 Conn. 210, 217, 837 A.2d 759 (2004).
When claiming defamation, "[c]ertainty is required in the allegations as to the defamation and as to the person defamed; a complaint for defamation must, on its face, specifically identify what allegedly defamatory statements were made, by whom, and to whom. A complaint is insufficient to withstand dismissal for failure to state a cause of action where, other than the bare allegation that the defendant's actions caused injury to the plaintiff's reputation, the complaint set forth no facts of any kind indicating what defamatory statements, if any, were made, when they were made, or to whom they might have been made." Crosby v. HSB North American Holdings, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, Docket No. CV 06-5000378 (May 16, 2007, Robinson, J.); Forgione v. Bette, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 04-4001099 (June 2, 2005, Gallagher, J.). "A complaint for defamation must, on its face, specifically identify what allegedly defamatory statement were made, by whom, and to whom." Chertkova v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 98-0486246 (July 12, 2002, Berger, J.), aff'd 76 Conn.App. 907, 822 A.2d 372 (2003). See also 2500 SS Limited Partnership v. White, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 95-0328934 (August 19, 1996, Levin, J.) (granting a motion for nonsuit, stating that "[a]lthough the complaint alleges the substance of the allegedly defamatory remarks . . . the complaint fails to specifically allege when, where and to whom each remark was allegedly made"). It is a basic requirement that a plaintiff must identify in the complaint the essential facts that give rise to his cause of action. It is fundamental that the complaint must contain ". . . a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action . . ." General Statutes § 52-91. It must contain ". . . a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies, but not of the evidence by which they are to be proved . . ." Practice Book § 10-1. Some facts are necessary; bare conclusions do not suffice. See 1 Stephenson's Connecticut Civil Procedure (3rd Ed., 1997), Sec. 42 at p. 133 citing Research Associates, Inc. v. New Haven Redevelopment Agency, 157 Conn. 587, 248 A.2d 927 (1968).
With these standards in mind, the court reviews the Revised Complaint and the Motion to Strike the Second Count. In the Second Count, BOCED alleges that Bishop Cote made written defamatory remarks about financial irregularities at BOCED in a letter to parishioners in February 2005. Revised Complaint, para. 6. Under the above standards, this event is alleged with sufficient particularity to satisfy the pleading requirements. The Revised Complaint permits the court and parties to identify the event in issue that forms the basis for the cause of action for written defamation. The Motion to Strike is denied with respect to this allegation.
In paragraph 8, BOCED alleges that "[w]hen called upon to justify his behavior before a meeting of parishioners, defendant Cote stated that BOCED was ineffectively managed." While the sufficiency of this paragraph might be questioned, a Motion to Strike may not be addressed to separate paragraphs of the count "for it is the totality of the count . . . not the individual paragraphs, which must set up a cause of action . . . If one wishes to take exception to separate paragraphs of the pleading, the proper procedure is to file a request to revise." 1 Stephenson's Connecticut Civil Procedure (3rd Ed., 1997) § 72(d). "[A] Motion to Strike addressed to the entire count fails if it does not reach all of the causes pleaded." Id. at § 72(f) citing Wachtel v. Rosol, 159 Conn. 496, 499, 271 A.2d 84 (1970). Accordingly, the Motion to Strike the Second Count is denied.
IV
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Strike is granted as to the First Count. As to the Second Count, it is denied.