The plaintiff appeals.Although the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) was made returnable beyond the deadline fixed by the Supreme Court (seeBuffolino v. City of New York, 92 A.D.3d 633, 937 N.Y.S.2d 871 ), we disagree with the court's exercise of its discretion in declining to entertain that motion, as the plaintiff demonstrated good cause for the delay (seeNisimova v. Starbucks Corp., 108 A.D.3d 513, 514, 967 N.Y.S.2d 838 ). Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for a determination on the merits of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) (seeHe Ping Shao v. Cao Zhao Wei, 118 A.D.3d 943, 944, 989 N.Y.S.2d 49 ; Tafsiou v. Arms Acres, 95 A.D.3d 995, 996, 943 N.Y.S.2d 763 ; Alvarez v. Eviles, 56 A.D.3d 500, 867 N.Y.S.2d 528 ).
As an initial matter, contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, their motion for summary judgment was untimely and they failed to demonstrate "good cause" for their delay ( CPLR 3212[a] ; seeMiceli v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 N.Y.3d 725, 726, 786 N.Y.S.2d 379, 819 N.E.2d 995 ; Brill v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.3d 648, 652, 781 N.Y.S.2d 261, 814 N.E.2d 431 ). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied, as untimely, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issues of liability and damages (seeGiuliano v. 666 Old Country Rd., LLC, 100 A.D.3d 960, 961–962, 954 N.Y.S.2d 215 ; Buffolino v. City of New York, 92 A.D.3d 633, 633, 937 N.Y.S.2d 871 ).
Contrary to Langan's contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in declining to consider the good cause arguments raised for the first time in its reply papers ( see Cabibel v. XYZ Assoc., L.P., 36 A.D.3d 498, 828 N.Y.S.2d 341), particularly in the absence of a surreply from the plaintiff ( see generally Matter of Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Rosario, 17 A.D.3d 677, 678, 792 N.Y.S.2d 912;Johnston v. Continental Broker–Dealer Corp., 287 A.D.2d 546, 731 N.Y.S.2d 666;Matter of TIG Ins. Co. v. Pellegrini, 258 A.D.2d 658, 685 N.Y.S.2d 777). As Langan failed to otherwise offer any explanation for its delay in making the motion, the Supreme Court properly denied the motion without consideration of the merits ( see Giuliano v. 666 Old Country Rd., LLC, 100 A.D.3d 960, 954 N.Y.S.2d 215;Buffolino v. City of New York, 92 A.D.3d 633, 937 N.Y.S.2d 871;Derby v. Bitan, 89 A.D.3d 891, 892, 932 N.Y.S.2d 718;John P. Krupski & Bros., Inc. v. Town Bd. of Town of Southold, 54 A.D.3d 899, 901, 864 N.Y.S.2d 149).
That branch of the motion of the defendants 666 Old Country Road, LLC (hereinafter Old Country Road), and Sutton & Edwards Management, LLC (hereinafter Sutton & Edwards), which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, and that branch of the cross motion of the defendant Nouveau Elevator Industries, Inc. (hereinafter Nouveau), which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, were untimely ( see Buffolino v. City of New York, 92 A.D.3d 633, 937 N.Y.S.2d 871;Hernandez v. 35–55 73rd St., LLC, 90 A.D.3d 709, 709–710, 934 N.Y.S.2d 332;Van Dyke v. Skanska USA Civ. Northeast, Inc., 83 A.D.3d 1049, 921 N.Y.S.2d 544). Old Country Road and Sutton & Edwards, and Nouveau, failed to demonstrate “good cause” for their respective delays in moving for summary judgment (CPLR 3212[a]; see Miceli v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 N.Y.3d 725, 726, 786 N.Y.S.2d 379, 819 N.E.2d 995;Brill v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.3d 648, 652, 781 N.Y.S.2d 261, 814 N.E.2d 431).
In an order dated April 28, 2016, the court directed that all motions for summary judgment should be made returnable "no later than 8/16/16." Here, VP Construction made its motion returnable on September 2, 2016, in violation of the court's order, and without demonstrating good cause for the delay (see, CPLR 2004, 3212[a]; Brill v. City of New York, 2 NY 3d 648, 652, 781 NYS2d 261, 814 NE2d 431; Buffolino v. City of N.Y., 92 AD3d 633, 633, 937 NYS2d 871 [2d Dept 2012]; Van Dyke v. Skanska USA Civ. Northeast, Inc., 83 AD3d 1049, 921 NYS2d 544). VP Construction failed to seek an extension of time to file their motion or to proffer an excuse for their delay, doing so only in reply to plaintiff's opposition.
A cross motion for summary judgment made after the expiration of the statutory period may be considered by the court, even in the absence of good cause, where a timely motion for summary judgment was made on grounds nearly identical to that of the cross motion (see Grande v Peteroy, 39 AD3d 590 [2d Dept 2007]). In this case, T&R and West's cross motion for summary judgment is untimely as it was made returnable two days beyond the court-ordered deadline of September 27, 2011 (see Buffolino v City of New York, ___ AD3d ___, 2012 NY Slip Op 924 [2d Dept 2012]; Hernandez v 35-55 73rd St., LLC, 90 AD3d 709 [2d Dept 2011]). Indeed, the cross motion by T&R and West and plaintiff's motion both seek summary judgment on plaintiff's claim under Labor Law § 240 (1) asserted against T&R and West, and the cross motion and Napoleon's motion both seek summary judgment on the third-party claim for contractual indemnification against Napoleon.